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Abstract
In this thesis, delay and security issues in network coding are considered. First, we study the delay
incurred in the transmission of a xed number of packets through acyclic networks comprised of
erasure links. The two transmission schemes studied are routing with hop-by-hop retransmissions,
where every node in the network simply stores and forwards its received packets, and linear coding,
where nodes mix their packets by forwarding linear combinations of all their previously received
packets. We show that even though the achievable rates of coding and routing are the same, network
coding can have an increasingly better performance than routing as the number of packets increases.
Secondly, we investigate the security benets of network coding. We investigate the achievable
secrecy rate region in a general network of noisy wiretap channels with general communication
demands. The eavesdropper has access to an unknown set of links, and on the wiretapped links
observes a degraded version of the intended receiver's observation. While characterizing the capacity
in general is an open problem, in the noise-free case there exist inner and outer bounds. In the noisy
case, we show how one can change any of the wiretap channels to a noiseless degraded broadcast
channel, so that the derived network's rate region bounds, and under certain conditions is equivalent,
to that of the initial network. Specically, we showed that in case the eavesdropper can choose
only a single link to wiretap at each time, then one can change all the links in the network with
corresponding noiseless ones, creating an equivalent noiseless secrecy problem. In the case where
the eavesdropper can wiretap multiple links simultaneously, we derive upper and lower bounding
noiseless network problems.
Finally, we consider design practical code design for the detection of adversarial errors in a
distributed storage system. We build on work of functions that can fool linear polynomials to create
and communicate hash functions of the data in order to detect with high probability the maliciously
attacked nodes in the system.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis studies problems related to transmission delay and security in network scenarios with
coding. It builds on classical information theory as well as the more recent eld of network coding.
Both these elds consider the use of coding operations in order to characterize and approach fun-
damental limits of performance in various communication scenarios, the former focusing on general
noisy channels and the latter on networks of simple channels. Among the performance objectives
of interest in network communications, throughput, latency and security are some of the most im-
portant. While throughput (capacity) has been extensively studied for various channel models and
network structures, relatively less is known so far about latency and security in networks.
The rst problem in this thesis analyzes le transmission delay on unreliable networks, which is a
more detailed performance metric compared to throughput. Specically, in a network of erasure links
with a single source and a single destination we examine the expected time it takes to send a xed
number of packets from the source to the destination. Previous work has shown that when hop by
hop feedback is unavailable, network coding is necessary to achieve the maximum throughput in the
network [1]. Although in the case of a single unicast transmission both network coding and routing
with hop-by-hop feedback and retransmissions achieve capacity, we show that in terms of latency,
network coding outperforms routing, and give an analytical characterization of the performance gap.
The other two problems we investigate deal with the security benets of network coding. Long
gone, are the days where networks had purely academic interest and all users were legitimate. In
todays world, computer network fall victims of malicious attacks from adversaries ranging in power
and computation resources from a single user to rogue nations. In network that carry sensitive
information it is of paramount importance to send the maximum possible information while ensuring
that there is no leakage to any potential wiretapper, and in the rst of the two problems we are
concerned with the secure rate region of general network with generic demands in the presence of
an eavesdropper.
In the second problem we deal with the detection of malicious attacks in a distributed storage
system using coding. In recent years, the demand for large-scale data storage has increased signi-
2cantly, with applications like social networks, le, and video sharing demanding access and security
for storing massive amounts of data. Distributed storage systems introduce redundancy to increase
reliability and use coding since it has reduced storage requirements than simple replication [2].
However when coding is used, the distributed storage system is particularly vulnerable to malicious
attacks. Due to the mixing operations used for the reconstruction of the initial information, even a
small number of attacked nodes can compromise the whole system, making the detection of those
contagious nodes of paramount importance. We derive a detection scheme that uses hash functions
and the communication of a logarithmic number of bits to identify compromised nodes.
1.1 Background and Related Work
1.1.1 Network Coding
Ahlswede et al. [3] introduced network coding for the class of multicast problems, where one source
wishes to transmit the same information to all receivers in the network. They showed that the
traditional approach of storing and forwarding packets might not to be sucient to achieve the
multicast rate when there are multiple receivers. Instead intermediate nodes should in general
forward functions of their incoming packets in order to achieve the min-cut of the network, which
is the maximum information rate that can be achieved. Work by [4] showed that propagating
linear combinations (linear network coding) suces to achieve the same rate region and an algebraic
framework for linear network coding was presented in [5]. Authors in [6] gave the rst polynomial
time design algorithms for linear network codes.
Further Ho et al. [7] showed that with a suciently large eld size the linear combinations of
network coding can be chosen randomly in a distributed manner, and achieve the maximum ow
capacity with high probability in a practical and decentralized manner with low design complexity.
Practical network coding protocols have further been developed [8, 9]. Creating random linear
combinations of packets in a network have been proved to be robust against packet losses [1] as
mixing packets together act as an erasure code introducing redundancy in the network. Authors
in [10] used vector spaces spanned by the transmitted packets as codewords and developed an error-
correction code for a noncoherent network model in the form of rank metric codes.
Dimakis et al. [2] used network coding to develop distributed storage codes with ecient storage
requirements and optimal repair characteristics that by far surpass simple replication. Further
research [11, 12] was devoted to the development of regenerating codes, or the exact repair of the
just the systematic part of the code [13]. Related to distributed storage, network coding has been
proved to have supreme characteristics in le sharing systems [14, 15].
31.1.2 Information Theoretic Security
Shannon [16] set the foundations for the mathematical treatment of secrecy and cryptography and
was the rst to dene the notion of information theoretic security. Later Wyner [17] found the
maximum secure achievable rate for a point-to-point channel in the presence of a wiretapper. Much
work have been devoted since then, with varying degrees of success, to derive results on more
complicated networks involving multiple nodes interconnected together. Csiszar and Korner [18]
analyzed the case of a broadcast channel with both a condential and a public message; a variation
of this problem appears in [19]. A natural generalization of these settings was the model for secret-
key agreement [20].
Relating network coding to secrecy and network security, Cai and Yeung [21] studied the maxi-
mum rate at which information can be reliably sent without information leakage to an eavesdropper
that observes all messages traversing a limited but unknown subset of links. A similar problem
where only the input vector is modied is considered in [22]. In [23, 24] Cui, Ho and Kliewer show
that nding the capacity of the secure network communication problem is NP hard for the case of
unequal capacity links. Dierent notions of security are introduced in [25, 26].
1.2 Thesis Outline and Contributions
The thesis outline and contributions are as follows. In Chapter 2 we look at the expected delay to
send a given number n of packets through networks of erasure channels. Unlike existing results [1,
27, 28] on network coding over lossy networks that focus on the rate region achieved by network
coding, the expected time to send a number of packets through a network has not been completely
characterized. The expected time to complete a transmission reveals sublinear characteristics of
the network that are not shown in the achievable rates. We show that in the case of a parallel
path network the gap between the expected transmission time of network coding versus hop-by-hop
retransmissions can grow as
p
n despite that the two transmission schemes achieve the same rates.
Moreover closely related work on delay in queueing theory [29, 30] assumes Poisson arrivals and
their results pertain to the delay of individual packets in steady state, our analysis does not involve
any assumptions about reaching steady state.
In Chapter 3 we connect two separate but related bodies of literature: that of the wiretap
channels by Wyner [17] and the eld of secure network coding introduced by Cai and Yeung [21].
Building on the equivalence approach of [31, 32], we derive upper and lower bounds for the secrecy
capacity region of noisy networks composed of degraded \simultaneously maximizeable" wiretap
channels. Simultaneously maximizeable channels are those for which the same input distribution
maximizes the mutual information to the intended receiver and the eavesdropper. For the case
where the eavesdropper can choose to wiretap at most one channel at a time, the upper and lower
4bounds are tight, and thus an equivalence holds between the noisy network and a network where
each eavesdropped link is replaced by a set of noiseless channels. This may come as a surprise
since in [31, 32] tight bounds cannot be found for networks with multiuser channels. One reason
for this is that unlike [31, 32] the receiver of the degraded output is an eavesdropper and has no
decoding requirements. For the case where the eavesdropper can access multiple channels at the
same time, the upper and lower bounds are shown to be generally loose and it is still an open
problem whether one can nd noiseless channels that would emulate a noisy channel in the case of
multiple eavesdropped channels. Both the upper and the lower bounds apply to general networks
with general multiple multicast demands, even when the actual capacity region is unknown.
In Chapter 4 we study the security of a distributed storage system and derive a detection scheme
to detect compromised nodes. We use pseudorandom small-bias generators used in [33] for a general
eld size and create almost perfectly random sequences that can fool any linear function. Eectively
we take projections of the data stored in the distributed storage system with random vectors and
convey the result to a central node that uses the existing redundancy of the code to detect all
attacked nodes. Our work makes no assumption for the computational capabilities of the attacker,
and we ensure detection with high probability as long as the number of attacked nodes are within
the capabilities of the code used.
5Chapter 2
On the Delay Advantage of Coding
in Packet Erasure Networks
This chapter considers the block delay for unicasting a le consisting of n packets over a packet
erasure network with probabilistic erasures. Such networks have been extensively studied from the
standpoint of capacity. Various schemes involving coding or retransmissions have been shown to
be capacity-achieving for unicasting in networks with packet erasures, e.g. [28, 1, 34, 35]. For a
capacity-achieving strategy, the expected block delay for transmitting n packets is nC +D(n) where
C is the minimum cut capacity and the delay function D(n) is sublinear in n but diers in general
for dierent strategies. In general networks, the optimal D(n) is achieved by random linear network
coding, in that decoding succeeds with high probability for any realization of packet erasure events
for which the corresponding minimum cut capacity is n1. However, relatively little has been known
previously about the behavior of the delay function D(n) for coding or retransmission strategies.
In this paper, we analyze the delay function D(n) for random linear network coding (coding for
short) as well as an uncoded hop-by-hop retransmission strategy (routing for short) where only one
copy of each packet is kept in intermediate node buers. Schemes such as [36, 35] ensure that there is
only one copy of each packet in the network; without substantial non-local coordination or feedback,
it is complicated for an uncoded topology-independent scheme to keep track of multiple copies of
packets at intermediate nodes and prevent capacity loss from duplicate packet transmissions. We
also assume that the routing strategy xes how many packets will traverse each route a priori based
on link statistics, without adjusting to link erasure realizations. While routing strategies could
dynamically re-route packets under atypical realizations, this would not be practical if the min-cut
links are far from the source. On the other hand, network coding allows redundant packets to be
transmitted eciently in a topology-independent manner, without feedback or coordination, except
for an acknowledgment from the destination when it has received the entire le. As such, network
1The eld size and packet length are assumed in this paper to be suciently large so that the probability of rank-
decient choices of coding coecients can be neglected, along with the fractional overhead of specifying the random
coding vectors.
6coding can fully exploit variable link realizations. These dierences result in a coding advantage in
delay function D(n) which, as we will show, can be unbounded with increasing n.
A major technical challenge in the analysis of the delay function for the routing strategy in-
volves computing the expectation of the maximum of two independent negative binomial random
variables. This problem has been previously studied in [37], where authors explain in detail why
it is complicated2 and derive an approximate solution to the problem. Our analysis addresses this
open problem by nding an exact expression and showing that it grows to innity at least as the
square root of n.
Related work on queuing delay in uncoded [29, 30] and coded [38] systems has considered the case
of random arrivals and their results pertain to the delay of individual packets in steady state. This
diers from our work which considers the delay for communicating a xed size batch of n packets
that are initially present at the source.
2.1 Main Results
For a line network, the capacity is given by the worst link. We show a nite bound on the delay
function that applies to both coding and the routing scheme when there is a single worst link.
Theorem 1. Consider n packets communicated through a line network of ` links with erasure prob-
abilities p1; p2; : : : ; p` where there is a unique worst link:
pm := max
1i`
pi; pi < pm < 1 8 i 6= m:
The expected time ETn to send all n packets either with coding or routing is:
ETn =
n
1  max
1i`
pi
+D(n; p1; p2; : : : ; p`); (2.1)
where the delay function D(n; p1; p2; : : : ; p`) is non-decreasing in n and upper bounded by:
D(p1; p2; : : : ; p`) :=
X`
i=1;i6=m
pm
pm   pi :
If on the other hand there are two links that take the worst value, then the delay function is
not bounded but still exhibits sublinear behavior. Pakzad et al. [27] show that in the case of a
line network with identical links, the optimal delay function grows as
p
n. This is achieved by both
2Authors in [37] deal with the expected maximum of any number of negative binomial distributions but the
diculty remains even for two negative binomial distributions.
7coding and the routing strategy3.
In contrast, for parallel path networks, we show that the delay function behaves quite dierently
for the coded and uncoded schemes.
Theorem 2. The expected time ET cn taken to send n packets using coding over a k-parallel path
multi-hop network is
ET cn =
n
k  
kX
i=1
max
1j`
pij
+Dcn
where the delay function Dcn depends on all the erasure probabilities pij, for i 2 f1; : : : ; kg, 1  j  `.
In the case where there is single worst link in each path Dcn is bounded, i.e. D
c
n 2 O(1) whereas if
there are multiple worst links in at least one path then Dcn 2 O(
p
n). The result holds regardless of
any statistical dependence between erasure processes on dierent paths.
Theorem 3. The expected time ET rn taken to send n packets through a k-parallel path network by
routing is
ET rn =
n
k  
kX
i=1
max
1j`
pij
+Drn (2.2)
where the delay function Drn depends on all the erasure probabilities pij, for i 2 f1; : : : ; kg, 1  j  `
and grows at least as
p
n, i.e. Drn 2 
(
p
n).
The above results on parallel path networks generalize to arbitrary topologies. We dene single-
bottleneck networks as networks that have a single min-cut.
Theorem 4. In a network of erasure channels with a single source S and a single receiver T the
expected time ET rn taken to send n packets by routing is
ET rn =
n
C
+ D^rn
where C is the capacity of the network and D^rn 2 
(
p
n). In the case of network coding the expected
time ET cn taken to send n packets is
ET rn =
n
C
+ D^rn
where D^cn 2 O(1) for single-bottleneck networks.
3The result in [27] is derived for the routing strategy which is delay-optimal in a line network; as discussed above,
coding in a suciently large eld is delay-optimal in any network.
8We also prove the following concentration result:
Theorem 5. The time T cn for n packets to be transmitted from a source to a sink over a network of
erasure channels using network coding is concentrated around its expected value with high probability.
In particular for suciently large n:
Pr [jT cn   ET cnj > n] 
2C
n
+ o

1
n

; (2.3)
where C is the capacity of the network and n represents the corresponding deviation and is equal to
n = n
1=2+=C,  2 (0; 1=2).
Since ET cn grows linearly in n and the deviations n are sublinear, T cn is tightly concentrated
around its expectation for large n with probability approaching one. Subsequent to our initial
conference publications [39, 40], further results on delay for line networks have been obtained by [41,
42].
2.2 Model
We consider a network G = (V; E) where V denotes the set of nodes and E = V  V denotes the set
of edges or links. We assume a discrete time model, where at each time step each node v 2 V can
transmit one packet on its outgoing edges. For every edge e 2 E each transmission succeeds with
probability 1 pe or the transmitted packet gets erased with probability pe; erasures across dierent
edges and time steps are assumed to be independent. In our model, in case of a success the packet
is assumed to be transmitted to the next node instantaneously, i.e. we ignore the transmission delay
along the links. We assume that no edge fails with probability 1 (i.e. pe < 1 for all e 2 E) since in
such a case we can remove that edge from the network.
Within network G there is a single source S 2 V that wishes to transmit n packets to a single
destination T in G. We investigate the expected time it takes for the n packets to be received by T
under two transmission schemes, network coding and routing. When network coding is employed,
each packet transmitted by a node v 2 V is a random linear combination of all previously received
packets at the node v. The destination node T decodes once it has received n linearly independent
combinations of the initial packets. When routing is employed, the number of packets transmitted in
each path is xed ahead of the transmission, in such a way that the expected time for all n packets
to reach destination T is minimized.
All nodes in the network are assumed to have suciently large buers to store the necessary
number of packets to accommodate the transmission scheme. In the case of routing, we assume an
automatic repeat request (ARQ) scheme with instantaneous feedback available on each hop. Thus, a
node can drop a packet that has been successfully received by the next node. For the case of coding,
9Figure 2.1: Multi-hop line network
as explained in [43], information travels through the network in the form of innovative packets, where
a packet is innovative for a node v if it is not in the linear span of packets previously received by
v. For simplicity of analysis, we assume that a node can store up to n linearly independent packets;
smaller buers can be used in practice4. Feedback is not needed except when the destination T
receives all the information and signals the end of transmission to all nodes. Our results hold
without any restrictions on the number of packets n or the number of edges in the network, and
there is no requirement for the network to reach steady state.
2.3 Line Networks
The line network under consideration is depicted in Figure 2.1. The network consists of ` links Li,
1  i  ` and `+ 1 nodes Nj , 0  j  `. Node Nj , 0  j  `  1 is connected to node Nj+1 to its
right through the erasure link Lj+1, where we assume that the source S and the destination T are
also dened as nodes N0 and N` respectively. The probability of transmission failure on each link
Li is denoted by pi.
For the case of a line network there is no dierence between network coding and routing in the
expected time it takes to transmit a xed number of packets. Note that coding at each hop (network
coding) is needed to achieve minimum delay in the absence of feedback, whereas coding only at the
source is suboptimal in terms of throughput and delay [1].
Proof of Theorem 1. By using the interchangeability result on service station from Weber [45], we
can interchange the position of any two links without aecting the departure process of node N` 1
and therefore the delay function. Consequently, we can interchange the worst link in the queue
(which is unique from the assumptions of Theorem 1) with the rst link, and thus we will assume
that the rst link is the worst link (p2; p3; : : : ; p` < p1 < 1).
Note that in a line network, under coding the subspace spanned by all packets received so far at
a node Ni contains that of its next hop node Ni+1, similarly to the case of routing where the set
of packets received at a node Ni is a superset of that of its next hop node Ni+1. Let the random
variable Rni ; 1  i  `   1; denote the rank dierence between node Ni and node Ni+1, at the
moment packet n arrives at N1. This is exactly the number of packets present at node Ni that
4By the results of [44], the buer size needed for coding is no larger than that needed for routing.
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are innovative for Ni+1 (which for brevity we refer to simply as innovative packets at node Ni in
this proof) at the random time when packet n arrives at N1. For any realization of erasures, the
evolution of the number of innovative packets at each node is the same under coding and routing.
The time Tn taken to send n packets from the source node S to the destination T can be expressed
as the sum of time T
(1)
n required for all the n packets to cross the rst link and the time n required
for all the remaining innovative packets Rn1 ; : : : ; R
n
` 1 at nodes N1; : : : ; N` 1 respectively to reach
the destination node T :
Tn = T
(1)
n + n:
All the quantities in the equation above are random variables and we want to compute their expected
values. Due to the linearity of the expectation
ETn = ET (1)n + En (2.4)
and by dening X
(1)
j ; 1  j  n to be the time taken for packet j to cross the rst link, we get:
ET (1)n =
nX
j=1
EX(1)j =
n
1  p1 (2.5)
since X
(1)
j ; 1  j  n; are all geometric random variables (Pr

X
(1)
j = k

= (1   p1)  pk 11 ; k  1).
Therefore combining equations (2.4) and (2.5) we get:
ET (1)n =
n
1  p1 + En: (2.6)
Equations (2.1), (2.6) give
D(n; p1; p2; : : : ; p`) = En
which is the expected time taken for all the remaining innovative packets at nodes N1; : : : ; N` 1 to
reach the destination. For the simplest case of a two-hop network (` = 2) we can derive recursive
formulas for computing this expectation for each n. Table 2.3 has closed-form expressions for the
delay function D(n; p1; p2) for n = 1; : : : ; 4. It is seen that as n grows, the number of terms in the
above expression increases rapidly, making these exact formulas impractical, and as expected for
larger values of ` ( 3) the situation only worsens. Our subsequent analysis derives tight upper
bounds on the delay function D(n; p1; p2; : : : ; p`) for any ` which do not depend on n.
The (`  1)-tuple Yn = (Rn1 ; : : : ; Rn` 1) representing the number of innovative packets remaining
at nodes N1; : : : ; N` 1 at the moment packet n arrives at node N1 (including packet n) is a multi-
dimensional Markov process with state space E  N ` 1 (the state space is a proper subset of N ` 1
11
Table 2.1: The delay function D(n; p1; p2) for dierent values of n
n D(n; p1; p2)
1 11 p2
2 21 p2   11 p1p2
3
1+p2(2 p1(6 p1+(2 5p1)p2+(1 3(1 p1)p1)p22))
(1 p2)(1 p1p2)3
4

1 + p2(3   p1(11 + 4p41p42 + p2(5 + (5   p2)p2) + p31p2(1   p2(5 + 2p2(5 + 3p2)))
 p1(4 + p2(15 + p2(21   (1   p2)p2))) + p21(1   p2(1   p2(31 + p2(5 + 4p2))))))

(1 p2)(1 p1p2)5
since Yn can never take the values (0; ; : : : ; ) where the  represents any integer value). Using the
coupling method [46] and an argument similar to the one given at Proposition 2 in [47] it can be
shown that Yn is a stochastically increasing function of n (meaning that as n increases there is a
higher probability of having more innovative packets at nodes N1; : : : ; N` 1).
Proposition 1. The Markov process Yn = (R
n
1 ; : : : ; R
n
` 1) is st-increasing.
Proof. Given in Appendix A along with the necessary denitions.
A direct result of Proposition 1 is that the expected time taken En for the remaining innovative
packets at nodes N1; : : : ; N` 1 to reach the destination is a non-decreasing function of n:
En  En+1  lim
n!1En (2.7)
where the second inequality is meaningful when the limit exists.
Innovative packets travelling in the network from node N1 to the destination node T can be
viewed as customers travelling through a network of service stations in tandem. Indeed, each inno-
vative packet (customer) arrives at the rst station (node N1) with a geometric arrival process and
the transmission (service) time is also geometrically distributed. Once an innovative packet has been
transmitted (serviced) it leaves the current node (station) and arrives at the next node (station)
waiting for its next transmission (service).
It is helpful to assume the rst link to be the worst one in order to use the results of Hsu and Burke
in [48]. The authors proved that a tandem network with geometrically distributed service times and
a geometric input process, reaches steady state as long as the input process is slower than any of
the service times. Our line network is depicted in Figure 2.1 and the input process (of innovative
packets) is the geometric arrival process at node N1 from the source S. Since p2; p3; : : : ; p` < p1 the
arrival process is slower than any service process (transmission of the innovative packet to the next
hop) and therefore the network in Figure 2.1 reaches steady state.
Sending an arbitrarily large number of packets (n ! 1) makes the problem of estimating
12
Figure 2.2: Two parallel multi-hop line networks having links with dierent erasure probabilities
lim
n!1En
5 the same as calculating the expected time taken to send all the remaining innovative
packets at nodes N1; : : : ; N` 1 to reach the destination T at steady state. This is exactly the
expected end-to-end delay for a single customer in a line network that has reached equilibrium. This
quantity has been calculated in [49] (page 67, Theorem 4.10) and is equal to
lim
n!1En =
X`
i=2
p1
p1   pi : (2.8)
Combining equations (2.7) and (2.8) and changing p1 to pm := max pi < 1 concludes the proof of
Theorem 1.
2.4 k-parallel Path Network
We dene the k-parallel path network as the network depicted in Figure 2.2. This network consists
of k parallel multi-hop line networks (paths) with k` nodes and k` links, with ` links in each path
(our results are readily extended to networks with dierent number of links in each path). Each
node Ni(j 1) is connected to the node Nij on its right by a link Lij , for i 2 f1; : : : ; kg and 1  j  `
where for consistency we assume that the source S and the destination T are dened as nodes Ni0
and Ni`, i 2 f1; : : : ; kg, respectively.
For the case of routing with retransmissions, the source S divides the n packets between the
dierent paths so that the time taken to send all the packets is minimized in expectation. This
is accomplished by having the number of packets that cross each path to be proportional to the
capacity of the path. Indeed, if the source S sends n1; : : : ; nk number of packets though each path
then according to Theorem 1 the expected time to send these packets is ni1 p1i +Dni , i 2 f1; : : : ; kg,
5If the network was not reaching a steady state the above limit would diverge.
13
where Dni are bounded delay functions. The values ni are chosen so that the linear terms of the
above expected values are equal, i.e. n11 p11 = : : : =
nk
1 pk1 and n1 + : : : + nk = n. Therefore the
choice of
ni =
n(1  pi1)
k  
kX
i=1
pi1
; i 2 f1; : : : ; kg (2.9)
minimizes the expected time to send the n packets. Therefore from now on, when routing is per-
formed, source S is assumed to send n(1  pi1)=(k  
Pk
i=1 pi1) over each path i.
6
2.4.1 Coding Strategy
Figure 2.3: A network of k parallel erasure links with erasure probabilities q1; : : : ; qk connecting
source S and destination T .
Before we analyze the expected time ET cn taken to send n packets through the network in Fig-
ure 2.2 using coding (where the c superscript stands for coding), we prove the following proposition
that holds for the simplied network of k parallel erasure links connecting the source to the desti-
nation as in Figure 2.3.
Proposition 2. The expected time ET^ cn taken to send by coding n packets from source S to desti-
nation T through k parallel erasure links with erasure probabilities q1; : : : ; qk respectively is
ET^ cn =
n
k  Pki=1 qi +Bn
where Bn is a bounded term. This relation holds regardless of any statistical dependence between the
erasure processes on dierent links.
Proof. We dene A0; A1; : : : ; Ak to be the probabilities of having 0; 1; : : : ; k links succeed at a specic
6To simplify the notation we will assume that all numbers n(1   pi1)=(k  
Pk
i=1 pi1) are integers. Our results
extend to the case that those numbers are not integers by rounding them to the closest integer.
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time instance. The recursive formula for ET^ cn is:
ET^n = A0  (ET^ cn + 1) +A1  (ET^ cn 1 + 1) + : : :+Ak  (ET^ cn k + 1)
, (1 A0)  ET^n = A1  ET^n 1 + : : :+Ak  ET^n k + 1 (2.10)
where ET^m = 0 for m  0 and the last term in (2.10) is obtained from the relation
Pk
i=0Ai = 1.
The general solution of (2.10) is given by the sum of a homogeneous solution and a special
solution. A special solution for the non-homogeneous recursive equation (2.10) is linear D  n where
after some algebra D = 1=(A1 + 2A2 + : : : + kAk), which is the inverse of the expected number of
links succeeding in a given instant. Therefore D = 1=(k  Pki=1 qi), independent of any statistical
dependence between erasures on dierent links.
The homogeneous solution of linear recurrence relation with constant coecients (2.10) can be
expressed in terms of the roots of the characteristic equation p(x) = (1 A0)xk A1xk 1 : : : Ak [50,
Section 3:2]. We will prove that the characteristic equation has x = 1 as a root and all the other
roots have absolute value less than 1. Indeed since A0+ : : :+Ak = 1) (1 A0) A1  : : : Ak = 0,
therefore x = 1 is a root of p(x); now assume that x = 1 is a multiple root of p(x). Then
p0(1) = 0 , k(1 A0)  (k   1)A1   : : : Ak 1 = 0
, k(1 A0)  (k   1)A1   : : :  (k   (k   1))Ak 1 = 0
, k = k(A0 +A1 + : : :+Ak 1) A1   2A2   : : :  (k   1)Ak 1
, k = k(1 Ak) A1   2A2   : : :  (k   1)Ak 1
, k = k   (A1 + 2A2 + : : :+ kAk)
, 0 = A1 + 2A2 + : : :+ kAk
, k = p1 + p2 + : : :+ pk
This implies that all links fail with probability 1, which contradicts the assumption from Section 2.2
that no link fails with probability 1. Assume now that characteristic equation p(x) has a complex root
x = rei where jxj > 1 or equivalently r > 1. Dene f(x) = xk and g(x) = A0xk+A1xk 1+: : :+Ak
then p(x) = 0 is equivalent to f(x) = g(x) but this last equality cannot hold since jg(x)j < jf(x)j
for jxj > 1. Indeed jg(x)j  A0jxjk +A1jxjk 1+ : : :+Ak = A0rk +A1rk 1+ : : :+Ak < (A0+A1+
: : :+Ak)r
k = rk = jf(x)j.
Let R =

r : p(r) = 0
	
be the set of all roots of p(x). The general solution for recursion formula
(2.10) is
ET^ cn =
n
k  Pki=1 qi +
X
rj2R
Fjr
n
j cos(n  j) +
X
rj2R
Gjr
n
j sin(n  j):
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We can set
Bn =
X
rj2R
Fjr
n
j cos(n  j) +
X
rj2R
Gjr
n
j sin(n  j) (2.11)
and since jBnj 
X
rj2R
jFj j+ jGj j this concludes our proof.
Now we are ready to prove the following theorem for the k-parallel path network shown in
Figure 2.2.
Proof of Theorem 2. As discussed in the proof of Theorem 1, by using the results of [45] we can
interchange the position of the rst link of each path with one of the worst links of the path without
aecting the arrival process at the receiver T . Therefore without loss of generality we will assume
that the rst link in each path is one of the worst links in the path. Also, as in the proof of
Theorem 1, for brevity we refer to packets present at a node Ni that are innovative for the next hop
node Ni+1 as innovative packets at node Ni.
The time T cn taken to send n packets from source S to the destination T in Figure 2.2 can be
expressed as the sum of the time T^ cn required for all n packets to reach one of nodes N11; : : : ; Nk1
and the remaining time ~T cn required for all innovative packets remaining in the network to reach the
destination T , i.e.
T cn = T^
c
n + ~T
c
n: (2.12)
As in the proof of Theorem 1 all quantities in equation (2.12) are random variables and we want to
compute their expected values. Due to linearity of expectation,
ET cn = ET^ cn + E ~T cn; (2.13)
where by Proposition 2,
ET^ cn =
n
k  
kX
i=1
pi1
+Bn (2.14)
where Bn is bounded. This holds regardless of any statistical dependence between the erasure
processes on the rst link of each path, and the remainder of the proof is unaected by any statistical
dependence between erasure processes on dierent paths.
The time E ~T cn required to send all the remaining innovative packets at nodes Nij (i 2 f1; : : : ; kg,
j 2 f2; : : : ; `   1g) to the destination is less than the expected time E~ it would have taken if all
the remaining innovative packets were returned back to the source S and sent to the destination T
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using only the rst path. Let Rij denote the number of remaining innovative packets at node Nij at
the moment the nth packet has arrived at one of the k nodes N11; : : : ; Nk1. Then the total number
of remaining innovative packets R is R =
kX
i=1
` 1X
j=1
Rij and the expected time E~ is upper bounded
by
E~ = E [E (~ jR)] 
X`
j=1
ER
1  p1j : (2.15)
where ER=(1  p1j) is the expected time taken for R packets to cross the jth hop in the rst path.
By combining the fact that E ~T cn  E~ with equations (2.13) and (2.14) we get
ET cn =
n
k  
kX
i=1
pi1
+Dcn (2.16)
where Dcn is upper bounded by
Dcn  Bn +
X`
j=1
ER
1  p1j :
By Proposition 1, the number of remaining innovative packets at each node of each path is a
stochastically increasing random variable with respect to n. Therefore, the expected number of
remaining packets is an increasing function of n. Consequently one can nd an upper bound on
ERij by examining the line network in steady state, or equivalently, as n! +1. For the case where
the rst link of each path is the unique worst link of the path, as shown in [48], each line network
will reach steady state and consequently E(R) 2 O(1). If there are multiple worst links in at least
one path, then ER 2 O(pn). This can be seen by interchanging the positions of links such that the
worst links of each path are positioned at the start. By the results of [27], the number of innovative
packets remaining at nodes positioned between two such worst links is O(
p
n). By the results of [48],
the number of innovative packets remaining at other intermediate network nodes is O(1).
Substituting p1i with max
1j`
pij for i 2 f1; : : : ; kg in equation (2.16) concludes the proof.
2.4.2 Routing Strategy
In this section we analyze the expected time ET rn taken to send n packets through the parallel path
network in Figure 2.2 using routing (where the r superscript stands for routing). We rst prove the
following two propositions.
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Proposition 3. For a; b; c1; c2 2 N+ with a < b the sum
bX
m=a
c1  m
c2 +m
is equal to:
bX
m=a
c1  m
c2 +m
= a  b  1 + (c1 + c2) (Hc2+b  Hc2+a 1) (2.17)
where Hn is the n
th Harmonic number, i.e. Hn =
nX
i=1
1
i
.
Proof.
bX
m=a
c1  m
c2 +m
= c1
bX
m=a
1
c2 +m
 
bX
m=a
m
c2 +m
= c1 (Hc2+b  Hc2+a 1) 
bX
m=a
m
c2 +m
(2.18)
Where
bX
m=a
m
c2 +m
can be evaluated as follows:
b  a+ 1 =
bX
m=a
c2 +m
c2 +m
, b  a+ 1 = c2
bX
m=a
1
c2 +m
+
bX
m=a
m
c2 +m
,
bX
m=a
m
c2 +m
= b  a+ 1  c2 (Hc2+b  Hc2+a 1) (2.19)
So from equations (2.18) and (2.19) we conclude that:
bX
m=a
c1  m
c2 +m
= a  b  1 + (c1 + c2) (Hc2+b  Hc2+a 1)
Consider the network of Figure 2.3 with k = 2 parallel erasure links. As shown in equation
(2.9) in order to minimize the expected completed time the routing strategy sends n(1 q1)2 q1 q2 packets
over the rst link and n(1 q2)2 q1 q2 packets over the second link. Proposition 4 examines this expected
transmission time under routing.
Proposition 4. The expected time ET^ rn taken to send by routing n packets from the source to the
destination through two parallel erasure links with probabilities of erasure q1 and q2 respectively is
ET^ rn =
n
2  q1   q2 + U
q1;q2
n
where Uq1;q2n is an unbounded term that grows at least as square root of n. The term routing means
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that out of the n packets, n(1 q1)2 q1 q2 packets are transmitted through the link with q1 probability of
erasure and n(1 q2)2 q1 q2 packets through the link with q2 probability of erasure.
Proof. Denote by Ai;j the expected time to send i packets over the link with erasure probability
q1 and j packets over the link with erasure probability q2. Clearly ET^ rn = Ai;j with i =
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2 ,
j = n(1 q2)2 q1 q2 . Ai;j satises the following two dimensional recursion formula:8>>><>>>:
Ai;j = q1q2[Ai;j + 1] + (1  q1)q2[Ai 1;j + 1]
+q1(1  q2)[Ai;j 1 + 1] + (1  q1)(1  q2)[Ai 1;j 1 + 1]
Ai;0 =
i
1 q1 ; A0;j =
j
1 q2 ; A0;0 = 0
9>>>=>>>;
or equivalently 8>>><>>>:
(1  q1q2)Ai;j = (1  q1)q2Ai 1;j + q1(1  q2)Ai;j 1
+(1  q1)(1  q2)Ai 1;j 1 + 1
Ai;0 =
i
1 q1 ; A0;j =
j
1 q2 ; A0;0 = 0
9>>>=>>>; : (2.20)
The two dimensional recursion formula in (2.20) has a specic solution i2(1 q1)+
j
2(1 q2) and a general
solution Bi;j where 8>>><>>>:
(1  q1q2)Bi;j = (1  q1)q2Bi 1;j + q1(1  q2)Bi;j 1
+(1  q1)(1  q2)Bi 1;j 1; i; j  1
Bi;0 =
i
2(1 q1) ; B0;j =
j
2(1 q2) ; B0;0 = 0
9>>>=>>>; : (2.21)
In order to solve equation (2.21) we will use the Z{transform with respect to i. More specically
we dene the Z{transform as:
B^z;j =
1X
i=0
Bi;j  zi: (2.22)
By multiplying all terms in equation (2.21) by zi and summing over i we get:
(1  q1q2)
1X
i=1
Bi;j  zi = (1  q1)q2
1X
i=1
Bi 1;j  zi + q1(1  q2)
1X
i=1
Bi;j 1  zi
+(1  q1)(1  q2)
1X
i=1
Bi 1;j 1  zi
, (1  q1q2)
h
B^z;j  B0;j
i
= z(1  q1)q2B^z;j + q1(1  q2)
h
B^z;j 1  B0;j 1
i
+z(1  q1)(1  q2)B^z;j 1:
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Table 2.2: Some pairs of functions along with their Z{transforms
Sequence Z{transform
1
1
1  z
i
z
(1  z)20@ i+ j   t  1
j   1
1A
bi+j t
zt
(b  z)j , for t  j
Since B0;j =
j
2(1 q2) the above equation becomes:8>>><>>>:
[(1  q1q2)  z(1  q1)q2] B^z;j = [q1(1  q2) + z(1  q1)(1  q2)] B^z;j 1
+j 1 q12(1 q2) +
q1
2
B^z;0 =
P1
i=0Bi;0z
i =
P1
i=0
i
2(1 q1)z
i = z2(1 q1)(1 z)2
9>>>=>>>; (2.23)
where equation (2.23) is an one dimensional recursion formula with the following general solution [50,
Section 3:2]:
B^z;j =
z
(1  q1)(1  z)2

q1(1  q2) + z(1  q1)(1  q2)
1  q1q2   z(1  q1)q2
j
+
j
2(1  q2)(1  z)  
z
2(1  q1)(1  z)2 : (2.24)
Equation (2.24) can be written in a compact form
B^z;j = a^(z)  b^(j; z) + d^(j; z) (2.25)
by dening the functions a^(z), b^(z; j) and d^(z; j) as follows:
a^(z) =
z
(1  q1)(1  z)2
b^(z; j) =

q1(1  q2) + z(1  q1)(1  q2)
1  q1q2   z(1  q1)q2
j
d^(z; j) =
j
2(1  q2)(1  z)  
z
2(1  q1)(1  z)2 :
Now we are ready to compute the inverse Z{transform of B^z;j . Using Table 2.2 along with
equation (2.25):
Bi;j = Z
 1
n
a^(z)  b^(z; j)
o
+ Z 1
n
d^(z; j)
o
20
, Bi;j =
iX
m=0
a(i m)  b(m; j) + j
2(1  q2)  
i
2(1  q1)
where a(i) and b(i; j) are the inverse Z{transforms of a^(z) and b^(z; j) respectively. From Table 2.2
a(i) = i1 q1 and therefore the equation above becomes
Bi;j =
iX
m=0
i m
1  q1 b(m; j) +
j
2(1  q2)  
i
2(1  q1) : (2.26)
The remaining step in order to compute Bi;j is to evaluate b(i; j):
b(i; j) = Z 1
(
q1(1  q2) + z(1  q1)(1  q2)
1  q1q2   z(1  q1)q2
j)
=
1
[(1  q1)q2]j  Z
 1
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Pj
t=0
0@ j
t
1A zt(1  q1)t(1  q2)t[q1(1  q2)]j t

1 q1q2
(1 q1)q2   z
j
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
=

q1(1  q2)
q2(1  q1)
j jX
t=0
0@ j
t
1A  1  q1
q1
t
 Z 1
8><>: z
t
1 q1q2
(1 q1)q2   z
j
9>=>;
=
(q1(1  q2))j((1  q1)q2)i
(1  q1q2)i+j
jX
t=0
0@ j
t
1A0@ i+ j   t  1
j   1
1A1  q1q2
q1q2
t
:
Therefore equation (2.26) becomes
Bi;j=

q1(1  q2)
1  q1q2
j iX
m=0
jX
t=0
i m
1  q1

(1  q1)q2
1  q1q2
m0@ j
t
1A0@ m+ j   t  1
j   1
1A1  q1q2
q1q2
t
+
j
2(1  q2)  
i
2(1  q1)
and since the expected time Ai;j = Bi;j +
i
2(1 q1) +
j
2(1 q2) then
Ai;j =

q1(1  q2)
1  q1q2
j iX
m=0
jX
t=0
i m
1  q1

(1  q1)q2
1  q1q2
m0@ j
t
1A0@ m+ j   t  1
j   1
1A1  q1q2
q1q2
t
+
j
1  q2 :
(2.27)
We are interested in evaluating ET^ rn = Ai;j for i =
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2 and j =
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 and therefore from
equation (2.27) we get
ET^ rn =
n
2  q1   q2 + U
q1;q2
n
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where
Uq1;q2n =

q1(1  q2)
1  q1q2
 n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2X
m=0
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2X
t=0
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2  m
1  q1

(1  q1)q2
1  q1q2
m0@ n(1 q2)2 q1 q2
t
1A0@ m+ n(1 q2)2 q1 q2   t  1
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2   1
1A1  q1q2
q1q2
t
with
0@ m
w
1A = 0 if m < w. If we dene W = (1 q1)q21 q1q2 , E = q1(1 q2)1 q1q2 and F = 1 q1q2q1q2 , then the
above expression can be written more compactly as
Uq1;q2n = E
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2X
m=0
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2X
t=0
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2  m
1  q1
0@ n(1 q2)2 q1 q2
t
1A0@ n(1 q2)2 q1 q2 +m  t  1
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2   1
1AWmF t:
In order to prove that function Uq1;q2n is unbounded we will prove that U
q1;q2
n is larger than another
simpler to analyze function that goes to innity and therefore Uq1;q2n also increases to innity. Indeed
the equation above can be written as
Uq1;q2n = E
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2X
m=0
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2X
t=0
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2  m
1  q1
0@ n(1 q2)2 q1 q2
t
1A0@ n(1 q2)2 q1 q2 +m  t
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2
1A n(1 q2)2 q1 q2
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 +m  t
WmF t
>
n(1  q2)E
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2
(1  q1)(2  q1   q2)
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2X
m=0
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2X
t=0
0@ n(1 q2)2 q1 q2
t
1A0@ n(1 q2)2 q1 q2 +m  t
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2
1A n(1 q1)2 q1 q2  m
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 +m
WmF t
and since all terms in the above double sum are non-negative we can disregard as many terms as we
wish without violating direction of the inequality, specically
Uq1;q2n >
n(1  q2)E
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2
(1  q1)(2  q1   q2)
X
m2J;t2G
0@ n(1 q2)2 q1 q2
t
1A0@ n(1 q2)2 q1 q2 +m  t
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2
1A n(1 q1)2 q1 q2  m
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 +m
WmF t(2.28)
where J = fd n(1 q1)2 q1 q2 (1  1pn )e; : : : ;
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2 g, G = fd(1 q1)
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 (1  1pn )e; : : : ; b(1 q1)
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 cg
and bxc, dxe are the oor and the ceiling functions respectively.
By using the lower and upper Stirling-based bound [51]:
p
2n
n
e
n
< n! <
p
2n
n
e
n
e
1
12n ; n  1
one can nd that 0@ n
n
1A> 1p
2(1  )n  2
nH()  e  112n(1 ) ;  2 (0; 1)
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and 0@ n
n
1A >s 
2(    1)n  2
nH

1


 e 

12n(  1) ;  > 1
where H() =   log2()  (1 ) log2(1 ) is the entropy function and therefore using inequality
(2.28) we can derive:
Uq1;q2n >
1
2(1  q1)
X
m2J;t2G
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2  m
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 +m
f

m
M
;
t
T

e
  2 q1 q2
12n(1 q2)h(
m
M ;
t
T )2
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 g(
m
M ;
t
T ) (2.29)
where M = n(1 q1)2 q1 q2 , T =
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 , f(; ) =
s
1+
1 q1
1 q2 
(1 )( 1 q11 q2 )
, h(; ) =
1+
1 q1
1 q2 

1 q1
1 q2 
+ 1(1 ) and
g(; ) = log2(E) + 
1  q1
1  q2 log2 (W ) +H() + (1 + 
1  q1
1  q2   )H
 
1
1 +  1 q11 q2   
!
+  log2(F ):
Since 1   1p
n
 mM  1 and (1   q1)   1pn  tT  (1   q1) we dene functions f(; ), h(; ) and
g(; ) within the region N =
h
1  1p
n
; 1
i

h
1  q1   1pn ; 1  q1
i
. Moreover we are only concerned
with large enough n so that 0 <  <  and region N looks like the one in Figure 2.4. For large
values of n, f(; ) >
q
1
2q1(1 q1) and h(; ) < 1+
2(1 q2)
(1 q1)q2 +
2
q1(1 q1) within region N and therefore
from inequality (2.29) we get:
Uq1;q2n >
1p
82q1(1  q1)3
e
  2 q1 q2
12n(1 q2) (1+
2(1 q2)
(1 q1)q2+
2
q1(1 q1) )
X
m2J;t2G
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2  m
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 +m
2
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 g(
m
M ;
t
T )
>
e 1p
82q1(1  q1)3
X
m2J;t2G
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2  m
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 +m
2
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 g(
m
M ;
t
T ) (2.30)
for large enough n.
Function g(; ) satises the following three conditions:
1. @g@ =
1 q1
1 q2 log2

W (1 q1)+(1 )(1 q2)(1 q1) (1 q2)

and @g@ = log2

F (1 )[(1 q1) (1 q2)]
[(1 q1)+(1 )(1 q2)]

2. @
2g
@2 =   (1 q1)
2
[(1 q1) (1 q2)][(1 q1)+(1 )(1 q2)] ln 2 < 0
3. @
2g
@2  @
2g
@2   @
2g
@@  @
2g
@@ =
(1 q1)2
(1 )[(1 q1)+(1 )(1 q2)][(1 q1) (1 q2)](ln 2)2 > 0
It's easy to see from condition 1 that @g(;)@

(1;1 q1)
= 0 and @g(;)@

(1;1 q1)
= 0. Moreover
conditions 2 and 3 show the concavity of g(; ) within region N and along with condition 1 it is
proved that function g(; ) achieves a maximum at point (; ) = (1; 1  q1). Therefore g(; ) 
g(1; 1  q1) = 0 making the exponent of 2 in (2.30) non-positive guaranteeing an exponential decay
of each term in the sum. Since region N is compact (closed and convex) and function g(; ) is
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Figure 2.4: The region N where function g(; ) is dened on.
concave, and therefore it will achieve its minimum on the boundary of N . It's not dicult to show
that @g(;1 q1)@  0 for   1 and therefore function g(; 1   q1) decreases in value from point I
to point IV. Similarly @g(1;)@  0 for   1   q1 and therefore function g(1; ) decreases in value
from point I to point II. Since @g(;1 q1 1=
p
n)
@  0 for a  1 and @g(1 1=
p
n;)
@  0 for   1   q1
with similar arguments as above we show that the minimum value for g(; ) within N is achieved
at point C  (m; m) = (1   1pn ; 1   q1   1pn ). Therefore g
 
k
n ;
i
n
  g (m; m) or else from
equation (2.30):
Uq1;q2n >
e 1(1  q2)
p
n
(2  q1   q2)
p
82q1(1  q1)
2
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 g(am;m)
X
m2J
n(1 q1)
2 q1 q2  m
n(1 q2)
2 q1 q2 +m
Using the Taylor expansion of function r(x) = g(1   x; 1   q1   x) around x = 0 we get the
following expression:
f(x) =
q21(q2   q1)  q2(1  q21)
(1  q1)q1q2(1  q1q2) ln 2x
2 + O(x3):
For x = 1p
n
we get
n(1  q2)
2  q1   q2 g (m; m) =
(1  q2)
 
q21(q2   q1)  q2(1  q21)

(2  q1   q2)(1  q1)q1q2(1  q1q2) ln 2 + O

1p
n

where along with Proposition 3 we get
Uq1;q2n >
e 1(1  q2)
p
n
(2  q1   q2)
p
82q1(1  q1)
2
(1 q2)(q21(q2 q1) q2(1 q21))
(2 q1 q2)(1 q1)q1q2(1 q1q2) ln 2+
cp
n t(n) (2.31)
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where t(n) = n
 
Hn  Hn k(n) 1
   k(n)   1 and k(n) = Apn with A = (1 q1)2 q1 q2 . The above
expression can be simplied by using the bounds proved by Young in [52]:
lnn+  +
1
2(n+ 1)
< Hn < lnn+  +
1
2n
where  is the Euler's constant. We obtain from (2.31):
Uq1;q2n >
e 1(1  q2)
p
n
(2  q1   q2)
p
82q1(1  q1)
2
(1 q2)(q21(q2 q1) q2(1 q21))
(2 q1 q2)(1 q1)q1q2(1 q1q2) ln 2+
cp
n(n) (2.32)
where (n) = n ln

n
n k(n) 1

  n2(n+1) k(n)+2n k(n) 1   k(n)   1. It can be easily proved that function
!(n) = n ln

n
n k(n) 1

  k(n)  1 is greater than A22 for n > 1. Indeed
!00(n) =
A(A2 + 3)n+ 2(A2 + 2)
p
n+A
4(n Apn  1)2n3=2 > 0 for n > 1 (2.33)
and since lim
n!+1!
0(n) = 0 it means that !0(n) < 0 for n > 1 and therefore !(n) is a decreasing
function of n > 1. Moreover
lim
n!+1!(n) = limn!+1
ln

n
n k(n) 1

  k(n)n
1
n
  1 L'Hospital= lim
n!+1
k(n)
n2 +
k2(n)
n2 +
2
n
  1n2 (2 + 2k(n)  2n)
  1 = A
2
2
and therefore !(n) > A
2
2 for n > 1. Finally inequality (2.32) becomes
Uq1;q2n >
e 1(1  q2)
p
n
(2  q1   q2)
p
82q1(1  q1)
2
(1 q2)(q21(q2 q1) q2(1 q21))
(2 q1 q2)(1 q1)q1q2(1 q1q2) ln 2+
cp
n
 
1
2

1  q1
2  q1   q2
2
  n
2(n+ 1)
k(n) + 2
n  k(n)  1
!
:
Clearly the above function is unbounded and Uq1;q2n increases with respect to n at least as
p
n.
Now we have all the necessary tools to prove the following theorem for k-parallel path multi-hop
networks as shown in Figure 2.2.
Proof of Theorem 3. Without loss of generality due to [45] we can interchange the rst link of each
of the k line networks with the worst link of the line network. The rst term in equation (2.2) is
due to the capacity of the k parallel multi-hop line network. The second term Drn is sublinear in
n; what is left to prove is that term Drn grows as 
(
p
n). This follows from Proposition 4. The
number of packets transmitted on the rst two paths is n1 = n

1  max
1i`
p1i
.
k  
kX
i=1
max
1j`
pij

and n2 = n

1   max
1i`
p2i
.
k  
kX
i=1
max
1j`
pij

respectively. The time T rn taken to send n packets
through the k-parallel path multi-hop network is greater than the time T^ rn taken for n1 packets to
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reach node N11 and n2 packets to reach node N21. Therefore from Proposition 4
ET rn >
n
k  
kX
i=1
max
1j`
pij
+ U
max1i` p1i;max1j` p2j
n0 :
where n0 = n

2  max
1i`
p1i   max
1i`
p2i
.
k 
kX
i=1
max
1j`
pij

is proportional to n. By Proposition 4,
U
max1i` p1i;max1j` p2j
n0 grows as 
(
p
n0). Thus, Drn grows as 
(
p
n).
2.5 General Network Topologies
We next consider networks with general topologies.
Lemma 1. In a single-bottleneck network, there exists a max-ow subgraph comprising paths each
of which has a single worst link.
Proof. Given a network G = (V; E) with a single minimum cut, let (v1; w1); : : : ; (vk; wk) be the edges
crossing the minimum cut. Let G0 be a max ow subgraph. Consider the network G   G0 obtained
from G by reducing the capacity of each link (i; j) 2 E by the capacity of the corresponding link
in G0 if any. There is a path from the source to each node vi; 1  i  k (which may not all be
distinct), otherwise this would contradict the assumption that there is a single minimum cut. Thus,
we can nd a subgraph G00 comprising a set of paths of nonzero and nonoverlapping capacity from
the source to each distinct node vi; 1  i  k. Similarly, we can nd a subgraph G000 comprising a set
of paths of nonzero and nonoverlapping capacity from each distinct node wi; 1  i  k, to the sink.
We can then decompose the union of subgraphs G0 + G00 + G000 (obtained by adding the capacities of
corresponding links) into a suciently large number of paths each of which has a single worst link
corresponding to the min cut of the original network.
Proof of Theorem 4. The expected time ET rn required to send all n packets by routing through
network G from source S to destination T is greater than the time E T rn it would take the n packets
to cross the mincut of the network by routing. Specically if we assume that all nodes on the source's
side of the cut are collapsed into a super source node and all nodes on the sink's side of the cut are
collapsed into a super destination node then the network becomes a parallel erasure links network
as shown in Figure 2.3. Then
ET rn  E T rn =
n
C
+Drn
where Drn 2 
(
p
n) by Theorem 3.
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Figure 2.5: (a) Network G with a single source S, a single destination T , an intermediate node A,
and four erasure links 1, 2, 3, and 4 with probabilities of erasure 0:5, 0:4, 0:8, 0:9 respectively. (b)
The solution of the linear program on network G would give us three rates 1 = 0:5, 2 = 0:2, and
3 = 0:1. (c) Network G^ derived from the solution of the linear program
For the case of coding on a network G, for any max-ow subgraph (composed of ows on paths
from source S to destination T ), one can construct a parallel path network G^ that requires at least
as much time to send the n packets from the source to the destination.
Denote by F the set of source-sink ows in the max-ow subgraph. For each ow f 2 F , let f
denote the ow rate and let Pf denote the path of ow f . For each node v 2 V in network G, let
Kv denote the set of ows passing through node v, where KS and KT are equal to the sets of all
ows in network G. For each edge e 2 E let Fe denote the set of ows passing through edge e. For
the example in Figure 2.5(b), F = f1; 2; 3g, 1 = 0:5, 2 = 0:2, 3 = 0:1, P1 = S ! T for ow
1, P2 = S ! A ! T for ow 2, and P3 = S ! A ! T for ow 3, KA = f2; 3g, and F1 = f1g,
F2 = f2; 3g, F3 = f2g, and F4 = f3g.
The process of creating network G^ = (V^; E^) from G is the following.
1. For every node v 2 G, create a set of nodes V^v =

v^f : f 2 Kv
	
. The set of nodes V^ is dened
as
[
v2V
V^v.
2. The edges of network G^ are created as follows. For each ow f 2 F and for each edge (u; v) in
path Pf of ow f , create an edge in network G^ from u^f to v^f with probability of erasure
p^(u^f ;v^f ) = 1 
fX
w2F(u;v)
w
(1  p(u;v))
where p(u;v) is the probability of erasure of link (u; v) in network G. Dene a function
H
 
(u^f ; v^f )

=
fP
w2Fu;v) w
.
3. Collapse all nodes of set VS to a single node S^ that denotes the source in network G^, and
27
collapse all nodes of set VT to a single node T^ that denotes the destination in network G^.
The process above splits every node v 2 V into Kv separate nodes and splits every edge e 2 E
into jFej separate edges. The sum of capacities of all edges that edge e is split into is equal to the
capacity of edge e. The result of applying this procedure to network N of Figure 2.5(b) is shown
in Figure 2.5(c). In network G^ erasure events on dierent links are not independent but correlated
as follows. For every edge (u; v) 2 E , denote by C(u;v) =

(u^; v^) 2 E^ : v^ 2 Ku; m^ 2 Kv
	
the set
of edges in G^ that are derived from edge (u; v) 2 E . The erasures on all edges in set C(u;v) are not
independent but correlated as follows. At each time step, with probability 1   p(u;v) one edge in
set C(u;v) succeeds, or all fail with probability p(u;v). In the case of a success, edge e^ 2 C(u;v) is the
single successful edge with probability He^.
The time taken T^ cn for the n packets to travel through network G^ by coding is at least as large
as the time T cn taken in network G, i.e.
ET cn  ET^ cn: (2.34)
Indeed network G^ can be emulated by network G if each node v 2 G has jKvj dierent buers and
packets between dierent buers are not mixed. By construction, networks G and G^ have the same
capacity and since G^ is a parallel path network, the mincut of network G^ passes through the worst
link of each path. According to Theorem 2
ET^ cn =
n
C
+ D^cn (2.35)
where D^cn 2 
(
p
n) when there are multiple worst links in at least one path or D^cn 2 O(1) when
there is a single worst link at each path. For a single-bottleneck network, by Lemma 1, one can
construct a max-ow subgraph comprising paths each of which has a single worst link, so D^cn 2 O(1).
Equations (2.34), (2.35) conclude our proof.
2.6 Proof of Concentration
Here we present a martingale concentration argument. In particular we prove a slightly stronger
version of Theorem 5:
Theorem 6 (Extended version of Theorem 5). The time T cn for n packets to be transmitted from a
source to a sink over a network of erasure channels using network coding is concentrated around its
expected value with high probability. In particular for suciently large n:
Pr[jT cn   ET cnj > n] 
2C
n
+
2Cn2
n2   n1+2 :
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where C is the capacity of the network and n represents the corresponding deviation and is equal to
n = n
1=2+=C,  2 (0; 1=2).
Proof. The main idea of the proof is to use the method of Martingale bounded dierences [53]. This
method works as follows: rst we show that the random variable we want to show is concentrated
is a function of a nite set of independent random variables. Then we show that this function
is Lipschitz with respect to these random variables, i.e. it cannot change its value too much if
only one of these variables is modied. Using this function we construct the corresponding Doob
martingale and use the Azuma-Hoeding [53] inequality to establish concentration. See also [54, 55]
for related concentration results using similar martingale techniques. Unfortunately however this
method does not seem to be directly applicable to T cn because it cannot be naturally expressed as a
function of a bounded number of independent random variables. We use the following trick of showing
concentration for another quantity rst and then linking that concentration to the concentration of
T cn.
Specically, we dene Rt to be the number of innovative (linearly independent) packets received
at the destination node T after t time steps. Rt is linked with T cn through the equation:
T cn = arg
t
(Rt = n): (2.36)
The number of received packets is a well dened function of the link states at each time step. If
there are L number of links in network G, then:
Rt = g(z11; :::; z1L; : : : ; zt1; :::; ztL):
The random variables zij ,1  i  t and 1  j  L, are equal to 0 or 1 depending on whether link j
is OFF or ON at time i. If a packet is sent on a link that is ON, it is received successfully; if sent on
a link that is OFF, it is erased. It is clear that this function satises a bounded Lipschitz condition
with a bound equal to 1:
jg(z11; :::; z1L; :::; zij ; :::; zt1; :::; ztL) 
g(z11; :::; z1L; :::; z
0
ij ; :::; zt1; :::; ztL)j  1:
This is because if we look at the history of all the links failing or succeeding at all the t time slots,
changing one of these link states in one time slot can at most inuence the received rank by one.
We note that we assume that coding is performed over a very large eld to ensure that every packet
that could potentially be innovative due to connectivity, indeed is.
Using the Azuma-Hoeding inequality (see the Appendix Theorem 7) on the Doob martingale
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constructed by Rt = g(z11; :::; z1L; :::; zt1; :::; ztL) we get following the concentration result:
Proposition 5. The number of received innovative packets Rt is a random variable concentrated
around its mean value:
Pr(jRt   ERtj  "t)  1
t
where "t
:
=
r
tL
2
`n(2t): (2.37)
Proof. Given in Appendix B.
Using this concentration and the relation (2.36) between T cn and Rt we can show that deviations
of the order "t
:
=
q
tL
2 `n(2t) for Rt translate to deviations of the order of n = n
1=2+=C for T cn. In
Theorem 6 smaller values  give tighter bounds that hold for larger n. Dene the events:
Ht = fjRt   ERtj < "tg
and
Ht = fjRt   ERtj  "tg
and further dene tun (u stands for upper bound) to be some t, ideally the smallest t, such that
ERt   "t  n and tln (l stands for lower bound) to be some t, ideally the largest t, such that
ERt + "t  n. Then we have:
Pr(T cn  tun) = Pr(T cn  tunjHtun)  Pr(Htun)
+ Pr(T cn  tunjHtun)  Pr(Htun)
where:
 Pr(T cn  tunjHtun) = 0 since at time t = tun the destination has already received more than
n innovative packets. Indeed given that Htun holds: n  ERtun   "tun < Rtun where the rst
inequality is due to the denition of tun.
 Pr(Htun)  1
 Pr(T cn  tunjHtun)  1
 Pr(Htun)  1tun due to equation (2.37).
Therefore:
Pr(T cn  tun) 
1
tun
: (2.38)
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Similarly:
Pr(T cn  tln) = Pr(T cn  tlnjHtln)  Pr(Htln)
+ Pr(T cn  tlnjHtln)  Pr(Htln)
where:
 Pr(T cn  tlnjHtln) = 0 since at time t = tln the destination has already received less than
n innovative packets. Indeed given that Htln holds: Rtun < ERtun + "tun < n where the last
inequality is due to the denition of tln.
 Pr(Htln)  1
 Pr(T cn  tlnjHtln)  1
 Pr(Htln)  1tln due to equation (2.37).
Therefore:
Pr(T cn  tln) 
1
tln
: (2.39)
Equations (2.38) and (2.39) show that the random variable T cn representing the time required for
n packets to travel across network G exhibits some kind of concentration between tln and tun, which
are both functions of n. As shown in Lemma 2 in Appendix B, for large enough n a legitimate choice
for tln and t
u
n is the following:
tun = (n+ n
1=2+0)=C; 0 2 (0; 1=2) (2.40)
tln = (n  n1=2+
0
)=C; 0 2 (0; 1=2) (2.41)
From both (2.38) and (2.39):
Pr(tln  T cn  tun) = 1  Pr(T cn  tln)  Pr(T cn  tun)
 1  1
tln
  1
tun
(2.42)
and by substituting in (2.42) the tun, t
l
n from equations (2.40) and (2.41) we get:
Pr( n
1=2+0
C
 T cn  
n
C
 n
1=2+0
A
)  1 
C
n  n1=2+0  
C
n+ n1=2+0
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and since ET cn = nC + O(
p
n) we have:
Pr(jT cn   ET cnj 
n1=2+
C
)  1  2C
n
  2Cn
2
n2   n1+2
or
Pr(jT cn   ET cnj >
n1=2+
C
)  2C
n
+
2Cn2
n2   n1+2
where  > 0 and this concludes the proof.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Denition 1. A binary relation  dened on a set P is called a preorder if it is reexive and
transitive, i.e. 8a; b; c 2 P :
a  a (reexivity) (A.1)
(a  b) ^ (b  c)) a  c (transitivity) (A.2)
Denition 2. On the set N ` 1 of all integer (`   1)-tuples we dene the regular preorder  that
is 8a; b 2 N ` 1 a  b i a1  b1; : : : ; a` 1  b` 1 where a = (a1; : : : ; a` 1) and b = (b1; : : : ; b` 1).
Similarly we can dene the preorder .
Denition 3. A random vector X 2 N ` 1 is said to be stochastically smaller in the usual stochastic
order than a random vector Y 2 N ` 1, (denoted by X st Y ) if: 8! 2 N ` 1, Pr(X  !)  Pr(Y 
!).
Denition 4. A family of random variables fYngn2N is called stochastically increasing (st-increasing)
if Yk st Yn whenever k  n.
Proof of Proposition 1. Markov process fYn; n  1g, is a multidimensional process on E = N ` 1
representing the number of innovative packets at nodes N1; : : : ; N` 1 when packet n arrives at N1.
To prove that the Markov process fYn; n  1g is stochastically increasing we introduce two other
processes fXn; n  1g and fZn; n  1g having the same state space and transition probabilities as
fYn; n  1g.
More precisely, Markov process fYn; n  1g is eectively observing the evolution of the number
of innovative packets present at every node of the tandem queue. We dene the two new processes
fXn; n  1g and fZn; n  1g to observe the evolution of two other tandem queues having the same
link failure probabilities as the queue of fYn; n  1g.
As seen in Figure A.1, at each time step and at every link, the queues for fXn; n  1g and
fZn; n  1g either both succeed or a fail together. Moreover the successes or failures on each link
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Figure A.1: Multi-hop network with the corresponding Markov chains
on the queues observed by fXn; n  1g and fZn; n  1g are independent of the successes or failures
on the queue observed by fYn; n  1g. Formally the joint process f(Xn; Zn); n  1g constitute a
coupling meaning that marginally each one of fXn; n  1g and fZn; n  1g have the transition
matrix PrY of fYn; n  1g. If Markov processes fXn; n  1g and fZn; n  1g have dierent initial
conditions then the following relation holds:
X1  Z1 ) Xn  Zn (A.3)
The proof of the above statement is very similar to the proof of Proposition 2 in [47]. Essentially
relation (A.3) states that since at both queues all links succeed or fail together the queue that holds
more packets at each node initially (n = 1) will also hold more packets subsequently (n > 1) at
every node.
The initial state Y1 of Markov process fYn; n  1g is state  = (1; 0; : : : ; 0) that is also called
the minimal state since any other state is greater than the minimal state. To prove Proposi-
tion 1 we set both processes fYn; n  1g and fXn; n  1g to start from the minimal state
(Y1
D
= ; X1
D
=  where
D
= means equality in distribution), whereas process fZn; n  1g has initial
distribution  that is the distribution of process fYn; n  1g after (n k) steps ( = Prn kY  and Z1 D=).
Then for every ! in the state space of fYn; n  1g we get:
Pr(Xn  !) = Pr(Yn  !) = Pr(Zk  !) (A.4)
where the rst equality holds since the two processes have the same distribution{both start from
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the minimal element and have the same transition matrices{and the second equality holds since
Zk
D
=PrkY   PrkY (Prn kY ) = PrnY  D=Yn:
Moreover due to the denition of the minimal element, X1  Z1 and using (A.3) we get Xn  Zn.
Therefore
Pr(Zk  !)  Pr(Xk  !) = Pr(Yk  !): (A.5)
The last equality follows from the fact that the two distributions have the same law. Equations
(A.4) and (A.5) conclude the proof.
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 5
Denition 5. A sequence of random variables V0; V1; : : : is said to be a martingale with respect
to another sequence U0; U1; : : : if, for all n  0, the following conditions hold:
 E[jVnj] <1
 E[Vn+1jU0; : : : ; Un] = Vn
A sequence of random variables V0; V1; : : : is called martingale when it is a martingale with respect
to itself. That is:
 E[jVnj] <1
 E[Vn+1jV0; :::; Vn] = Vn
Theorem 7. (Azuma-Hoeding Inequality): Let X0, X1,...,Xn be a martingale such that
Bk  Xk  Xk 1  Bk + dk
for some constants dk and for some random variables Bk that may be a function of X0; :::; Xk 1.
Then for all t  0 and any  > 0,
Pr(jXt  X0j  )  2 exp
 
  2
2Pt
i=1 d
2
i
!
Proof. Theorem 12.6 in [53]
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is based on the fact that from a sequence of random variables
U1; U2; : : : ; Un and any function f it's possible to dene a new sequence V0; : : : ; Vn8<: V0 = E[f(U1; : : : ; Un)]Vi = E[f(U1; : : : ; Un)jU1; : : : ; Ui]
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that is a martingale (Doob martingale). Using the identity E[V jW ] = E[E[V jU;W ]jW ] it's easy to
verify that the above sequence V0; : : : ; Vn is indeed a martingale. Moreover if function f is c-Lipschitz
and U1; : : : ; Un are independent it can be proved that the dierences Vi  Vi 1 are restricted within
bounded intervals [53] (pages 305-306).
Function Rt = g(z11; :::; ztL) has a bounded expectation, is 1-Lipschitz and the random variables
zij are independent and therefore all the requirements of the above analysis hold. Specically by
setting
Gh = E[g(z11; :::; ztL) j z11; :::; zkr| {z }]
h-terms in total
we can apply the Azuma-Hoeding inequality on the G0; :::; GtL martingale and we get the following
concentration result
Pr[jGtL  G0j  ] = Pr[jRt   E[Rt]j  ]  2 expf 2
2
tL
g: (B.1)
The equality above holds since
 G0 = E[Rt]
 GtL = Rt (the random variable itself)
and by substituting on (B.1)  with "t
:
=
q
tL
2 `n(2t)
Pr[jRt   E[Rt]j  "t]  1
t
Lemma 2. A legitimate choice for tun and t
l
n is:
tun = (n+ n
1=2+0)=C; 0 2 (0; 1=2)
tln = (n  n1=2+
0
)=C; 0 2 (0; 1=2)
Proof. For any t  n=C, the expected number of received packets ERt is given by ERt = Ct  r(t),
where C is the capacity of the network and r(t) can be bounded as follows. Letting nt = Ct  n,
we have
E(T cnt) = E(E(T
c
nt jr(t)))
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= E(t+ O(r(t)))
= t+ O(r(t))
which by Theorem 4 implies that r(t) should be O(
p
nt)  O(
p
n).
The only requirement for tun is that it is a t such that ERt  t  n. This is indeed true for large
enough n if we substitute tun with (n+ n
1=2+0)=C:
E[Rtun ]  tun  n) Ctun   r(tun)  tun  n) Ctun   r(tun) 
r
Ltun
2
ln(2tun)  n
) C  n+ n
1=2+0
C
  r(tun) 
r
L(n+ n1=2+0)
2C
ln(
2(n+ n1=2+0)
C
)  n: (B.2)
Since r(t) 2 O(pn) there is a constant B > 0 such that r(t)  Bpn and therefore in order for
(B.2) to hold it is sucient if
n+ n1=2+
0  Bpn 
r
L(n+ n1=2+0)
2C
ln(
2(n+ n1=2+0)
C
)  n
) n1=2+0 
r
L(n+ n1=2+0)
2C
ln(
2(n+ n1=2+0)
C
) +B
p
n
) n1=2+0  pn
r
L(1 + n0 1=2)
2C
ln(
2(n+ n1=2+0)
C
) +B
p
n
) n0 
r
L(1 + n0 1=2)
2C
ln(
2(n+ n1=2+0)
C
) +B
where the last equation holds for large enough n.
Similarly it can be proved that tln can be substituted with (n   n1=2+
0
)=C such that for large
n, ERt + t  n.
38
Chapter 3
Network Equivalence in the
Presence of an Eavesdropper
3.1 Introduction
The problem of secure (secret) communication in the presence of an eavesdropper has been studied
using a variety of approaches. One body of literature studies the secure capacity of the wiretap
channel introduced by Wyner in [17]. In this model, the eavesdropper's observation is a degraded
version of the legitimate receiver's observation, and the goal of secure communication is to maximize
the rate at which information can be reliably delivered to the legitimate receiver without information
leakage to the eavesdropper. Another body of literature investigates the secure capacity of networks
of noise-free links. Under this model, introduced by Cai and Yeung in [21], an eavesdropper perfectly
observes all messages traversing a restricted but unknown subset of links. The goal again is to
maximize the rate at which information can be reliably delivered to the intended receiver(s) without
information leakage to the eavesdropper. The results of [21] treat multicast networks with equal
capacity links; various extensions appear in [22, 56]. In [23, 24] Cui, Ho, and Kliewer show that
nding the capacity of the secure network communication problem is NP hard for the case of unequal
capacity links; the paper therefore gives some achievable coding strategies without proving whether
those bounds are tight.
This paper aims to build a bridge between the wiretap channel and secure network coding
literatures. While conceptually related, the two elds have evolved largely independently. The rst
paper on the capacity of a network of wiretap channels is [57], which nds upper and lower bounds
on the unicast capacity of a network of independent erasure channels when the output observed by
the eavesdropper equals that of the intended receiver on all wiretapped channels. This paper also
considers the problem of secure communication over a network of independent wiretap channels. For
our work, the channels are physically degraded, \simultaneously maximizable" wiretap channels (see
Denition 6 in Section 3.2), which include the erasure channels of [57] as a special case. We further
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generalize the model from [57] by broadening the focus from unicast capacity to a consideration
of complete capacity regions. The \capacity region," dened formally in Section 3.2, refers to the
set of all vectors of simultaneously achievable rates under all possible combinations of unicast and
multicast connections. In our model, the eavesdropper wiretaps a limited but unknown subset of
channels and for each eavesdropped link overhears a possibly degraded version of the received channel
output at the intended link output. Our central result shows that the secure capacity region for
any network of such channels can be bounded from above and below by the secure network coding
capacity regions of a corresponding pair of noiseless networks. In the case where the eavesdropper
has access to only one link, the identity of which is unknown to the code designer, the upper and
lower bounds on the secure network coding capacity are identical. This result gives an equivalence in
the sense that the capacity regions of the noiseless and noisy networks are identical for all possible
topologies and all possible connection types that can be established across the network. When
the eavesdropper has access to more than one link, the upper and lower bounds dier, giving new
achievability results and converses for cases where the secure network coding problem can be solved.
Using these bounding and equivalence results, secure network coding capacity bounds can be applied
to bound the secure capacity of a network of wiretap channels.1 The bounding relationship between
the secrecy capacity region for noisy wiretap networks and noise-free wiretap networks is derived
by generalizing the techniques developed by Koetter, Eros, and Medard in [31, 32], which show
similar capacity bounds in the absence of secrecy constraints.
3.2 Network Model
The following description denes terminology and notation for a network of independent wiretap
channels and its secure capacity under a given restricted adversarial model. Consider a network
G = (V; E), where V is the set of nodes and E  V  V  N is a set of directed \edges" between
pairs of nodes in the network. For the purposes of this work, edge (i; j; k) represents the kth wiretap
channel through which node i communicates to node j and through which an eavesdropper may or
may not be listening. The total number of nodes in the network ism, and each node i 2 V transmits,
at each time step t, a random variable X
(i)
t 2 X (i) and receives a random variable Y (i)t 2 Y(i). The
sets X (i) and Y(i) are the input and output alphabets of the outgoing and incoming channels,
respectively, at node i; we consider both discrete and continuous alphabets. The indegree din(i) and
1The denitions of reliability and security used in the prior literature vary from \strong reliability" and \strong
security," where the receiver's error probability is precisely zero and the eavesdropper learns nothing about the
transmitted message (mutual information precisely equals 0) to \weak reliability" and \weak security," where the
constraints on error probability and mutual information are asymptotic in nature. We use the latter denitions, as
dened formally in Section 3.2.
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outdegree dout(i) of node i in graph G are dened as
Ein(i) = f(u; v; w) 2 E : v = ig ; din(i) = jEin(i)j
Eout(i) = f(u; v; w) 2 E : u = ig ; dout(i) = jEout(i)j :
If node i has indegree or outdegree larger than one (that is, if node i 2 V receives outputs from more
than one channel or transmits inputs to more than one channel) then
X (i) =
Y
e2Eout(i)
X (e) and Y(i) =
Y
e2Ein(i)
Y(e):
The channel inputs and outputs for node i at time t are given by
X
(i)
t =

X
(e)
t : e 2 Eout(i)

and Y
(i)
t =

Y
(e)
t : Ein(i)

:
Here X
(e)
t and Y
(e)
t denote the input to and the output from edge e, at time t, and X (e) and Y(e)
denote their alphabets.
Let P(E) denote the power set of the set of all edges. We dene a secure communication problem
by dening an adversarial set A  P(E). Each set E 2 A describes a subset of channels over which
an eavesdropper may be listening. The goal of code design is to build a code that is secure against
eavesdropping on the set of channels E for every E 2 A. When the eavesdropper listens to edge
e = (i; j; k), the eavesdropper receives, at each time t, a degraded version Z
(e)
t of the channel output
Y
(e)
t observed by the intended recipient, which is the output node j of edge e = (i; j; k). If the
eavesdropper has eavesdropping set E 2 A, then at time t it receives the set of random variables
Z
(e)
t : e 2 E

, which we compactly write as Z
(E)
t . The vector

Z
(E)
1 ; : : : ; Z
(E)
n

of observations
from all edges e 2 E over time steps t 2 f1; : : : ; ng is denoted by  Z(E)n. Similarly we dene 
X(E)
n
=
 
X
(E)
1 ; : : : ; X
(E)
n

and
 
Y (E)
n
=
 
Y
(E)
1 ; : : : ; Y
(E)
n

where X
(E)
t =

X
(e)
t : e 2 E

and
Y
(E)
t =

Y
(e)
t : e 2 E

.
For each e 2 E , channel e is a memoryless, time-invariant, physically degraded wiretap channel
described by a conditional distribution
p(y(e); z(e)jx(e)) = p(y(e)jx(e))  p(z(e)jy(e)):
All wiretap channels are independent by assumption, giving
p
 
y(E); z(E)jx(E) = Y
e2E
p
 
y(e); z(e)jx(e)) =
Y
e2E
p
 
y(e)jx(e))p z(e)jy(e)):
We further restrict our attention to channels that are \simultaneously maximizable," as dened
41
below.
Denition 6. Wiretap channel e is called simultaneously maximizable if arg

maxp(x) I(X
(e);Y (e))

=
arg

maxp(x) I(X
(e);Z(e))

.
The maximization in Denition 6 is subject to any constraints on the channel input (e.g., the
power constraint at the input to a Gaussian channel) associated with the communication network
of interest. Examples of simultaneously maximizable wiretap channels include weakly symmetric
channels and Gaussian channels. For all simultaneously maximizable wiretap channels, the following
property holds.
Lemma 3. [58, Proposition 3:4:42] Given a simultaneously maximizable wiretap channel e,
max
p(x(e))
h
I(X(e);Y (e))  I(X(e);Z(e))
i
= max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Y (e))  max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Z(e)):
Intuitively, restriction to simultaneously maximizable channels simplies our analysis since the
same input distribution maximizes an individual wiretap channel's capacity to both its intended
and unintended receivers. This property is employed in the derivations of Theorems 9 and 10 in
Section 3.4.
A code of blocklength n operates over n time steps with the goal of reliably communicating, for
each i 2 V and non-empty B  Vnfig, message
W (i!B) 2 W(i!B) def=f1; : : : ; 2nR(i!B)g
from source node i 2 V to set B  Vnfig of sink nodes in a manner that guarantees information
theoretic security in the presence of any eavesdropper E 2 A. This message delivery constitutes
a unicast connection if jBj = 1 and a multicast connection if jBj > 1. Constant R(i!B) is called
the transmission rate from source i to sink set B. By setting R(i!B) = 0 for some subset of
(i;B) pairs, we can obtain both a single unicast connection (as in [57]) and a single multicast
connection (as in [21]) as special cases of this framework. The vector of all rates R(i!B) is denoted
by R =
 
R(i!B) : i 2 V;B 2 B(i), where set B(i) = fB : B  Vnfig;B 6= ;g is the set of non-empty
receiver sets to which node i may wish to transmit. Similarly, the vector of all messages is denoted
by W =
 
W (i!B) : i 2 V;B 2 B(i). In an m-node network, vectors R and W have dimension
m(2m 1   1) since nodes send no messages to themselves or to empty sets.
In addition to all outgoing messages
 
W (i!B) : B 2 B(i), each node i 2 V is assumed to have
access to a random variable T (i) 2 T (i) def=f1; : : : ; 2nC(i)g for use in establishing random keys to
2The result is stated in [58, Proposition 3:4:4] for weakly symmetric channels, but the proof given there applies
without change to all simultaneously maximizable channels, as noted in [58, Remark 3:4:6].
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protect information from the adversary. Each T (i) is uniformly distributed on its alphabet and
independent of all messages and channel noise. Here
C(i) =
X
e2Eout(i)
max
p(x(e))
I
 
X(e);Y (e)

is the sum of the outgoing channel capacities from node i. Node i needs at most nC(i) bits of
randomness in a code of blocklength n since it could not hope to transmit any more than this even
if it dedicated all outgoing links exclusively to that communication.
Denition 7. Let a network
N def=
 Y
e2E
X (e);
Y
e2E

p(y(e)jx(e))p

z(e)jy(e)

;
Y
e2E

Y(e) Z(e)
!
be given corresponding to a graph G = (V; E). A blocklength n solution S(N ) to network N is dened
as a set of encoding and decoding functions
X
(i)
t :

Y(i)
t 1

Y
B2B(i)
W(i!B)  T (i)  ! X (i)
W (j!K;i) :

Y(i)
n

Y
B2B(i)
W(i!B)  T (i)  !W(j!K)
mapping

Y
(i)
1 ; : : : ; Y
(i)
t 1;
 
W (i!B) : B 2 B(i); T (i) to X(i)t for each i 2 V and t 2 f1; : : : ; ng and
mapping

Y
(i)
1 ; : : : ; Y
(i)
n ;
 
W (i!B) : B 2 B(i); T (i) to W (j!K;i) for each j 2 V, K 2 B(j), and i 2 K.
The solution S(N ) of blocklength n is called a (; "; A;R){solution, denoted (; "; A;R){S(N ), if the
specied encoding and decoding functions imply Pr

W (j!K;i) 6=W (j!K)

<  for every j 2 V,
K 2 B(j), and i 2 K and I   ZEn ;W  < n" for every E 2 A.
Denition 8. The A{secure rate region R(N ; A)  Rm(2m 1 1)+ of a network N is the closure of
all rate vectors R such that for any  > 0 and " > 0, a solution (; "; A;R){S(N ) exists.
Given an arbitrary network N and some channel e 2 E , the model Ne(Rc; Rp) for N , dened
similarly to [31, 32], is used in the equivalence and bounding results proved in the following sections.
Denition 9. Given a network N def=
 Y
e2E
X (e);
Y
e2E

p

y(e)jx(e)

p

z(e)jy(e)

;
Y
e2E

Y(e) Z(e)
!
and some channel e 2 E, Ne(Rc; Rp) replaces arbitrary degraded wiretap channel
Ce =
 X (e); p(y(e)jx(e))p(z(e)jy(e));Y(e) Z(e)
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: (a) A noisy degraded broadcast channel e. (b) A noiseless degraded broadcast channel
with rates Rc +Rp and Rp toward the regular and degraded output respectively.
with the noiseless degraded wiretap channel
C(Rc; Rp) =

f0; 1gRc+Rp ;  y(e)   (x(e);c; x(e);p) z(e)   y(e);p; f0; 1gRc+Rp  f0; 1gRp
that delivers the rate-Rc condential portion x
(e);c of channel input x(e) = (x(e);c; x(e);p) to the
intended receiver and the rate-Rp public portion x
(e);p of that input to both the intended receiver and
the eavesdropper. The resulting network is given by
Ne(Rc; Rp) def=
0@f0; 1gRc+Rp  Y
e2Enfeg
X (e);  y(e)   (x(e);c; x(e);p) z(e)   y(e);p

Y
e2Enfeg

p(y(e)jx(e)) p

z(e)jy(e)

; f0; 1gRc+Rp  f0; 1gRp 
Y
e2Enfeg

Y(e) Z(e)
1A :
Figure 3.1 illustrates wiretap channel Ce and noiseless model Ce(Rc; Rp) from Denition 9. The
given noiseless wiretap channel is physically degraded since wiretap output Z(e) = Y (e);p is condi-
tionally independent of input X(e) =
 
X(e);c; X(e);p

given intended output Y (e) = (Y (e);c; Y (e);p).
It is also simultaneously maximizable since independently maximizing the entropies of components
of X(e);c and X(e);p of the channel input maximizes the mutual information for both the intended
receiver and the wiretap output. As in [31, 32], we allow non-integer values of Rc and Rp to denote
noiseless bit pipes that require multiple channel uses to deliver some integer number of bits.
Many of the proofs in the sections that follow rely on the notion of a \stacked network" introduced
in [31, 32]. The stacked network dened here simply adds an eavesdropper to the stacked network
introduced in [31, 32]. Informally, the N -fold stacked network N contains N copies of network N .
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The N copies of each node i 2 V use the outgoing messages and channel outputs from all N layers
of the network to form the channel inputs in each layer of the stack. Likewise, each node uses the
channel outputs and messages from all layers in the stack in building its message reconstructions.
An eavesdropper E 2 A overhears all copies of channel e for each e 2 E.
As dened formally below, a solution for N -fold stacked network N must securely and reliably
transmit, for each i 2 V and B 2 B(i), N independent messages W (i!B)(1); : : : ;W (i!B)(N) from
node i to all the receivers in set B. Following [31, 32] we underline the variable names from N to
obtain variables for the stacked network N . Therefore W (i!B) 2 W(i!B) def=

W(i!B)
N
, T (i) 2
T (i) def=  T (i)N , X(i)t 2 X (i) def= X (i)N , Y (i)t 2 Y(i) def= Y(i)N , and Z(e)t 2 Z(e) def= Z(e)N denote
N -dimensional vectors of messages, channel inputs, channel outputs, and eavesdropper outputs
corresponding to W i!B, X(i)t , Y
(i)
t , and Z
(e)
t , respectively, in network N . The variables in the `th
layer of the stack are denoted by an argument `. For example X
(i)
t (`) is the layer-` channel input
from node i at time t. Finally, following [31, 32], we dene the rate R(i!B) for a stacked network to
be (log2 jW(i!B)j)=(nN) since any solution of blocklength n for N -fold stacked network N can be
operated as a rate-R solution of blocklength nN for network N under this denition [31, Theorem
1]. A similar argument, given in Theorem 8 below, justies the security constraint imposed in the
denition that follows.
Denition 10. Let a network
N def=
 Y
e2E
X (e);
Y
e2E

pe

y(e)jx(e)

pe

z(e)jy(e)

;
Y
e2E

Y(e) Z(e)
!
be given corresponding to a graph G = (V; E), and let an eavesdropper set A  P (E) be dened on
network N . Let N be the N -fold stacked network for N . A blocklength-n solution S(N ) to this
network is dened as a set of encoding and decoding functions
X
(i)
t :

Y(i)
t 1

Y
B2B(i)
W(i!B)  T (i)  ! X (i)
W
(j!K;i)
:

Y(i)
n

Y
B2B(i)
W(i!B)  T (i)  !W(j!K)
mapping

Y
(i)
1 ; : : : ; Y
(i)
t 1;
 
W (i!B) : B 2 B(i); T (i) to X(i)t for each i 2 V and t 2 f1; : : : ; ng and
mapping

Y
(i)
1 ; : : : ; Y
(i)
n ;
 
W (i!B) : B 2 B(i); T (i) to W (j!K;i) for each j 2 V, K 2 B(j), and i 2 K.
The solution S(N ) is called a (; "; A;R){solution for stacked network N , denoted (; "; A;R){S(N ),
if

log2
W (i!B) =(nN) = R(i!B), I Z(E)n ;W < nN" for every E 2 A, and the specied
encoding and decoding functions imply Pr

W
(j!K;i) 6=W (j!K)

< .
Denition 11. The A-secure rate region R(N ; A)  Rm(2m 1 1)+ of stacked network N is the
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closure of all rate vectors R such that for any  > 0 and any " > 0, a solution (; "; A;R){S(N )
exists for suciently large N .
Like [31, Theorem 1], Theorem 8 shows that the capacity regions for a network N and its
corresponding stacked version N are identical and that a stacked solution yields error probability
decaying exponentially to zero with the number of layers N ; in this case the capacity of interest is
the secure capacity. The denition of a stacked solution follows [31, Denition 5].
Denition 12. Let a network
N def=
 Y
e2E
X (e);
Y
e2E

pe

y(e)jx(e)

pe

z(e)jy(e)

;
Y
e2E
Y(e) 
Y
e2E
Z(e)
!
be given corresponding to a graph G = (V; E). Fix positive integers n and N to serve as the blocklength
and stack size, respectively in the denition that follow. For each i 2 V and B 2 B(i), let R(i!B)
and ~R(i!B) be constants with ~R(i!B)  R(i!B). Dene W (i!B) = f1; : : : ; 2nR(i!B)g and ~W (i!B) =
f1; : : : ; 2n ~R(i!B)g. Let N be the N -fold stacked network for N . A blocklength-n stacked solution
S(N ) to this network is dened as a set of mappings
~W
(i! B)
:W(i!B) ! ~W(i! B)
X
(i)
t :

Y(i)
t 1

Y
B2B(i)
~W(i!B)  T (i)  ! X (i)
~W (j!K;i) :

Y(i)
n

Y
B2B(i)
~W(i!B)  T (i)  ! ~W(j!K)
W (j ! K; i) : ~W(j ! K) !W(j!K)
such that channel encoder ~W
(i! B)
( ) encodes message W (i!B) to ~W (i! B), encoder X(i)t ( ) inde-
pendently encodes each dimension ` 2 f1; : : : ; Ng of outgoing messages ~W (i! B), received channel
outputs Y
(i)
1 ; : : : ; Y
(i)
t 1, and random keys T
(i) to channel input X
(i)
t , node decoder
~W (j!K;i)( ) in-
dependently decodes each dimension of the reconstruction ~W
(j ! K; i)
of ~W
(j ! K)
at node i, and
channel decoder W (j ! K; i)( ) reconstructs message vector W (j!K) as a function of ~W (j ! K), giv-
ing
~W
(i! B)
= ~W
(i! B) 
W (i!B)

X
(i)
t (`) = X
(i)
t

Y
(i)
1 (`); : : : ; Y
(i)
t 1(`);
 
~W
(i! B)
(`) : B 2 B(i); T (i)(`)
~W
(j ! K; i)
(`) = ~W (j!K;i)

Y
(i)
1 (`); : : : ; Y
(i)
n (`);
 
~W
(i! B)
(`) : B 2 B(i); T (i)(`)
W (j ! K; i) = W (j ! K; i)( ~W (j ! K; i)):
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Theorem 8. The rate regions R(N ; A) and R(N ; A) are identical. Further, there exists a sequence
of (2 N; "; A;R){S(N ) stacked solutions for the stacked network N for some  > 0.
Proof. The argument to show R(N ; A)  R(N ; A) is identical to that of [31, Theorem 1]: given
any R 2 int(R(N ; A)), a blocklength-n (; "; A;R)   S(N ) solution for network N is unraveled
across time to achieve a blocklength-nN solution for network N . Since the given code satises the
causality constraints and precisely implements the operations of S(N ), the solution S(N ) achieves
the same rate, error probability, and secrecy on N as the solution S(N ) achieves on N , which gives
the forward result.
The converse likewise follows [31, Theorem 2]. Again, x " > 0, and for any R 2 int R(N ; A)
choose ~R 2 int R(N ; A) with ~R(i!B) > R(i!B) for all (i;B) with R(i!B) > 0. Dene  =
mini2V minB2B(i)
 
~R(i!B)  R(i!B) and choose constant  > 0 satisfying
max
i2V
max
B2B(i)
~R(i!B)+ h() < :
This is possible by choosing  small enough so that  < =(3maxi2V maxB2B(i) ~R(i!B)) and h() <
=(3). Since ~R(i!B) > R(i!B), there exists a blocklength n such that a (; "3 ; A; ~R){S(N ) single-
layer solution exists. A stacked solution is built using this same (; "3 ; A;R){S(N ) single-layer
solution in each layer and a randomly chosen channel code across the layers of the stack, as described
in Denition 12. Precisely, for each W (i!B) 2 W(i!B), codeword ~W (i!B) is chosen independently
and uniformly at random from ~W(i!B). The argument proving the asymptotic decay in the expected
error probability for each intended receiver (EC [P (n)e ]  2 N0) [31, Theorem 2] remains unchanged;
the expectation is here taken with respect to the random channel code designs for all messages
(i;B). All that remains to be done, then, is to demonstrate the security of the earlier algorithm.
Towards this end, we next show that since the solution used in each layer of the stack has mutual
information leakage no greater than n"3 for each E 2 A, the expected value of the mutual information
EC
h
I

~Z(E)

n
;W
i
using an independent randomly chosen channel code for each message (i;B)
is no greater than nN"3 for each E 2 A. The eavesdropper's observation

~Z(E)

n
is denoted with a
tilde since each single-layer solution is applied to a channel-coded message ~W (`) =
 
~W
(i!B)
(`) : i 2
V;B 2 B(i), where ~W (i!B) = ~W (i!B)(W (i!B)) as described in Denition 12. Again, expectation
EC denotes the expectation with respect to the random channel code design. A specic instance of
each channel code is chosen later in the argument that follows. The mutual information for a given
E 2 A is bounded as
EC
h
I

~Z(E)

n
;W
i
(a)
 EC
h
I

~Z(E)

n
; ~W
i
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= EC
h
I

~Z(E)(1)

n
; : : : ;

~Z(E)(N)

n
; ~W (1); : : : ; ~W (N)
i
= EC
h
H

~Z(E)(1)

n
; : : : ;

~Z(E)(N)

n

 H

~Z(E)(1)

n
; : : : ;

~Z(E)(N)

n
 ~W (1); : : : ; ~W (N)i
(b)
 EC
"
NX
`=1
H

~Z(E)(`)

n

 
NX
`=1
H

~Z(E)(`)

n
 ~W (1); : : : ; ~W (N); ~Z(E)(1)n ; : : : ; ~Z(E)(`  1)n#
(c)
= EC
"
NX
`=1
H

~Z(E)(`)

n

 
NX
`=1
H

~Z(E)(`)

n
 ~W (`)#
=
NX
`=1
EC
h
I

~Z(E)(`)

n
; ~W (`)
i (d)
<
nN"
3
;
where (a) holds due to the data processing inequality since W ! ~W !

~Z(E)

n
forms a Markov
chain, (b) holds by the chain rule and the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, (c) holds by the
independence of the copies of network N in the N layers of N -fold stacked network N and the
independent application of solution S(N ) in each layer, and (d) holds since S(N ) is a (; "=3; A;R)
secure solution.
Thus EC

P
(n)
e
  2 N0 and EChI  ~Z(E)n ;W i  nN"3 . It remains to show that there is
a specic instance for the choice of each channel code such that both the probability of error and
the mutual information are not too large. We prove this using Markov's inequality [59, Section
8:1] to show that the probability, under the random channel code design, that P
(n)
e  3  2 N0 or
I
 
(Z(E))n;W
  nN" is strictly less than 1. Precisely,
Pr
n
P (n)e  3  2 N
0o[nI  ~Z(E)n ;W  nN"o
(a)
 Pr

P (n)e  3  2 N
0
+ Pr

I

~Z(E)

n
;W

 nN"

(b)
 EC

P
(n)
e

3  2 N0 +
EC
h
I

~Z(E)

n
;W
 i
nN"
(c)
 2
3
< 1; (3.1)
where inequality (a) is the union bound, (b) is Markov's inequality, and (c) applies our earlier bounds
on EC

P
(n)
e

and EC
h
I

~Z(E)

n
;W
 i
. Therefore, for suciently large N there must be at least
one instance of the collection of codes with error probability no greater than 3  2 N0 < 2 N
( = 0=2) and mutual information no greater than nN".
3.3 Intuition and Summary of Results
We derive lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacity region of a noisy network of wiretap
channels in the presence of an eavesdropper that has access to the degraded outputs from an unknown
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subset E 2 A of the wiretap channels in the network. In some cases, these lower and upper bounds
are identical, showing equivalence of secure capacity between noisy and noiseless wiretap networks.
We derive these results using an approach from [31, 32], which shows that the capacity of a network
NA is a subset of the capacity of network NB by showing that any solution for NA can be modied
to obtain a solution for NB with similar performance.
In Theorem 9, we show that for any network N of wiretap channels and any edge e 2 E , replacing
channel Ce with a noiseless degraded wiretap channel Ce(Rc; Rp), with Rc > max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Y (e))  
max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Z(e)) and Rp > max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Z(e)), as shown in Figure 3.1(b), yields a new network
Ne(Rc; Rp) whose capacity region is a superset of the secure capacity region of N . Theorem 9 is
similar to [32, Theorem 5], which shows that for traditional (rather than secrecy) capacity, replacing
a noisy degraded broadcast channel with the same noiseless counterpart yields an upper bounding
network. The proof of Theorem 9, which extends the argument of [32, Theorem 5] from traditional
to secure capacity, appears in Section 3.4.1.
Theorem 9. Consider a network N and an adversarial set A  P(E). If
Rc > max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Y (e))  max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Z(e))
Rp > max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Z(e));
then R(N ; A)  R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A).
Theorem 10 proves that the upper bound shown in Theorem 9 is tight in both the case where e
is a secure link (e =2 E for all E 2 A) and the case where link e is not simultaneously eavesdropped
with any other link (e 2 E implies jEj = 1). The proof of Theorem 10 appears in Section 3.4.2.
Theorem 10. Consider a network N , an adversarial set A  P(E), and a single link e 2 E. Let
Rc = max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Y (e))  max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Z(e))
Rp = max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Z(e)):
If e is invulnerable to wiretapping (e =2 E for all E 2 A) or is not simultaneously wiretapped with
other links (e 2 E implies jEj = 1), then R(N ; A) = R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A).
Example 1 demonstrates the applications of Theorem 9 and 10 in an example. While Theorem 9
seems to be tight on many small examples, it is not always tight when the replaced link appears in
one or more eavesdropping sets of size greater than 1 (e 2 E for some E 2 A such that jEj > 1), as
illustrated by Example 1. It remains an open problem whether one can nd tight noiseless network
models in this case.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 3.2: (a) The network for Example 1 and (b) its equivalent model by replacing channels e2, e4,
and e5 by their equivalent noiseless links by Theorem 10 (rate-0 links are omitted from the model).
(c) The noiseless model of (a) by applying Theorem 9 and (d) the secrecy capacity achieving code
for the network in (c). (e), (f) The channel distributions for independent degraded wiretap channels
e1, e3 and e2, e4, e5 respectively.
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Example 1. Figure 3.2(a) shows a network. Channels e1 = (1; 2; 1), e2 = (1; 4; 1), e3 = (1; 3; 1),
e4 = (4; 2; 1), and e5 = (4; 3; 1) are independent degraded binary wiretap channels. Channels e1
and e3 have erasure probability 0 at each intended receiver and erasure probability
1
2 at each wiretap
output, as shown in Figure 3.2(e). Channels e2, e4, and e5 have erasure probability
1
2 , with identical
outputs for their intended and eavesdropped outputs, as shown in Figure 3.2(f). We wish to employ
the network to securely transmit a single multicast from source S at node 1 to terminals T1 and T2
at nodes 2 and 3. We therefore set R(i!B) = 0 for all (i;B) 6= (1; f2; 3g) and then consider the point
R 2 R(N ; A) that maximizes R(1!f2;3g) subject to these constraints. The eavesdropper can listen in
on either both e1 and e3 or just e2, giving A =
fe1; e3g; fe2g	. When the eavesdropper overhears
e1 and e3, it has access to the degraded output of these links. Since Y
(e2) = Z(e2) with probability
1, when the eavesdropper overhears link e2, it receives everything heard by the intended receiver
over this link. The network N shown in Figure 3.2(b) has secrecy capacity under adversarial set
A =
fe1; e3g; fe2g	 identical to that of the network in Figure 3.2(a)  R(N ; A) = R( N ; A) and is
obtained by three applications of Theorem 9. Here channel Ce4 and Ce5 have been replaced by channel
C( 12 ; 0) since channels e4 and e5 are invulnerable to eavesdropping (e4; e5 =2 E for all E 2 A).
Likewise Ce2 has been replaced by C(0; 12 ) since e2 cannot be simultaneously eavesdropped with any
other channel (e2 2 E implies jEj = 1) and has 0 condential bits. The noiseless network N^ is
an upper bounding model for the network in Figure 3.2(b) (and therefore also an upper bounding
model for the network in Figure 3.2(a), giving R(N ; A) = R( N ; A)  R(N^ ; A)), and is obtained
by two applications of Theorem 9. These applications replace channels e1 and e3 by their upper
bounding models. We therefore bound the maximal rate R1!f2;3g achievable in N and N by nding
the corresponding maximal multicast rate in N^ .
A rate-1 blocklength-2 code for network N^ is shown in Figure 3.2(d). The message W (1!f2;3g) 2
f0; 1g2 is broken into a pair of messages W (1!f2;3g) =  W1;W2 2 f0; 1g2 with H W1 = H W2 =
1 and H
 
W1;W2

= 2. Random key K1 2 f0; 1g is chosen uniformly at random and independently
of
 
W1;W2

. The code is secure since I
 
W1;W2;K1

= 0 and I
 
W1;W2;W2 +K1

= 0. This code
achieves the secure multicast capacity from S to fT1; T2g of network N^ by Lemma 6 in Appendix C.
Lemma 7 in the same appendix proves that the noisy network N of Figure 3.2(a) has multicast
secrecy capacity at most 0:875.
To build some intuition about the result, notice that our capacity-achieving code for N^ transmits
the same key over a pair of noiseless links (e1 and e3 in N^ ). Direct emulation of this solution over
the corresponding noisy links in N network in Figure 3.2(a) fails to maintain security. Specically,
if the same input is transmitted over channels e1 and e3 (X
(e1)
t = X
(e3)
t for all t 2 f1; : : : ; ng), then
an eavesdropper accessing E = fe1; e3g sees independent channel outputs Z(e1)t and Z(e3)t resulting
from the same channel input X
(e1)
t = X
(e3)
t at each time t. Since each transmitted bit is erased with
probability 12 and the erasure events are independent by assumption, an eavesdropper that wiretaps
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both e1 and e3 is expected to receive roughly 75% of the transmitted information bits. Consequently,
a key of rate 0:5 is not enough to completely protect W (1!f2;3g) from the eavesdropper in this case.
While it is possible to avoid this problem on a single eavesdropped link by removing redundancy
before transmission, the problem is more dicult to address in the case where the eavesdropper
has access to multiple channels simultaneously. The problem here is that transmitting correlated
information on multiple channels may be necessary to achieve the secure capacity in the noiseless
case, but the same strategy may fail in the noisy case since the eavesdropper may be able to take
advantage of the correlation between dierent channels' inputs.
Theorems 11 and 12 provide two dierent lower bounds for the case of multiple wiretapped
channels. These bounds are designed to guarantee that the links to the eavesdropper are lled to
capacity.
Lower bound { Model 1
The rst lower bound results from removing the public portion of the upper bounding model. The
lower bound is achievable since it is always possible to simply avoid the transmission of any rate
on channel e that can be overheard by the eavesdropper. The proof of Theorem 11, appears in
Section 3.4.
Theorem 11. Consider a network N , an adversarial set A  P(E), and a single link e 2 E. If
Rc < max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Y (e))  max
p(x(e))
I(X(e);Z(e))
then R(Ne(Rc; 0); A)  R(N ; A).
The lower bound in Lemma 11 is not tight in general. As a result, we do not use it to bound
all channels but instead apply it to a selective sequence of channels from E . Notice that the model
Ce(Rc; 0) for channel Ce in Theorem 11 sets the public rate Rp to zero. This eectively removes e
from all eavesdropping sets E 2 A, giving a new adversarial set A0 = Enfeg : E 2 A	. Repeated
application of Theorem 11 on a carefully chosen sequence of channels enable us to reduce all eaves-
dropping sets to size at most one. Once this is accomplished, we can use the equivalence result of
Theorem 10 to replace the remaining noisy channels.
Lower bound { Model 2
In this model we bound the secrecy capacity region of network N with adversarial set A  P(E)
by deriving a relationship between that secrecy capacity and the traditional capacity of a noise-
less communication network called the A-enhanced network N (A) dened below and illustrated by
Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: The A-enhanced network N (A).
Denition 13. Consider network N on graph G = (V; E). Dene rate vector Rc;p =
 
( Re;c; Re;p) :
e 2 E, and x an adversarial set A  P(E). The A-enhanced network N ( Rc;p; A) on graph G =
(V; E) is dened as follows:
1. V = V [ vi : i 2 V	 [ vi : i 2 V	 [ vE : E 2 A	 [ fvT g. For each i 2 V we call vi and vi
the ith message node and random key node of network N ( Rc;p; A). For each E 2 A, node vE
is called an eavesdropper node. Node vT is called the overall key node.
2. E = hi : i 2 V	 [ hi : i 2 V	 [ E [ he : e 2 E	 [ (vT ; vE ; 1) : E 2 A	.
For each i 2 V, hi and hi are noiseless hyperarcs of capacity
C(i) =
X
e2Eout(i)
( Re;c + Re;p):
Hyperarc hi noiselessly delivers the same rate- C
(i) description from node vi to all of the nodes in
i
	 [ vE : E 2 A	. Hyperarc hi delivers the same rate- C(i) description from node vi to both of
the nodes in

i; vT
	
. For each e = (i; j; k) 2 E, channel Ce in network is a bit pipe of capacity Re;c
from node i to node j, and hyperarc he is a noiseless hyperarc of capacity Re;p from node i to all of
the nodes in

j
	 [ vE : E 2 A; e 2 E	; set fvE : E 2 A; e 2 E	 is empty if edge e of graph G is
invulnerable to eavesdropping. For every E 2 A channel C(vT ;vE ;1) is noiseless bit pipe of capacity
CE =
X
e2E
( Re;c + Re;p) 
X
e2E
Re;p
from node vT to node vE.
The A-enhanced network is used for traditional (rather than secure) communication with a
collection of reconstruction constraints that depend on both N and A. Specically, for each i 2 V
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and B 2 B(i), a solution for A-enhanced network N ( Rc;p; A) must deliver message W (vi!B) from
node vi to all of the nodes in B 2 B(i), where B(i) is the receivers set for node i 2 V in network
N (rather than network N ( Rc;p; A))3. In addition, a solution for network N ( Rc;p; A) must deliver
random keys T (i) 2 T (i) = f1; : : : ; 2n C(i)g from node vi to nodes fvE : E 2 Ag. We therefore dene
a solution S(N ( Rc;p; A)) for an A-enhanced network N ( Rc;p; A) as follows
Denition 14. Let N ( Rc;p; A) be the A-enhanced network for network N and adversarial set A 
P(E). A blocklength-n solution S(N ( Rc;p; A)) to network N ( Rc;p; A) is dened as a set of encoding
and decoding functions
(X(vi))n :
Y
B2B(i)
W(vi!B)  ! (X (vi))n
(X(vi))n : T (i)  ! (X (vi))n
X
(i)
t :
 Y(hi)t 1   Y(hi)t 1  Y
e2Ein(i)
 Y(e)t 1   Y(he)t 1  ! X (i) X (he)
X
(vT )
t :
Y
i2V
 Y(hi)t 1  ! Y
E2A
X (vT ;vE ;1)
W (vj!K;i) :
 Y(i)n   Y(hi)n   Y(hi)n  Y
e2Ein(i)
 Y(he)n  !W(vj!K)
TE :
Y
i2V
 Y(hi)n Y
e2E
 Y(he)n   Y(vT ;vE ;1)n  !Y
i2V
T (i)
WE :
Y
i2V
 Y(hi)n Y
e2E
 Y(he)n   Y(vT ;vE ;1)n  !Y
i2V
Y
B2B(i)
W(vi!B):
For each i 2 V, encoder (X(vi))n at node vi maps
 
W (vi!B) : B 2 B(i) to (X(vi))n = (X(hi))n (since
node vi has a single output to noiseless hyperarc hi), while encoder (X
(vi))n at node vi maps T
(i) to
(X(vi))n = (X(
hi))n (since node vi has a single output to noiseless hyperarc hi). For each i 2 V, en-
coder X
(i)
t at node i maps past network outputs

(Y (hi))t 1; (Y (hi))t 1;
 
(Y (e))t 1; (Y (he))t 1 : e 2 Ein(i)

to X
(i)
t and X
(he)
t . Encoder X
(vT )
t at node vT maps past network outputs (Y
(hi))t 1 to
 
X
(vT ;vE ;1)
t :
E 2 A. For each j 2 V, K 2 B(j) and i 2 K, decoder W (vj!K;i) maps:

(Y (i))n; (Y (hi))n; (Y (
hi))n;
 
(Y (he))n : e 2 Ein(i)

to W (vj!K;i). For each E 2 A, decoders TE and WE map
 
(Y (hi))n; (Y (hi))n; (Y (vT ;vE ;1))n

to
reproductions
 
T (1); : : : ; T (m)

and
 
W (vi!B) : i 2 V;B 2 B(i). Given a rate vector R =  R(i!B) :
i 2 V;B 2 B(i), the solution S(N (R;A)) of blocklength n is called a (;R){solution, denoted
(;R){S(N ( Rc;p; A)), if log2
 W (vi!B)=n = R(i!B), and the specied encoding and decoding
functions imply Pr

W (vj!K;i) 6=W (vj!K)

<  for every j 2 V, K 2 B(j), and i 2 K and
3The use of rate R(i!B) for message W (vi!B) (i.e., W (i!B) 2 W(i!B) = f1; : : : ; 2nR(i!B)g) is used to relate the
capacity region R N ( Rc;p; A) for N ( Rc;p; A) to the A-secure capacity region R(N ; A) for N in Theorem 12.
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Pr

TE 6= T [ WE 6=W

<  for every E 2 A.
Denition 15. The rate region R(N (Rc;p; A))  Rm(2
m 1 1)
+ of the A-enhanced network N ( Rc;p; A)
of network N is the closure of all rate vectors R such that for any  > 0, a solution (;R){
S(N ( Rc;p; A)) exists.
Theorem 12. Consider network N on graph G = (V; E) and an adversarial set A  P(E). Let
N (Rc;p; A) be the A-enhanced network of network N . If for every e 2 E
Re;p < max
p(x)
I(X(e);Z(e))
Re;c < max
p(x)
I(X(e);Y (e)) max
p(x)
I(X(e);Z(e));
then R(N ( Rc;p; A))  R(N ; A).
Unlike the rest of the results, where changing a single wiretap channel Ce to its noiseless coun-
terpart Ce(Rc; Rp) results in an equivalent or bounding network, Theorem 12 requires all wiretap
channels in the noisy network N to be changed to noiseless channels in order to obtain a lower
bounding network. Intuitively, this is because our construction requires the eavesdropper E 2 A to
decode all sources of randomness in the network, which is not possible generally for noisy networks
where the entropy of the noise can be potentially innite. If we wish to replace only some noisy
channels by their noiseless counterparts then Theorem 11 should be used. When all channels are to
be replaced Theorem 12 can be used, potentially leading to a tighter bound.
3.4 Proofs
In the proofs following, for notational convenience we shorten notation as X = X(e), Y = Y (e), and
Z = Z(e).
3.4.1 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof of Theorem 9. By Theorem 8 it suces to prove R(N ; A)  R(N e(Rc; Rp); A). Fix any rate
vector R in the relative interior of the A{secure rate region of network N , i.e. R 2 int (R(N ; A)).
Choose some ~R 2 int (R(N ; A)) for which ~R(i!B) > R(i!B) for all i 2 V and B 2 B(i) with
R(i!B) > 0. Then for any  > 0 and " > 0 there exists a (; "; A; ~R){S(N ) solution for network
N ; let n be the blocklength of that solution. Then Pr

~W (j!K;i) 6= ~W (j!K)

<  for all (j;K) with
K 2 B(j), i 2 K and R(j!K) > 0, and I ( ~ZE)n; ~W  < n" for all E 2 A. We use the single-layer
solution (; "; A; ~R){S(N ) for network N and a carefully chosen  to build a random N -layer stacked
solution (2 N; "; A;R){S(N ) for network N as described in the proof of Theorem 8. As in that
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proof of Theorem 8, the error probability and secrecy bounds are calculated in expectation over a
random code choice and then the existence of at least one single good code is proved.
Theorem 5 of Section V in [32] shows that in the communication, rather than secrecy capac-
ity problem, we can build a sequence of rate-R random codes for network N e(Rc; Rp) with error
probability approaching zero. We apply the same code construction here; the code construction
combines the random stacked code (2 N; "; A;R){S(N ) across network N with the aid of 2n ran-
dom emulation code encoders
 

(p)
t;N ; 
(c)
t;N
	n
t=1
and 2n corresponding decoders
 

(p)
t;N ; 
(c)
t;N
	n
t=1
of blocklength N . The random codes
 

(p)
t;N ; 
(c)
t;N

;
 

(p)
t;N ; 
(c)
t;N
	n
t=1
are constructed as follows. The
random decoder 
(p)
t;N : f0; 1gNRp ! ~Z maps each sequence ofNRp bits to a codeword drawn i.i.d. ac-
cording to distribution
QN
`=1 p
 
~z(`)

. The tilde superscript on ~Z denotes the fact that the underlying
stacked code (2 N; "; A;R){S(N ) operates on every layer of the stacked network at rate ~R. For each
~b(p) 2 f0; 1gNRp , the random design of decoder (c)t;N : f0; 1gNRc  f0; 1gNRp ! ~Y draws codewords

(c)
t;N (1;
~b(p)); : : : ; 
(c)
t;N (2
NRc ;~b(p)) i.i.d. according to distribution
QN
`=1 p
 
~y(`)j(p)t;N (~b(p); `)

, where

(p)
t;N (
~b(p); `) denotes the `th component of N -vector 
(p)
t;N (
~b(p)). For each ~Xt 2 ~X random encoder

(p)
t;N :
~X ! f0; 1gNRp chooses index (p)tN (~x) uniformly at random from those ~b(p) 2 f0; 1gNRp for
which
 
~x; 
(p)
tN (
~b(p))
 2 A^(N)1;t ( ~X; ~Z), whereas for each ~b(p) 2 f0; 1gNRp encoder (c)t;N : ~Xf0; 1gNRp !
f0; 1gNRc chooses an index (p)tN
 
~x;~b(p)

uniformly at random from those ~b(c) 2 f0; 1gNRc such that 
~x; 
(c)
tN (
~b(c); 
(p)
t;N (~x)); 
(p)
tN (
(p)
t;N (~x))
 2 A^(N)2;t ( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z), where A^(N)1;t ( ~X; ~Z) and A^(N)2;t ( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z) are re-
stricted typical sets, whose denitions are given in equations (D.1) and (D.2) of Appendix D.
Formally, S(N e(Rc; Rp)) for stacked network N e(Rc; Rp) is derived from the stacked solution 
2 N; "; A;R

{S(N ) of stacked network N as follows. Let e = (i; j; k), then each component Y^ (e)t ,
e 2 Ein(), of the network output Y^ ()t at time t in stacked network N e(Rc; Rp) is channel decoded
to obtain
~Y
(e)
t =
8<: 
(c)
tN
 
Y^
(e)
t

if  = j
Y^
(e)
t otherwise
:
Subsequently the encoding functions ~X
()
t for each  2 V of code S(N ) for stacked network N are
applied to give
~X
()
t =
~X
()
t

~Y
()
1 ; : : : ;
~Y
()
t 1;
 
~W
(!B)
: B 2 B(); ~T () :
Then each component ~X
(e)
t , e 2 Eout(), of the network input ~X
()
t is encoded (if necessary) using
the emulation code's encoder to give
X^
(e)
t =
8<:
 

(c)
tN (
~X
(i)
t ; 
(p)
tN (
~X
(i)
t )); 
(p)
tN (
~X
(i)
t )

if e = e
~X
(e)
t otherwise
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thereby giving the inputs for all channels in network N e(Rc; Rp). If there is an adversarial set E 2 A
such that e 2 E then eavesdropper overhearing edge e in stacked network N e(Rc; Rp) is receiving
bits ~B
(p)
t = 
(p)
tN (
~X
V1(e)
t ) and not
~Z
(e)
t = 
(p)
tN (
~B
(p)
t ). We will prove that by looking at the bits ( ~B
(p))n
instead of ( ~Z
(e)
)
n
the eavesdropper has no gain in terms of mutual information with the message.
Indeed
W ! ~W !  ( ~XV1(e))n; ( ~XV1(Enfeg))n!  ( ~Z(e))n; ( ~Z(Enfeg))n (a)!  ( ~B(p))n; ( ~Z(Enfeg))n
where (a) holds since when multiple bit sequences correspond to the ( ~Z
(e)
)
n
chosen then one of the
bit sequences is chosen at random. Therefore
EC
h
Ip^
 
W ; ( ~B
(p)
)n; ( ~Z
(Enfeg)
)
ni  EC hIp^  ~W ; ( ~B(p))n; ( ~Z(Enfeg))ni  EC hIp^  ~W ; ( ~Z(e))n; ~Z(Enfeg))ni
where subscript p^ is used to stress that the mutual informations are computed with respect to the
probability distribution p^ induced on network Ne(Rc; Rp) through solution S(N e(Rc; Rp)) described
above, and consequently without loss of generality we will do our analysis as if the eavesdropper
overhearing edge e receives ( ~Z
(e)
)n and not ( ~B(p))n.
Dene the indicator function J as
J =
8>>><>>>:
1;
There exists t 2 f1; : : : ; ng such that ( ~Xt; ~Zt) =2 A^(N)1;t ( ~X; ~Z) or
( ~Xt;
~Y t;
~Zt) =2 A^(N)2;t ( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z)
0; otherwise
: (3.2)
It is proved in Lemma 15 of [32] that pt
h
A^
(N)
1;t (
~X; ~Z)
ci
 2 Nc1(1;t) and pt
h
A^
(N)
2;t (
~X; ~Y ; ~Z)
ci

2 Nc2(2;t) for suciently large N where c1(1; t) > 0 and c2(2; t) > 0. Due to the union bound
Pr(J = 1)  Pnt=1 pt hA^(N)1;t ( ~X; ~Z)ci + Pnt=1 pt hA^(N)2;t ( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z)ci and since blocklength n
is xed one can choose N suciently large so that Pr(J = 1)  2 Nc(1;2) where c(1; 2) =
1
2 mint
fc1(1; t); c2(2; t)g. By changing the noisy channel of edge e of stacked network N to the
noiseless bit pipes of network N e(Rc; Rp) and applying the stacked solution S(N ) along with the set
of encoders/decoders fa(0)tN ; a(1)tN ; (1)tN ; (2)tN gnt=1 we eectively change the distribution on ~Y V2(e)t and
therefore the distribution of ~X
V1(e)
t for all channels e that are downstream of edge e.
It was proved in Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 4 in [32] that provided that the three inequalities
below hold
2a1(1; t) + 1 < Rp   I( ~Xt; ~Zt) 8t 2 f1; : : : ; ng
4a2(2; t) < Rc   (I( ~Xt; ~Yt)  I( ~Xt; ~Zt)) 8t 2 f1; : : : ; ng (3.3)
4a1(1; t) + 31 < c2(2; t) 8t 2 f1; : : : ; ng
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for all t 2 f1; : : : ; ng where a1(1; t) and a2(2; t) are dened in Appendix D, along with
t 1X
t0=1
(t0) < t((t))=2 8t 2 f1; : : : ; ng
nX
t0=1
(t0) < =2 (3.4)
where  = 4a1(1; t)+31+8a2(2; t), then P^r
 
(~xt; ~zt) =2 A^(N)1;t ( ~X; ~Z)
S
(~xt; ~yt; ~zt) =2 A^
(N)
2;t (
~X; ~Y ; ~Z)
 
2 Nc^
0(1;2;t) for some c^0(1; 2; t) > 0 where probability P^r is computed with the new distribution
induced in network N e(Rc; Rp) with the use of random encoders/decoders

a
(0)
tN ; a
(1)
tN ; 
(1)
tN ; 
(2)
tN
	n
t=1
.
Therefore by the union bound P^r(J = 1) Pnt=1 2 Nc^0(1;2;t)  2 Nc^(1;2) for c^(1; 2) = 12 mint c^0(1; 2; t)
and suciently large N . For reasons that will become evident shortly we will use N large enough
so that Pr(I = 0)  12 and P^r(J = 0)  12 . The denitions of a1(1; t) and a2(2; t) are given in
Appendix D and they both tend to zero as 1(t) and 2(t) tend to zero.
To explore the security of code S(N e(Rc; Rp)), we rst investigate the probability that the
emulated channel outputs ~Z
(E)
1 ; : : : ;
~Z(E)n to an eavesdropper E at times 1; : : : ; n that are jointly
typical with the message vector ~W under stacked solution S(N ) on network N . Dene typical set
A
(N)
0;E for each eavesdropper E 2 A as
A
(N)
0;E =

( ~w; ~zE1 ; : : : ; ~z
E
n ) 2 ~W  ~Z
E  : : : ~ZE :
  1N log p( ~w) H( ~W )
  0;  1N log p(~zE1 ; : : : ; ~zEn ) H( ~ZE1 ; : : : ; ~ZEn )
  0;  1N log p(~zE1 ; : : : ; ~zEn ; ~w) H( ~ZE1 ; : : : ; ~ZEn ; ~W )
  0 : (3.5)
For each E 2 A
Pr

(A
(N)
0;E)
c

 2 Nf(0;E)
(a)
 2 Nf(0) (3.6)
for some f(0; E) > 0 by Lemma 8 in [31], which follows from the Cherno bound. Inequality (a)
holds by setting f(0) = min
E2A
f(0; E).
Let Ip^
 
~W ; ( ~Z(E))n

be the mutual information between message ~W and eavesdropped output
( ~Z(E))n with respect to the probability distribution p^ induced at the solution S(N e(Rc; Rp)) for
stacked network N e(Rc; Rp). Then,
EC
h
Ip^
 
~W ; ( ~Z(E))n
i
 EC
h
Ip^
 
~W ; ( ~Z(E))n; J
i
= EC
h
Ip^
 
~W ; J
i
+ EC
h
Ip^
 
~W ; ( ~Z(E))njJi
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(a)
 1 + EC
h
Ip^
 
~W ; ( ~Z(E))njJi
= 1 + P^r(J = 1)  EC
h
Ip^
 
~W ; ( ~Z(E))njJ = 1i+ P^r(J = 0)  EC hIp^  ~W ; ( ~Z(E))njJ = 0i
(b)
 1 + 2 Nc^(1;2)nN
X
i2V
X
B2B(i)
~R(i!B) + EC
h
Ip^
 
W ; ( ~Z(E))njJ = 0i
(c)
 2 + EC
h
Ip^
 
~W ; ( ~Z(E))njJ = 0i (3.7)
where (a) follows since EC
h
Ip^( ~W ; J)
i
 EC [H(J)]  1 since J is a binary variable, (b) follows since
P^r(J = 1)  2 Nc^(1;2), EC
h
Ip^
 
~W ; ( ~Z(E))njJ = 1i  H  ~W jJ = 1  nNPi2VPB2B(i) ~R(i!B) 
nNC(i), and Pr(J = 0)  1, and (c) holds for N suciently large.
To bound EC
h
Ip^
 
~W ; ( ~Z(E))njJ = 0i, note that
EC
h
Ip^
 
~W ; ( ~Z
E
)
njJ = 0i = X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2(A(N)
0;E)
c
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log p^( ~w; (~z
E)njJ = 0)
p^( ~wjJ = 0)p^((~zE)njJ = 0)
+
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log p^( ~w; (~z
E)njJ = 0)
p^( ~wjJ = 0)p^((~zE)njJ = 0) : (3.8)
To bound the rst term of (3.8), note that for N suciently large8><>:
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2(A(N)
0;E)
c
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0)log p^( ~w; (~z
E)njJ = 0)
p^( ~w)p^((~zE)njJ = 0)
9>=>;

X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2(A(N)
0;E)
c
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log p^((~z
E)njJ = 0)
p^( ~w)p^((~zE)njJ = 0)
(a)
=
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2(A(N)
0;E)
c
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log 1
1=2nN
P
i2V
P
B2B(i) j ~W (i!B)j
=

nN
X
i2V
X
B2B(i)
j ~W (i!B)j
 X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2(A(N)
0;E)
c
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0)


nN
X
i2V
X
B2B(i)
j ~W (i!B)j
 X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2(A(N)
0;E)
c
p^( ~w; (~zE)n; J = 0)
P^r(J = 0)
(b)
 2

nN
X
i2V
X
B2B(i)
j ~W (i!B)j
 X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2(A(N)
0;E)
c
p^( ~w; (~zE)n; J = 0)
(c)


nN
X
i2V
X
B2B(i)
j ~W (i!B)j

2N
Pn
t=1 b(1;2;t)
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2(A(N)
0;E)
c
p( ~w; (~zE)n; J = 0)


nN
X
i2V
X
B2B(i)
j ~W (i!B)j

2N
Pn
t=1 b(1;2;t)
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2(A(N)
0;E)
c
p( ~w; (~zE)n)
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(d)


nN
X
i2V
X
B2B(i)
j ~W (i!B)j

2N
Pn
t=1 b(1;2;t)2 Nf(
0): (3.9)
where (a) holds since all messages are equiprobable and therefore p^( ~w) = 2 nN
P
i2V
P
B2B(i) j ~W
(i!B)j,
(b) holds since P^r(J = 0)  12 for N suciently large, (c) replaces p^ by p using Lemma 8 proved
in Appendix E where b(t) is dened in Appendix E to be b(1; 2; t) = 4a1(1; t) + 8a2(2; t) +
21(t) + 2=N , and (d) follows from inequality (3.6). In order to upper bound the term in equation
(3.9) we need to choose parameters 1(1); : : : ; 1(n) and 2(1); : : : ; 2(n) so that the exponent of
2 N(f(
0) Pnt=1 b(1;2;t)) is negative. We rst choose parameter 0 of the typical set dened in equation
(3.5) to be equal to parameter " used in the bound I
 
( ~Z
E
)n;W
  n" on the rate which mutual
information is revealed to the eavesdropper. We then choose parameters 1(n) and 2(n) so that
(n) < min


4n
;
f(")
4n
;
"
4n

(3.10)
and all the subsequent 1(t) and 2(t) for t 2 fn  1; : : : ; 1g such that
(t) < min


4n
;
f(")
4n
;
"
4n
;min
t0>t

t0((t
0))
4t0

8t 2 fn  1; : : : ; 1g (3.11)
and this guarantees that inequalities (3.3) and (3.4) are satised. Parameter b(1; 2; t) can be
written as b(1; 2; t) = (t) +
2
N   1(t) and therefore once all 1(1); : : : ; 1(n) have been chosen to
satisfy equations (3.10) and (3.11) we use a suciently large N such that 2N < mint
1(t), giving
b(1; 2; t) < (t) for all t 2 f1; : : : ; ng and therefore
nX
t=1
b(1; 2; t) <
nX
t=1
(t)
(a)
<
1
4
min

; f("); "
	
; (3.12)
here inequality (a) follows from (3.10) and (3.11). Consequently, combining the inequality above
and (3.9) we get
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2(A(N)
0;E)
c
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log p^( ~w; (~z
E)njJ = 0)
p^( ~w)p^((~zE)njJ = 0) 

nN
X
i2V
X
B2B(i)
j ~W (i!B)j

2 
3
4Nf()  1
for suciently large N .
To bound the second term of (3.8), note that
p
 
(~zE)n; J = 0

= p
 
(~zE)n

Pr
 
J = 0j(~zE)n:
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To bound this probability, dene set
G(N) =

(~zE)n : Pr
 
J = 1 j (~zE)n < 1
2

(3.13)
and therefore
p
 
(~zE)n; J = 0
  1
2
p
 
(~zE)n

; 8(~zE)n 2 G(N): (3.14)
The probability of observing a vector (~zE)n outside of set G(N) is exponentially small
X
(~zE)n2(G(N))c
p((~zE)n) < 2  Pr(J = 1) < 2  2 Nc(1;2): (3.15)
Thus we bound the second term of (3.8) as8><>:
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0)log p^( ~w; (~z
E)njJ = 0)
p^( ~w)p^((~zE)njJ = 0)
9>=>; (3.16)
=
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log p^( ~w; (~z
E)n; J = 0)
p^( ~w)p^((~zE)n; J = 0)
(a)

X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0)log p( ~w; (~z
E)n; J = 0)22
Pn
t=1 b(1;2;t)
p( ~w)p((~zE)n; J = 0)
=
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log p( ~w; (~z
E)n; J = 0)
p( ~w)p((~zE)n; J = 0)
+
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0)
 
2
nX
t=1
b(1; 2; t)
!

X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2G(N)
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log p( ~w; (~z
E)n; J = 0)
p( ~w)p((~zE)n; J = 0)
+
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2(G(N))c
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log p( ~w; (~z
E)n; J = 0)
p( ~w)p((~zE)n; J = 0)
+ 2
nX
t=1
b(1; 2; t)
(b)

X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2G(N)
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log p( ~w; (~z
E)n; J = 0)2
p( ~w)p((~zE)n)
+
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2(G(N))c
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log p((~z
E)n; J = 0)
p( ~w)p((~zE)n; J = 0)
+ "
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
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2G(N)
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log p( ~w; (~z
E)n) 2
p( ~w)p((~zE)n)
+
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2(G(N))c
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log 1
1=2nN
P
i2V
P
B2B(i) j ~W (i!B)j
+ "
=
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2G(N)
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log p( ~w; (~z
E)n)
p( ~w)p((~zE)n)
+
X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2G(N)
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log 2
+

nN
X
i2V
X
B2B(i)
j ~W (i!B)j
 X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2(G(N))c
p( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0)
+ "
(c)

X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2G(N)
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log 2
 N(H( ~W; ~ZE) 0)
2 N(H(
~W )+H( ~ZE)+20)
+

nN
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i2V
X
B2B(i)
j ~W (i!B)j
 X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2(G(N))c
p( ~w; (~zE)n; J = 0)
Pr(J = 0)
+ 1 + "
(d)

X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2G(N)
p^( ~w; (~zE)njJ = 0) log 2N(I( ~W ; ~ZE)+30)
+ 2

nN
X
i2V
X
B2B(i)
j ~W (i!B)j
 X
( ~w;(~zE)n)2A(N)
0;E
V
(~zE)n2(G(N))c
p( ~w; (~zE)n)
+ 1 + "
 N

I( ~W ; ~ZE) + 30

+ 1 + "
+ 2

nN
X
i2V
X
B2B(i)
j ~W (i!B)j
 X
(~zE)n2(G(N))c
p((~zE)n)
(e)
 N

I( ~W ; ~ZE) + 30

+ 1 + "
+ 4

nN
X
i2V
X
B2B(i)
j ~W (i!B)j

2 Nc(1;2)
(f)
 N

I( ~W ; ~ZE) + 3"

+ 2 + ": (3.17)
Here (a) follows from the fact that p( ~w) = p^( ~w) and the bounds proved in Lemma 8 of Appendix E;
(b) follows from inequalities (3.12) and (3.14), (c) follows from the denition of the typical set in
(3.5); (d) holds since we choose N large enough so that Pr(J = 0)  12 ; (e) follows from (3.15) and
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nally inequality (f) holds since 0 = " and N is chosen large enough so that the last term is less
than 1. The solution (; "; A; ~R){S(N ) for network N is secure, i.e. I( ~W ; ~ZE) < n" and therefore
by combining inequalities (3:8) and (3:17) we get
EC
h
Ip^
 
~W ; ( ~Z
E
)
njJ = 0i  N(n"+ 3") + 3 + "
and therefore by inequality (3:7)
EC
h
Ip^
 
~W ; ( ~Z
E
)
ni  N(n"+ 3") + 5 + "
 nN("+ 3"
n
+
5 + "
nN
)  5nN"
for suciently large N .
Therefore we have constructed a random code (; 5";A;R){S(N e(Rc; Rp)) for networkN e(Rc; Rp).
To conclude the proof one should prove that there is at least one code instance where both the prob-
ability of error and the mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper is not large.
One can follow an analysis identical to the one used in equation (3.1) of Theorem 8 to prove that
there is indeed at least one deterministic code solution (3; 15";A;R){S(N e(Rc; Rp)) for network
N e(Rc; Rp).
3.4.2 Proof of Theorem 10
In order to prove Theorem 10 we rst prove Lemma 4 that provides a lower bounding network for
the case where one replaces a noisy degraded wiretap channel Ce with noiseless channel Ce(Rc; Rp)
for the case where channel e is secure (e =2 E for all E 2 A) or when channel e is not simultaneously
eavesdropped with any other link in the network (jEj = 1 if e 2 E). We then prove in Lemma 5
a continuity result on the rate region R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A) with respect to (Rc; Rp) when Rc > 0 and
Rp > 0. The lower bounding network of Lemma 4 along with an application of the continuity result
of Lemma 5 will lead to the proof of Theorem 10.
Lemma 4. Consider a network N , an adversarial set A  P(E), and a single link e 2 E. Let
Rc < max
p(x)
I(X(e);Y (e)) max
p(x)
I(X(e);Z(e))
Rp < max
p(x)
I(X(e);Z(e)):
If e is invulnerable to wiretapping (e =2 E for all E 2 A) or is not simultaneously wiretapped with
other links (jEj = 1 if e 2 E), then R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A)  R(N ; A).
Proof. We will prove Lemma 4 for a network Ne(Rc; Rp) where channel e is eavesdropped but not
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Figure 3.4: Network Ne(Rc; Rp) along with networks I, II and N that assist proving Lemma 4. In
the proof of Lemma 4 network I is operated in a stack of N1 layers where network II is operated in
a double stack of N2N1 layers.
simultaneously with any other channel, that is 9 E 2 A such that E = feg and e =2 E for all E 2 An E.
The proof of Lemma 4 when channel e is invulnerable to wiretapping (e =2 E for all E 2 A) is a
simple version of the proof below and we will outline it.
Denote by Ct and Pt the rate Rc and rate Rp transmissions across the condential and public
links, respectively, of edge e 2 E at time t. Let Cn = (C1; : : : ; Cn), Pn = (P1; : : : ; Pn) and denote
by Cij and P
i
j for any j < i the vectors C
i
j = (Cj ; Cj+1; : : : ; Ci) and P
i
j = (Pj ; Pj+1; : : : ; Pi). The
secrecy is achieved by having some independent source of randomness T (secret keys) injected at
one or more locations within the network. Moreover there is the randomness corresponding to all
the noisy channels in the network and collectively denoted by Tc where both T and Tc are depicted
in Figure 3.4. The rest of the proof shows how to achieve any point R inside the secrecy rate
region of network Ne(Rc; Rp) in network N . In particular we will take a secure code of rate R for
network Ne(Rc; Rp) and construct a secure code for network N . To assist in the proof above we will
make use of networks I and II shown in Figure 3.4 that are identical to networks Ne(Rc; Rp) and
N respectively with the addition of a noiseless side channel of capacity Ce from a \super-source"
that has access to (W;Cn; Pn) to the eavesdropper wiretapping channel e where the exact value of
capacity Ce will be specied in equation (3.22). In network I (II) the eavesdropper is required to
decode the message W from all the sources, the public bits Pn and the condential bits Cn with
the use of the side channel, the eavesdropper's information Pn (Zn) and the message W .
The outline of the proof is that one applies a secure code of blocklength n for network Ne(Rc; Rp)
to every layer of a stacked version of network I. The number of layers in the stacked version of network
I is denoted by N1. The reason for creating a stacked version of network I is so that we can use the
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law of large number and typical sequences in order to prove that the eavesdropper can decode the
message W along with the condential Cn and public bits Pn by having access to W , Pn and the
side channel of capacity Ce from the \super source". The constructed coded for the stacked version
of network I can be seen as a code of blocklength n1 = nN1 for the non-stacked version of network
I. To move the proof from network I to network II we use a stacked version of network II with N2
number of layers where N2 6= N1 in general. The code used at each layer of the stacked version of
network II is the code of blocklength n1 constructed above. We need to use a stacked version of
network II to use a channel code at edge e of network II to emulate the noiseless edge e of network
I. Below follow the details of the proof described above.
Choose any  > 0, " > 0 and R 2 int R(Ne; A) in the relative interior of rate region R(Ne; A).
We will show how to construct a (; 12";A;R){S(N ) for network N .
Ne(Rc;Rp) to I: Network I is identical to network Ne(Rc; Rp) with the addition of a noiseless
bit pipe of capacity Ce to the eavesdropper of channel e as well as an innite capacity link from
the source messages W to the eavesdropper eectively making W available to the eavesdropper of
channel e. In network I all receivers are required to decode their messages with small probability of
error and moreover the eavesdropper of channel e is required to decode the condential and public
bits along with all the source message W by having access to the side channel of capacity Ce, the
public bits and all the source messages W . Assume that we take any rate tuple R in the relative
interior of the A{secure rate region of network Ne(Rc; Rp), i.e. R 2 int (R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A)) and we
will show how to construct a code of the same rate for network N . For reasons that will become
evident later we will choose two rates ~R 2 int (R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A)) and ~~R 2 int (R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A))
such that R(i!B) < ~R(i!B) < ~~R(i!B) for all i 2 V and B 2 B(i) with R(i!B) > 0. As in the proof
of Theorem 8 set ~~ = min
R(i!B)>0
( ~~R(i!B)   ~R(i!B)) and ~ = min
R(i!B)>0
( ~R(i!B)  R(i!B)) and nd constants
~~ and ~ satisfying
max
(i;B):R(i!B)>0
~~R(i!B)~~+ h(~~) < ~~ (3.18)
max
(i;B):R(i!B)>0
~R(i!B)~+ h(~) < ~ (3.19)
Then there exists a blocklength n secrecy code (~; ";A; ~~R){S(Ne(Rc; Rp); A) of rate ~~R for network
Ne(Rc; Rp) such that Pr

~~W (j!K;i) 6= ~~W (j!K)

<
~~ for K 2 B(j) such that i 2 K and R(j!K) > 0
and I( ~~Pn; ~~W ) < n"12 , where the double tilde on the public bits, and the message refers to the fact
that the code operates at rate ~~R.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the rates Rp; Rc of the condential and public bit
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pipes satisfy the following inequalities
Rc  max
p(x)
I(X;Y ) max
p(x)
I(X;Z)  "
2
Rp  max
p(x)
I(X;Z)  "
2
:
(3.20)
If not, we can replace the bit pipes with larger ones satisfying the inequalities above. Clearly a code
that worked for the old network can be applied to the new network after the bit pipes are changed
and the additional capacity has been added. Similar to Lemma 9 of Appendix F, we can assume
without loss of generality that the public bit pipe is lled to capacity for the code of rate ~~R; that
is the public bit pipe ~~Pn carries a number of independent bits per transmission that can be made
arbitrarily close to Rp. Specically we can assume that
H( ~~Pn)  n(Rp   "
2
): (3.21)
by choosing parameter  of Lemma 9 as  = "2 .
Since (3.18) holds, it was shown in the proof of Theorem 8 that a stacked solution of N1 layers
for network I can be build using code (~; ";A; ~~R){S(Ne(Rc; Rp); A) so that all receiving nodes j 2 N
at stacked network I in Figure 3.4 can receive all ~W
(i!B)
with rate ~R(i!B) and probability of error
Pr

~W (i!B) 6= ~W (i!B)

 ~=2 for suciently large N1.
We set the capacity Ce of the side channel equal to
Ce =
1
n
H( ~~Cnj ~~Pn; ~~W ) + ": (3.22)
Therefore since the eavesdropper has access to message ~~W and public bits ~~Pn then the side channel
has the necessary capacity to transfer enough bits so that the eavesdropper is able to decode the
condential bits ~~Cn. Indeed assume that we dene the notion of typical set for the tuple ( ~~W; ~~Pn)
of the message and the public bits as
A(N1) (
~~W; ~~Pn) =
n
( ~~w; ~~p
n
) :
  1N1 log p( ~~w) H( ~~W )
  ;  1N1 log p(~~pn) H( ~~Pn)
  ;  1N1 log p( ~~w; ~~pn) H( ~~W; ~~Pn)
   : (3.23)
It can be proved that the probability of observing an atypical tuple ( ~~w; ~~pn) =2 A(N1) ( ~~W; ~~Pn) drops
exponentially fast with increasing N1. Indeed similar to Lemma 8 of [31] one can use the Cherno
bound and prove that Pr
h
A
(N1)
 (
~~W; ~~Pn)
ci
 2 N1u() with u() > 0, for large enough N1. We
will consider the case where we encounter an atypical ( ~~w; ~~pn) tuple as an error event. Moreover
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the conditional typical set A
(N1)
 (
~~Cnj ~~w; ~~pn) with respect to a specic typical sequence ( ~~w; ~~pn) 2
A
(N1)
 (
~~W; ~~Pn) is dened as
A(N1) (
~~Cnj ~~w; ~~pn) =

~~cn :
  1N1 log p( ~~w; ~~pn;~~cn) H( ~~W; ~~Pn; ~~Cn)
   : (3.24)
By using the Cherno bound as in Lemma 8 of [31] it can be proved that for all ( ~~w; ~~pn) 2
A
(N1)
 (
~~W; ~~Pn) the probability of observing a (~~cn) tuple so that ~~cn =2 A(N1) ( ~~Cnj~~w; ~~pn) is dropping
exponentially fast, i.e. Pr
h
A
(N1)
 (
~~Cnj~~w; ~~pn)
ci
 2 N1u0() with u0() > 0, for large enough N1.
As before we will only consider the case of typical ~~cn given a typical (~~w; ~~pn) since the observing an
atypical tuple will be regarded as an error event.
The size of the conditional typical set can be shown to be upper bounded by jA(N1) ( ~~Cn j ~~w; ~~pn)j 
2N1(H(
~~Cnj ~~W; ~~Pn)+2) for every ( ~~w; ~~pn) 2 A(N1) ( ~~W; ~~Pn). Indeed
1 
X
~~cn2A(N1) ( ~~Cnj ~~w;~~pn)
p( ~~w; ~~pn;~~cn)
p( ~~w; ~~pn)
(a)

X
~~cn2A(N1) ( ~~Cnj ~~w;~~pn)
2 N1(H(
~~W; ~~Pn; ~~Cn)+)
2 N1(H(
~~W; ~~Pn) )
=
A(N1) ( ~~Cn j ~~w; ~~pn) 2 N1(H( ~~Cnj ~~W; ~~Pn)+2)
where inequality (a) is based on the denitions (3:23) and (3:24) of the typical sets. Therefore the
size of the conditional typical set
A(N1) ( ~~Cn j ~~w; ~~pn) is upper bounded by
A(N1) ( ~~Cn j ~~w; ~~pn)  2N1(H( ~~Cnj ~~W; ~~Pn)+2) (3.25)
Therefore for each ( ~~w; ~~pn) 2 A(N1) ( ~~W; ~~Pn) all conditionally typical ~~cn 2 A(N1) ( ~~Cn j ~~w; ~~pn) are as-
signed a unique bit sequence. Due to the size of the conditional typical set A
(N1)
 (
~~Cn j ~~w; ~~pn) one
need to use at most N1(H(
~~Cnj ~~W; ~~Pn) + 2) + 1 bits to uniquely identify each ~~cn inside the set.
This one-to-one mapping between all ~~cn 2 A(N1) ( ~~Cn j ~~w; ~~pn) for all typical ( ~~w; ~~pn) is revealed to
the eavesdropper and since the eavesdropper has access to both the message ~~w transmitted and the
public bits ~~pn, the super-source only needs to transmit through the noiseless channel of capacity
Ce the N1(H(
~~Cnj ~~W; ~~Pn) + 2) + 1 bits that identify ~~cn given (~~w; ~~pn). Through the noiseless side
channel one can transfer error free Ce bits per use or else N1(H(
~~Cnj ~~W; ~~Pn) + n") after nN1 uses of
the N1 layers of the stacked network. Therefore if  = "=4 then the error free channel has enough
capacity to transfer all N1(H(
~~Cnj ~~W; ~~Pn) + 2) + 1 bits needed for the decoding of the ~~cn tuple for
large enough N1.
The two sources of error on the code for network I is when the one of the messages ~W
(i!j)
is de-
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coded erroneously and this happens with probability at most ~=2, or when ( ~~w; ~~pn) =2 A(N1) ( ~~W; ~~Pn) or
if for a typical ( ~~w; ~~pn) =2 A(N1) ( ~~W; ~~Pn) then the condential bits are atypical i.e. ~~cn =2 A(N1) ( ~~Cnj~~w; ~~pn).
By taking the numbers of layers N1 of the stacked version of network I large enough one can ensure
that both events happen with probability less than ~=4 and therefore we have devised a code for a
stacked version of network I of rate ~R and overall probability of error less than or equal to . This
code from now one will be viewed as a code of blocklength n1 = nN1 for the non-stacked version of
network I where for notational convenience the public bits ~~Pn1 , the condential bits ~~Cn1 and the
messages ~~W and ~W of rate ~~R and ~R are denoted as ~~Pn1 , ~~Cn1 ~~Wn1 , ~Wn1 respectively.
For all E the eavesdroppers observation (~~Z
(E)
I )
n1 in network I is the same as the eavesdrop-
per's observation is network Ne(Rc; Rp) and similar to the proof of Theorem 8 where each layer is
independent of the others we get
EC
h
I
  ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z(E)I )n1i  n1"12 8E 2 A: (3.26)
I to II:We use a stacked version of network I with N2 layers (that is in general dierent from N1)
where on each layer of the stack we apply the code of blocklength n1 and rate ~R with probability of
error Pr

~Wn1 6= ~Wn1 [ ( ~~Cn1 ; ~~Pn1 ; ~~Wn1) 6= ( ~~Cn1 ; ~~Pn1 ; ~~Wn1)

 ~. Networks I and II are identical
except edge e where the noiseless bit-pipes of network I have been replaced by a broadcast channel
in network II. The stacked code of network I is transformed into a code for the stacked version of
network II with N2 layers by adding a channel code at edge e of network II so that the condential
and public bits are transmitted through the channel that replaced the noiseless bit pipes of e of
network I. It will be proved that the eavesdropper at network II can decode the public bits ~~Pn1
(where the underscore refers to the N2 layers of the stacked) by overhearing the noisy transmission
~~Zn1 , the noiseless bits ~~Ln1 that go through the side link of capacity Ce and the message
~~Wn1 and
therefore the eavesdropper can apply the same code as that was used for network I and additionally
decode the condential bits ~~Cn1 . Below we will explain in details and give the proofs of all the above
steps.
Since (3.19) holds as discussed in the proof of Theorem 8 that a stacked solution of N2 layers for
network I can be build using the random code of blocklength n1 and rate ~R that was designed for
network I. For suciently large N2 all messages can be delivered with rate R
(i!B) and probability
of error Pr

W (i! B) 6=W (i!B)

 =6.
For edge e in network II at every time step t 2 f1; : : : ; n1g once both the public ~~P t and the
condential ~~Ct bits have been received a random channel encoder/decoder pair faN2;t; bN2;tgn1t=1 is
applied to transfer these bits through edge e. At each time step t 2 f1; : : : ; n1g there are N2(Rp+Rc)
bits delivered at the N2 layers of edge e and these bits have to be conveyed to the receiver through
the noisy channel that replaced the noiseless bits of edge e. The N2(Rp+Rc) bits at each time step
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correspond to 2N2(Rp+Rc) incoming messages mt(i), i 2

1; : : : ; 2N2(Rp+Rc)
	
at edge e. The channel
encoders aN2;t at each time step t have assigned to each one of the 2
N2(Rp+Rc) incoming messages
mt(i) a random N2{tuple xt(i) = (xt1(i); : : : ; xtN2(i)) where xtj(i), j 2 f1; : : : ; N2g are chosen from
the distribution p(x) that gives rise to the corresponding mutual informations max
p(x)
I(X;Y ) and
max
p(x)
I(X;Z) of the noisy channel e for network II. This mapping is revealed to both the eavesdropper
and the output of e.
Once the N2(Rp +Rc) public and condential bits at time t are ready for transmission then the
corresponding N2{tuple is transmitted through the N2 noisy channels across the N2 layers and the
intended receiver gets y
t
while the eavesdropper gets zt. From the received N2{tuple yt the decoder
nds the N2{tuple xt(i) corresponding to message mt(i) so that (xt(i); yt) are jointly typical, i.e.
nd message mt(i) such that (xt(i); yt) 2 A
(N2)
t; (X;Y ) where
A
(N2)
t; (X;Y ) =

(x; y) 2 X V1(e)  YV2(e) :
  1N2 log pt(x) Ht(X)
  ;  1N2 log pt(y) Ht(Y )
  ;  1N2 log pt(x; y) Ht(X;Y )
   (3.27)
where pt(x; y) = p(yjx)pt(x). Similar to (3.2) dene indicator function I as
I =
8<: 1; There is t 2 f1; : : : ; n1g such that the encode/decoder pair faN2;t; bN2;tg fails0; otherwise (3.28)
The encoder/decoder pair fail if the received sequence y
t
is not jointly typical with what was sent
and this probability is upper bounded by 2 N2gt() for some gt() > 0 [60, Chapter 7] or if there are
more than one sequences xt(j), xt(k) with j 6= k that are jointly typical with the received sequence
y
t
. According to Theorem 7:6:1 of [60] the probability that y
t
is jointly typical with some xt(j) where
mt(j) is dierent from the message mt(i) that was sent is upper bounded by 2
 N2(maxp(x) I(X;Y ) 3)
and therefore the overall average probability of error at each time step t for the channel code is
upper bounded by
2 N2gt() + 2N2(Rc+Rp)2 N2(maxp(x) I(X;Y ) 3)  2 N2gt() + 2 N2[(maxp(x) I(X;Y ) (Rc+Rp)) 3]:
The above probability is the average probability or error but since there is no guarantee that the
messages mt(i) that needs to transmitted with the channel code are equiprobable then we have
to worry about the expected probability of error instead of the average. In Appendix I of [32] it
was proved that by a careful choice of the channel code's index assignments, each channel code
for every t can have an expected error probability no greater than the average probability. So by
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choosing  = 16
 
maxp(x) I(X;Y )  (Rc +Rp)

we can get that the channel code fails at time t with
an expected probability upper bounded by
2 N2gt() + 2 
N2
2 (maxp(x) I(X;Y ) (Rc+Rp)); (3.29)
and by using the union bound across the n1 time steps we can upper bound the probability of event
(I = 1) as
Pr(I = 1)  2 N2I : (3.30)
Before we continue we need to give a few denitions that will be used in equation (3.35). Let S be
a subset of set f1; : : : ; n1g, i.e. S  f1; : : : ; n1g, including the empty set as well as the whole set, and
Sc to be the complement of S, i.e. Sc = f1; : : : ; n1gnS. We dene FS to be the set fFi : i 2 Sg and
for reasons that will become obvious from equations (3.36), (3.37) and (G.1) we need to compute an
upper bound on quantity H( ~~PSc ;
~~CSc j~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ; ~~CS). For the code of blocklength n1 for network
I the eavesdropper receives ~~Ln1e that are the bits sent by the link of capacity Ce, the public bits
~~Pn1
and the message ~~Wn1 and can decode the condential bits ~~Cn1 with probability of error at most .
Therefore due to Fano's inequality [60] we get
H( ~~Cn1 j ~~Pn1 ; ~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1)  h() + n1Rc: (3.31)
where we remind that h(p) =  p log2 p  (1 p) log2(1 p) is the binary entropy function. Therefore
from the above inequality we get
H( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Ln1e ;
~~Wn1 ; ~~Cn1) = H( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Ln1e ;
~~Wn1) +H( ~~Cn1 j ~~Pn1 ; ~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1)
 H( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1) + h() + n1Rc
or else by applying the chain rule for entropies on both sides of the above inequality
H(~~Ln1e ;
~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ;
~~CS)+H(
~~PSc ;
~~CSc j~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ; ~~CS)H(~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS)+H( ~~PSc j~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS)+h()+n1Rc
) H( ~~CS j~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS) +H( ~~PSc ; ~~CSc j~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ; ~~CS)  H( ~~PSc j~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS) + h() + n1Rc
) H( ~~PSc ; ~~CSc j~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ; ~~CS)  H( ~~PSc) + h() + n1Rc
and since H( ~~PSc)  (n1   jSj)Rp we get
H( ~~PSc ;
~~CSc j~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ; ~~CS)  (n1   jSj)Rp + h() + n1Rc
 (n1   jSj) (Rp + h() + n1Rc)
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where the last inequality holds since we choose set S so that jSj  n1   1. This is done so that
Sc 6= ; in order ~~PSc and ~~CSc to have a non-trivial meaning. Moreover by choosing  small enough
so that h()  maxp(x) I(X;Z) Rp4 and  
maxp(x) I(X;Z) Rp
4n1Rc
we get
H( ~~PSc ;
~~CSc j~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ; ~~CS) 
n1   jSj
2

Rp +max
p(x)
I(X;Z)

: (3.32)
As we discussed above the public and the condential bits are transmitted through the channel
with the use of a random code. We dene the notion of typicality for each time step t 2 f1; : : : ; n1g
with respect to the eavesdropper's channel as the following set
A
(N2)
t; (X;Z) =

(x; z) 2 X  Z :
  1N2 log pt(x) Ht(X)
  ;  1N2 log pt(z) Ht(Z)
  ;  1N2 log pt(x; z) Ht(X;Z)
   : (3.33)
Upon the reception of the information from the degraded channel (z1; : : : ; zn1), where zt 2 ZN2 8t 2
f1; : : : ; n1g, the eavesdropper tries to nd the an n1{tuple of indexes (i1; : : : ; in1) so that the trans-
mitted codeword (x1(i1); : : : ; xn1(in1)) has the property (xt(it); zt) 2 A
(N2)
t; for all t 2 f1; : : : ; n1g
(then we call that the two sequences are jointly typical). An error occurs if the received sequence
(z1; : : : ; zn1) is not jointly typical with what was sent and the probability of this event is upper
bounded by n12
 N2k0() for some k0() > 0 where the term n1 comes from the union bound over
all the n1 time steps and the term 2
 N2k0() comes from an argument identical to the one used in
Lemma 8 of [31]. For suciently large N2 and k() =
1
2k
0() we get that the probability sequence
(z1; : : : ; zn1) is not jointly typical with what was sent is upper bounded by 2
 N2k(). A decoding er-
ror can also occur if there are more than one sequences (x1(i1); : : : ; xn1(in1)) that are jointly typical
with the received sequence (z1; : : : ; zn1). The probability of this event is computed in detail in the
following. Since we consider a random code meaning that we will compute the average probability
of error of all codes created i.i.d. by the distribution p(x) that maximizes I(X;Y ) and I(X;Z)
then without loss of generality we will assume that for all time steps t 2 f1; : : : ; n1g N2{tuple xt(1)
was the one transmitted. The eavesdropper will nd that (x1(1); : : : ; xn1(1)) (compactly written
as xn1(1)) is jointly typical with what was received (z1; : : : ; zn1) (compactly written as z
n1) and
now we will prove that the probability of having any other (x1(i1); : : : ; xn1(in1)) (compactly written
as xn1(in1)) with in1 = (i1; : : : ; in1) 6= (1; : : : ; 1) that is typical with (z1; : : : ; zn1) is exponentially
small. Specically if all ij for j 2 f1; : : : ; n1g are dierent from 1 then the probability (averaging
over all codes C) that (x1(i1); : : : ; xn1(in1)) is jointly typical with (z1; : : : ; zn1) is upper bounded by
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2 N2n1(maxp(x) I(X;Z)+3). Indeed
Pr

8t : (xt(it); zt) 2 A(N2)t; (X;Z)

=
X
C
Pr
n
8t : (xt(it); zt) 2 A(N2)t; (X;Z) jC
o
Pr(C)
where C represents the code. For the specic expression above the part of the code that is of interest
is xn1(1) and xn1(in1) and therefore the right hand side of the above expression becomes
X
xn1 (1);xn1 (in1 )
Pr
n
8t : (xt(it); zt) 2 A(N2)t; (X;Z) jxn1(1); xn1(in1)
o
Pr (xn1(1); xn1(in1))
(a)
=
X
xn1 (1);xn1 (in1 );zn1
Pr
n
8t : (xt(it); zt) 2 A(N2)t; (X;Z) \ zn1 jxn1(1); xn1(in1)
o
Pr (xn1(1))Pr (xn1(in1))
=
X
xn1 (1);xn1 (in1 );zn1
Pr
n
8t : (xt(it); zt) 2 A(N2)t; (X;Z) jxn1(1); xn1(in1); zn1
o
Pr (zn1 jxn1(1); xn1(in1) )Pr (xn1(1))Pr (xn1(in1))
(b)
=
X
xn1 (1);xn1 (in1 );zn1
 Y
t2f1;:::;n1g
Pr
n
(xt(it); zt) 2 A(N2)t; (X;Z) jxt(it); zt
o
Pr (zn1 jxn1(1))Pr (xn1(1))Pr (xn1(in1))
=
X
xn1 (in1 );zn1
 Y
t2f1;:::;n1g
Pr
n
(xt(it); zt) 2 A(N2)t; (X;Z) jxt(it); zt
o
Pr (xn1(in1))
X
xn1 (1)
Pr (zn1 ; xn1(1))
=
X
xn1 (in1 );zn1
 Y
t2f1;:::;n1g
Pr
n
(xt(it); zt) 2 A(N2)t; (X;Z) jxt(it); zt
o
Pr (xn1(in1))Pr (zn1)
(c)
=
X
xn1 (in1 );zn1
Y
t2f1;:::;n1g
Pr
n
(xt(it); zt) 2 A(N2)t; (X;Z) jxt(it); zt
o
Pr (xt(it))Pr (zt)
=
Y
t2f1;:::;n1g
X
xt(it);zt
Pr
n
(xt(it); zt) 2 A(N2)t; (X;Z) jxt(it); zt
o
Pr (xt(it))Pr (zt)
=
Y
t2f1;:::;n1g
X
(xt(it);zt)2A
(N2)
t;
Pr (xt(it))Pr (zt)
(d)

Y
t2f1;:::;n1g
2N(Ht(X;Z)+)2 N(Ht(X) )2 N(Ht(Z) )
(f)
=2 n1N(maxp(x) I(X;Z) 3) (3.34)
where (a) and (c) hold since the codebook is chosen independently for dierent time steps, (b)
holds since zn1 is conditionally independent of xn1(in1) when xn1(1) is given and (d) holds since
the codebook is created by the distribution p(x) that maximizes the mutual information I(X;Z).
In the inequality above we assumed that all indexes i1; : : : ; in1 are dierent from 1. If some
of the indexes are equal to 1 then the probability of joint typicality is larger. Specically de-
ne the subset S  f1; : : : ; n1g so that 8t 2 S it = 1 whereas 8t 2 Sc it 6= 1. Then the
probability that (x1(i1); : : : ; xn1(in1)) is jointly typical with (z1; : : : ; zn1) is upper bounded by
2 (n1 jSj)N2(maxp(x) I(X;Z) 3). Indeed we just need to do the analysis that derived equation (3.34)
only for the indexes in the set Sc and upper bound the probability that (xt(it); zt) 2 A(N2)t; (X;Z)
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for t 2 S by 1. Therefore
Pr

8t : (xt(it); zt) 2 A(N2)t; (X;Z)

 2 (n1 jSj)N2(maxp(x) I(X;Z) 3) (3.35)
if 8t 2 S it = 1 and 8t 2 Sc it 6= 1 and remember that we assume that xn(1) was the message
transmitted.
In Appendix G we dene the notion of typicality for vector (~~Ln1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1) and the notion
of conditional typicality for vector ( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1) given a typical vector (
~~`n1 ; ~~wn1). We also showed
that with very high probability vectors (~~Ln1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1) will be typical and therefore the event
that this vector is atypical is regarded as an error event and consequently the eavesdropper will
only search among the typical ( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1) given (
~~`n1 ; ~~wn1) to nd the one transmitted. Once the
bits from the side link
~~`n1 , and the message ~~wn1 have been received the number of conditionally
typical public and condential bits ( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1) given the specic
~~`n1 and ~~wn1 is upper bounded by
2
n1N2
2 (Rp+maxp(x) I(X;Z))+2N2! according to equation (G.1). Therefore the probability that there is
another (x1(i1); : : : ; xn1(in1)) (other than (x1(1); : : : ; xn1(1))) with, ij 6= 1; 8j 2 f1; : : : ; n1g that is
jointly typical with (z1; : : : ; zn1) is upper bounded by
Pr (E;)
(a)

A(N2)!  ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 j ~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 2 nN2(maxp(x) I(X;Z) 3)
(b)
 2n1N22 (Rp+maxp(x) I(X;Z))+2N! 2 n1N2(maxp(x) I(X;Z) 3)
= 2 
n1N2
2 (maxp(x) I(X;Z) Rp)+2N2!+3n1N2
 2 N22 (maxp(x) I(X;Z) Rp)+2N!+3n1N2 : (3.36)
where inequalities (a) and (b) follow from (3.34) and (G.1) respectively and the meaning subscript
; will become obvious from the following equation. In general the probability that there is another
(x1(i1); : : : ; xn1(in1)) with it = 1 for t 2 S  f1; : : : ; n1g and it 6= 1 for t 2 Sc such that it is jointly
typical with (z1; : : : ; zn1) is upper bounded by
Pr (ES)
(a)

A(N2)!  ~~PSc ; ~~CSc j ~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pS ;~~cS 2 (n1 jSj)N2(maxp(x) I(X;Z) 3)
(b)
 2 (n1 jSj)N22 (Rp+maxp(x) I(X;Z))+2N2! 2 (n1 jSj)N2(maxp(x) I(X;Z) 3)
= 2 
(n1 jSj)N2
2 (maxp(x) I(X;Z) Rp)+2N2!+3n1N2
 2 N22 (maxp(x) I(X;Z) Rp)+2N2!+3n1N2 (3.37)
where inequalities (a) and (b) hold due to (3.35) and (G.1) respectively and (~~p
t
;~~ct) are set to val-
ues corresponding to message mt(1) for all t 2 S. If ! is set to ! = 116
 
maxp(x) I(X;Z) Rp

and
 = 124n1
 
maxp(x) I(X;Z) Rp

then the probability that there is at least one (x1(i1); : : : ; xn1(in1))
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other than (x1(1); : : : ; xn1(1)) that is jointly typical with (z1(1); : : : ; zn1(1)) is bounded above ac-
cording to equations (3.36) and (3.37) by
Pr (ES)  2n12 
n1N2
4 (maxp(x) I(X;Z) Rp)  2 n1N28 (maxp(x) I(X;Z) Rp)
where the term 2n1 in the rst inequality above is coming from the union bound over all subsets
S and the last inequality holds for suciently large N2. Since Rp < maxp(x) I(X;Z) then this
probability drops exponentially fast to zero and therefore since the eavesdropper can decode the
public bits ~~Pn1 it can use the code of network I and decode ~~Cn1 . By choosing N2 suciently large
we can make the overall probability of error, that is either one of the messages W (i!j) is decoded
erroneously at some node j 2 V or the public bits ~~Pn1 , condential bits ~~Cn1 or the message ~~Wn1
erroneously decode on the eavesdropper, upper bounded by 3 . The code created for the stack version
of network II with N2 layers can be viewed as a code of blocklength n2 = N2n1 = N2N1n for the
non-stacked version of network II.
II to N : So far we have started with a code for network Ne(Rc; Rp) of blocklength n and rate ~~R
and we constructed a code for network II of blocklength n2 = N2N1n and rate R and we will now
prove that this is also a secure code. To do that we need to prove that the for all eavesdropping sets
E not containg e, i.e. I( ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z(E))n1) is small and that I( ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z)n1) is small too.
For term I( ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z(E))n1), similar to (3.7) and for N2 suciently large,
EC
h
I
  ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z(E))n1i  2 + EC hI  ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z(E))n1 jI = 0i
Note that EC
h
I
  ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z(E))n1 jI = 0i = EC hI  ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z(E)I )n1 jI = 0i = EC hI  ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z(E)I )n1i
where (~~Z
(E)
I )
n1 is the eavesdropper's observation on E links of the stacked version of network I with
N2 layers, since (
~~Z(E))n1 and (~~Z
(E)
I )
n1 are identical when the channel code on edge e do not fail
for any time t 2 f1; : : : ; n1g, which is the condition indicated by I = 0. Moreover the last equality
holds since the event I = 0 on network I is independent of the messages ~~Wn1 and overheard signal
(~~Z
(E)
I )
n1 on network I. Thus
EC
h
I
  ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z(E))n1i  2 + EC hI  ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z(E)I )n1i
 2 +N2EC
h
I
  ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z(E)I )n1i (a) 2 +N2n1" (b) n1N2" (3.38)
where (a) follows from (3.26), and (b) holds for suciently large N2.
For term I( ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z)n1), we rst need to upper bound H( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ; ~~Wn1 j~~Zn1 ; ~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1). Since
the public bits ~~Pn1 and the condential bits ~~Cn1 can be decoded with probability of error at most
74
 then due to Fano's inequality [60, Theorem 2:10:1]
EC
h
H( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ; ~~Wn1 j~~Zn1 ; ~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1)
i
=EC
h
H( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 j~~Zn1 ; ~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1)
i
h() + n2(Rp +Rc)
(3.39)
From the denition of mutual information we get
EC
h
I( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~Zn1 ; ~~Ln1e ;
~~Wn1)
i
= EC
h
H( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ; ~~Wn1)
i
  EC
h
H( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ; ~~Wn1 j~~Zn1 ; ~~Ln1e ; ~~Wn1)
i
(a)
 EC
h
H( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ; ~~Wn1)
i
  h()  n2(Rp +Rc)
(b)
 EC
h
H( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Wn1)
i
+ EC
h
H( ~~Cn1 j~~Pn1 ; ~~Wn1)
i
  n2"
(c)
= N2N1EC
h
H( ~~Pn; ~~W )
i
+N2N1EC
h
H( ~~Cnj ~~Pn; ~~W )
i
  n2"
(d)
= N2N1EC
h
H( ~~Pn; ~~W )
i
+ nN2N1(Ce   ")  n2"
= N2N1

EC
h
H( ~~W )
i
+ EC
h
H( ~~Pnj ~~W )
i
+ nN2N1(Ce   2")
(e)
 N2N1

EC
h
H( ~~W )
i
+ EC
h
H( ~~Pn)
i
+ nN2N1(Ce   3") (3.40)
where inequality (a) is Fano's inequality expressed in (3.39), inequality (b) holds since we choose 
small enough so that h() + n1(Rp + Rc) < n2", equality (c) holds since the information bits on
the dierent layers of the stacked network are independent, (d) follows from equation (3.22), and (e)
holds since the code of blocklength n and rate ~~R is secure and therefore
n  EC
h
I( ~~W ; ~~Pn)
i
, n  EC
h
H( ~~Pn)
i
  EC
h
H( ~~Pnj ~~W )
i
, EC
h
H( ~~Pnj ~~W )
i
 EC
h
H( ~~Pn)
i
  n" (3.41)
Moreover by the chain rule we get
EC
h
I( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~Zn1 ; ~~Ln1e ;
~~Wn1)
i
= EC
h
I( ~~Wn1 ; ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ; ~~Wn1)
i
+ EC
h
I(~~Ln1e ;
~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ; ~~Wn1 j ~~Wn1)
i
+ EC
h
I(~~Zn1 ; ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1; ~~Wn1 j ~~Wn1 ; ~~Ln1e )
i
 EC
h
H( ~~Wn1)
i
+ EC
h
H(~~Ln1e )
i
+ EC
h
I(~~Zn1 ; ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 j ~~Wn1 ; ~~Ln1e )
i
= N2N1EC
h
H( ~~W )
i
+ n1N2N1Ce + EC
h
I(~~Zn1 ; ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 j ~~Wn1 ; ~~Ln1e )
i
(3.42)
Therefore N2N1

EC
h
H( ~~W )
i
+ EC
h
H( ~~Pn)
i
+nN2N1(Ce 3")  N2N1EC
h
H( ~~W )
i
+n1N2N1Ce+
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EC
h
I(~~Zn1 ; ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 j ~~Wn1 ; ~~Ln1e )
i
or equivalently
N2N1EC
h
H( ~~Pn)
i
 EC
h
I(~~Zn1 ; ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 j ~~Wn1 ; ~~Ln1e )
i
+ 3nN2N1" (3.43)
Moreover since ~~Wn1 ; ~~Ln1e ;
~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ! ~~Xn1 ! ~~Zn1 we get from the data processing inequality that
EC
h
I( ~~Wn1 ; ~~Ln1e ;
~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ; ~~Zn1)
i
 EC
h
I( ~~Xn1 ; ~~Zn1)
i
. By using the chain rule in the left hand side
of the inequality we get
EC
h
I( ~~Wn1 ; ~~Zn1)
i
+ EC
h
I(~~Ln1e ;
~~Zn1 j ~~Wn1)
i
+ EC
h
I( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ; ~~Zn1 j ~~Wn1 ; ~~Ln1e )
i
 EC
h
I( ~~Xn1 ; ~~Zn1)
i
 nN2N1max
p(x)
I(X;Z)
or else EC
h
I( ~~Wn1 ; ~~Zn1)
i
is upper bounded by
EC
h
I( ~~Wn1 ; ~~Zn1)
i
 nN2N1max
p(x)
I(X;Z)  EC
h
I( ~~Pn1 ; ~~Cn1 ; ~~Zn1 j ~~Wn1 ; ~~Ln1e )
i
(a)
 nN2N1max
p(x)
I(X;Z) N2N1EC
h
H( ~~Pn)
i
+ 3nN2N1" (3.44)
where inequality (a) follows from (3.43). By combining inequalities (3.20) and (3.21) we get
H( ~~Pn)  n

max
p(x)
I(X;Z)  "

and therefore by combining the inequality above with (3.44) we get
EC
h
I( ~~Wn1 ; ~~Zn1)
i
 4nN2N1"
and since Wn1 ! ~~Wn1 ! ~~Zn1 , where Wn1 si the message of rate R. Due to the data processing
inequality
EC
h
I(Wn1 ; ~~Zn1)
i
 EC
h
I( ~~Wn1 ; ~~Zn1)
i
 4nN2N1": (3.45)
From inequalities (3.38), (3.45) and since n1 = nN1 we have created a random code that for any
E 2 A
EC
h
I
  ~~Wn1 ; ( ~~Z(E))n1i  4nN1N2" (3.46)
and probability of error less than 3 . One can follow an analysis identical to the one used in equation
(3.1) of Theorem 8 to prove that there is at least one deterministic code (; 12";R){S(N ; A) for
network N .
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Lemma 5. The secrecy rate region R Ne(Rc; Rp); A is continuous in (Rc; Rp) for all Rc > 0,
Rp > 0 and A 2 P(E).
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 2 of [31]. The only dierence is that now
the codes are secure codes, and we need to check the security constraint for the code that results
from the prior code construction. Dene for any Rc > 0, Rp > 0, c < Rc and p < Rp
(c; p)
def
= max
R^2R(Ne(Rc+c;Rp+p);A)
min
R2R(Ne(Rc c;Rp p);A)
jjR^  Rjj1;
which is the worst-case `1-norm between any point in R
 N e(Rc + c; Rp + p); A and its closest
point in R N e(Rc   c; Rp   p); A. To prove continuity, we show that for any  > 0, there exists
a c > 0 and p > 0 such that (c; p)   .
Fix any c > 0, p > 0 and R^ 2 R
 N e(Rc+c; Rp+p); A. Then for any  and N^ suciently
large there is a solution (; "; R^){S N e(Rc + c; Rp + p); A for network N e(Rc + c; Rp + p).
The same solution can be applied to the stacked network N e(Rc   c; Rp   p) with N number of
layers in the stack as long as number N is chosen large enough so that
N(Rc   c)  N^(Rc + c)
N(Rp   p)  N^(Rp + p):
Indeed this can be accomplished by operating the solution S N e(Rc + c; Rp + p); A unchanged
across the rst N^ copies of the stacked network N e(Rc   c; Rp   p) since networks N e(Rc +
c; Rp+p) and N e(Rc c; Rp p) are identical apart from edge e, and sending the N^(Rc+c)
and N^(Rp + p) bits intended for transmission across the N^ bit pipes of rate Rc + c and Rp + p
respectively of edge e across the N copies of the rate Rc   c and Rc + c respectively of bit pipe e
in network N e(Rc   c; Rp   p). Setting
N =

N^ max

Rc + c
Rc   c ;
Rp + p
Rp   p

(3.47)
and
q = argmax

Rc + c
Rc   c ;
Rp + p
Rp   p

:
The rate R for the resulting code in network N e(Rc   c; Rp   p) is
R =
R^N^
N
 R^ N^(Rq   q)
N^(Rq + q) +Rq   q
which approaches R^ as N^ grows without bound. The new code is secure since I
 
( ZE)
n
;W

=
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I
 
(Z^
E
)
n
;W

< nN^" < n N" for every E 2 A.
Now we have all the tools necessary to prove Theorem 10 saying that one can change a link
e, that is either not eavesdropped or if eavesdropped it is not wiretapped simultaneously with any
other link, with a noiseless degraded broadcast channel without aecting the secrecy rate region of
the initial network. Applying Theorem 10 for every channel in a network where jEj = 1 for every
E 2 A, proves the optimality of the separation between channel network coding over unreliable
channels in secure communication networks.
Proof of Theorem 10. From Lemma 4 and Theorem 9 we get R(Ne(Rc ;Rp ); A)  R(N ; A) 
R(Ne(Rc+;Rp+); A) 8 > 0. Therefore by taking  to zero and using the continuity proved in
Lemma 5 we have R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A) = R(N ; A) where Rc = max
p(x)
I(X(e);Y (e))  max
p(x)
I(X(e);Z(e))
and Rp = max
p(x)
I(X(e);Z(e)).
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Figure 3.5: The \equivalent" secret and communication networks
3.4.3 Proof of Theorem 11
Proof of Theorem 11. The idea of the proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 4. The essence
of the proof is that we will start with a secure code for network Ne(Rc; 0) and we will construct a
secure code for network N . Specically we will show how to achieve any point R inside the secrecy
rate region of network Ne(Rc; 0) at network N . The two networks Ne(Rc; 0) and N are identical
except from edge e where at network Ne(Rc; 0) edge e is a noiseless bit pipe that can carry up to Rc
bits per channel use whereas edge e in network N is a noisy degraded broadcast channel with the
property Rc < max
p(x)
I(X;Y ) max
p(x)
I(X;Z). This property is essential so that one can apply a secure
channel such as the one derived by Wyner [17] and carry the information traveling edge e securely.
Specically the information bits Cn transversing edge e of network Ne(Rc; 0) will be mixed with
some random bits Pn in networkN to ensure the security of the code for networkN . To prove that an
eavesdropper gets a very small mutual information with the message by choosing any eavesdropping
set E 2 A we would make use of an auxiliary network I shown in Figure 3.5. Network I is similar
to network N with the addition that for every eavesdropping set E where e 2 E we add a receiver
that has access to the whole message W , the eavesdropper's observation (ZEnfeg)n, the degraded
output Zn from the channel in edge e and a noiseless bit of capacity CE carrying bits (the value of
CE is dened in equation (3.49)) from a \super source" that has access to (C
n; Pn) the information
transversing edge e at network N , message W and the eavesdropper's observation (ZEnfeg)n. The
additional receiver corresponding to eavesdropping set E demands message W , the eavesdropping
observations (ZEnfeg)n and the information (Pn; Cn) input to edge e. These additional receivers
assist in the proof of the secrecy of the code for those eavesdropping set E 2 A such that e 2 E
in the following manner: the sum of capacities of (W; (ZEnfeg)n; Zn; LnE) (where L
n
E are the bits in
the noiseless bit pipe of capacity CE) that are all the incoming links to the auxiliary receivers is
almost equal to the entropy of (Pn; Cn;W; (ZEnfeg)n) that correspond to the decoded message at
the auxiliary receivers and therefore all links are lled up to capacity. Therefore there is no spare
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capacity at links ((ZEnfeg)n; Zn) to carry any information about message W and therefore the code
is secure. The proof of secrecy for eavesdropping sets E 2 A such that e =2 E is derived identical to
equation (3.38) of the proof of Lemma4 and therefore is skipped. The details of the proof for those
E 2 A such that e 2 E follow below.
Fix any rate R inside the secrecy rate region of network Ne(Rc; 0), i.e. R 2 int(R(N (Re); A))
and choose some ~R 2 int(R(N (Re); A)) such that ~R(i!B) > R(i!B) for all i 2 V and B 2 B(i) with
R(i!B) > 0. Then for any  > 0 and " > 0 there is a solution of blocklength n and rate ~R for
network Ne(Rc; 0) such that Pr

~W (j!K;i) 6= ~W (j!K)

<  for all (j;K) with K 2 B(j), i 2 K and
R(j!K) > 0, and I
 
( ~ZE)n; ~W

< n" for all E 2 A, where the tilde on the eavesdropper's observation
(~ZE)n and the message ~W refers to the fact that the code operates at rate ~R. By carefully choosing
parameter  it was shown in the proof of Theorem 8 one can create a (2 N; "; R){S(Ne(Rc; 0); A)
solution for the stacked network N e(Rc; 0). One can use code (2 N; "; R){S(N e(Rc; 0); A) along
with some channel encoder/decoder faNt; bNtgNt=1 pair and nd a secure solution for the stacked
network N where the noiseless bit pipe of edge e have been replaced by a noisy degraded broadcast
channel. The channel code works as follows: At each time step t 2 f1; : : : ; ng once the bits ~Ct
on edge e of network N (Re) have been received they are transmitted through the noisy channel
along with N(maxp(x) I(X;Z)  ") random bits denoted by ~P t. The random bits ~P t are generated
independently across dierent times t and independent of the message W and the noise randomness.
Therefore the entropy H
 
~Pn

of the random bits across the n time steps is equal to
H
 
~Pn

= nN

max
p(x)
I(X;Z)  "

(3.48)
and the rate Rp of the random bits equal to Rp = maxp(x) I(X;Z)  ".
Therefore at each time step t there is a total of N(Rc+Rp) bits delivered at the input of edge e
and have to be conveyed through the degraded broadcast channel that replaced the noiseless bit pipe
of rate Rc of network Ne(Rc; 0). The N(Rc + Rp) bits at each time step correspond to 2N(Rc+Rp)
incoming messages mt(i), i 2

1; : : : ; 2N(Rc+Rp)
	
at edge e. The channel encoders aN;t at each
time step t have assigned to each one of the 2N(Rc+Rp) incoming messages mt(i) a random N{tuple
~Xt(i) =

~Xt1(i); : : : ; ~XtN (i)

where ~Xtj(i), j 2 f1; : : : ; Ng are chosen from the distribution p(x)
that gives rise to the corresponding mutual informations maxp(x) I(X;Y ) and maxp(x) I(X;Z) of
the noisy degraded broadcast channel e. This mapping is revealed to both the eavesdropper and
V2(e) that is the output of e. Once the N(Rc + Rp) public and condential bits at time t are
ready for transmission then the corresponding N{tuple is transmitted through the N noisy channels
across the N layers and the intended receiver gets ~Y t. From the received N{tuple
~Y t the decoder
nds the N{tuple ~Xt(i) corresponding to the transmitted message mt(i) so that (
~Xt(i);
~Y t) are
jointly typical, i.e. nd message mt(i) such that ( ~Xt(i);
~Y t) 2 A(N)t; ( ~X; ~Y ) where the denition
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A
(N)
t; ( ~X; ~Y ) is given in (3.27). As shown in equation (3.29) one can choose  appropriately so that
the probability that the channel code fails drops exponentially fast. At a later point in the proof it
is going to be useful to mention that if one has access to the bits ~Ct transversing edge e and the
degraded output ~Zt of edge e then one can decode the random bits
~P t. Indeed from the received
N{tuple ~Zt one can nd N{tuple
~Xt(i) corresponding to the transmitted message mt(i) so that
( ~Xt(i);
~Zt) are jointly typical, i.e. nd message mt(i) such that (
~Xt(i);
~Zt) 2 A(N)t; ( ~X; ~Z) where the
denition A
(N)
t; (
~X; ~Z) is given in (3.33). The probability that there are more than one sequences
~Xt(j),
~Xt(k) with j 6= k that are jointly typical with the received sequence ~Zt is upper bounded by
2NRp2 N(maxp(x) I(X;Z) 3) and by choosing  = 16 maxp(x) I(X;Z) makes the probability of error
to drop exponentially fast with the number of layers N .
By setting the capacity CE of the side channel to each auxiliary receiver equal to
CE =
1
n
H
 
~Cnj(~ZEnfeg)n; ~W + ": (3.49)
then the side channel has the necessary capacity to transfer enough bits so that the auxiliary re-
ceiver is able to decode bits ~C
n
. Indeed since each auxiliary receiver has access to message ~W and
eavesdropper's observation (~ZEnfeg)n by dening the notion of typical set for tuple ( ~w; (~zEnfeg)n)
as
A(N)
 
~W; ( ~ZEnfeg)n

=
n
( ~w; (~zEnfeg)n) :
  1N log p( ~w) H( ~W )
  ;  1N log p((~zEnfeg)n) H ( ~ZEnfeg)n
  ;  1N log p( ~w; (~zEnfeg)n) H  ~W; ( ~ZEnfeg)n
   :
and the notion of conditionally typical ~cn given a typical ( ~w; (~zEnfeg)n) as
A(N) ( ~C
nj ~w; (~zEnfeg)n) =

~cn :
  1N log p(~cn; ~w; (~zEnfeg)n) H  ~Cn; ~W; ( ~ZEnfeg)n
   :
one can prove similarly to (3.25) that the size of the conditionally typical set A
(N)
 ( ~Cnj ~w; (~zEnfeg)n)
is upper bounded by
A(N) ( ~Cnj ~w; (~zEnfeg)n)  2N [H( ~Cnj ~W;( ~ZEnfeg)n)+2]:
By using the Cherno bound as in Lemma 8 of [31] it can be proved that the probability of observing
an atypical ~w; (~zEnfeg)n or a conditionally atypical ~cn for a typical ( ~w; (~zEnfeg)n) drops exponentially
fast. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4 we only consider the case of typical ~cn given a typical
( ~w; (~zEnfeg)n) since the observing an atypical tuple has exponential small probability and will be
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regarded as an error event. By setting  = "=4 the error free channel has enough capacity to transfer
all N [H( ~Cnj ~W; ( ~ZEnfeg)n) + 2] bits needed to describe all typical ~cn during the nN channel uses
of the noiseless bit pipe and therefore allowing the auxiliary receiver to decode ~cn. So far we have
started with a rate ~R secure code for network Ne(Rc; 0) and constructed code for a stacked version
of network I in Figure 3.5. The sources of error for the constructed code of network I are when the
code for the stack network N e(Rc; 0) fails or when the channel code at edge e fails or when tuple
( ~w; (~zEnfeg)n) or ~cn are atypical. The overall probability of decoding error for the stacked version
of network I can be made less than value  by choosing the number of layers N of the stack large
enough.
In order to prove the security of the constructed code for network N we rst need to upper bound
H
 
~Pn; ~Cn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~W j~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~LnE ; ~W

. Since the message ~W , the public bits ~Pn, the
condential bits ~Cn and the eavesdropper's observation (~ZEnfeg)n can be decoded with probability
of error at most  then due to Fano's inequality [60]
EC
h
H
 
~Pn; ~Cn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~W j~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~LnE ; ~W
i
= EC
h
H
 
~Pn; ~Cnj~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~LnE ; ~W
i
 h() + nN(Rc +Rp) (3.50)
From the denition of mutual information we get
EC
h
I
 
~Pn; ~Cn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~W ; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~LnE ; ~W
i
= EC
h
H
 
~Pn; ~Cn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~W
i  EC hH ~Pn; ~Cn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~W j~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~LnE ; ~W i
(a)
 EC
h
H
 
~Pn; ~Cn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~W
i  h()  nN(Rp +Rc)
(b)
 EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)n; ~W
i
+ EC
h
H
 
~Cnj(~ZEnfeg)n; ~W i+EC hH ~Pnj~Cn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~W i nN"
(c)
= EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)n; ~W
i
+ EC
h
H
 
~Cnj(~ZEnfeg)n; ~W i+ EC hH ~Pni  nN"
(d)
= EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)n; ~W
i
+NEC
h
H
 
~Cnj( ~ZE)n; ~W i+ EC hH ~Pni  nN"
(e)
= EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)n; ~W
i
+ nN(CE   ") + EC
h
H
 
~Pn
i  nN"
= EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)n; ~W
i
+ nN(CE   2") + EC
h
H
 
~Pn
i
(3.51)
where (a) holds due to (3.50), (b) holds since we choose  small enough so that h()+n(Rp+Rc) <
n", (c) holds since the public bits ~Pn are chosen independently of the message ~W , the condential
bits ~Cn and the noise inserted in the network, (d) holds since the information bits on the dierent
layers of the stacked network are independent, and (e) follows from equation (3.49).
By applying the chain rule on mutual information I
 
~Pn; ~Cn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~W ; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~LnE ; ~W

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we get similarly to inequality (3.42)
EC
h
I
 
~Pn; ~Cn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~W ; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~LnE ; ~W
i
 EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)n; ~W
i
+EC
h
H
 
~LnE
i
+EC
h
I
 
~Pn; ~Cn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~W ; ~Znj(~ZEnfeg)n; ~LnE ; ~W
i
 EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)n; ~W
i
+ nNCE + EC
h
I
 
~Pn; ~Cn; ~Znj(~ZEnfeg)n; ~LnE ; ~W
i
Therefore EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)n; ~W
i
+nN(CE 2")+EC
h
H
 
~Pn
i  EC hH (~ZEnfeg)n; ~W i+nNCE+
EC
h
I
 
~Pn; ~Cn; ~Znj(~ZEnfeg)n; ~LnE ; ~W
i
or equivalently
EC
h
H
 
~Pn
i  EC hI ~Pn; ~Cn; ~Znj(~ZEnfeg)n; ~LnE ; ~W i+ 2nN": (3.52)
Moreover since ~W; ~LnE ;
~Pn; ~Cn; (~ZEnfeg)n ! ~Xn; (~ZEnfeg)n ! ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n we get from the data
processing inequality that I
 
~W; ~LnE ;
~Pn; ~Cn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n
  I  ~Xn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n
and by using the chain rule in the left hand side of this inequality we get
I
 
~W ; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n

+ I
 
~LnE ; (
~ZEnfeg)n; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)nj ~W + I ~Pn; ~Cn; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)nj ~W; ~LnE ; (~ZEnfeg)n
 I  ~Xn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n: (3.53)
The right hand side of inequality (3.53) can be expanded as
EC
h
I
 
~Xn; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n
i
= EC
h
H
 
~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n
i  EC hH ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)nj ~Xn; (~ZEnfeg)ni
(a)
= EC
h
H
 
~Zn
i
+ EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)nj~Zni  EC hH ~Znj ~Xni
 EC
h
I
 
~Xn; ~Zn
i
+ EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)n
i
= nN max
p(x)
I(X;Z) + EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)n
i
: (3.54)
where equality (a) holds since ~Zn is conditionally independent of (~ZEnfeg)n given ~Xn. Due to
the fact that I
 
~Pn; ~Cn; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)nj ~W; ~LnE ; (~ZEnfeg)n

= I
 
~Pn; ~Cn; ~Znj ~W; ~LnE ; (~ZEnfeg)n

and
combining (3.53), (3.54) we get
EC
h
I
 
~W ; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n
i
+ EC
h
I
 
~LnE ; (
~ZEnfeg)n; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)nj ~W i+ EC hI ~Pn; ~Cn; ~Znj ~W; ~LnE ; (~ZEnfeg)ni
 nN max
p(x)
I(X;Z) + EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)n
i
or since H
 
(~ZEnfeg)nj ~W  = I ~LnE ; (~ZEnfeg)n; ( ~ZEnfeg)nj ~W   I ~LnE ; (~ZEnfeg)n; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)nj ~W 
EC
h
I
 
~W ; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n
i
+ EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)nj ~W i+ EC hI ~Pn; ~Cn; ~Znj ~W; ~LnE ; (~ZEnfeg)ni
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 nN max
p(x)
I(X;Z) + EC
h
H
 
(~ZEnfeg)n
i
or else EC
h
I
 
~W ; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n
i
is upper bounded by
EC
h
I
 
~W ; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n
i
 nN max
p(x)
I(X;Z) + EC
h
I
 
~W ; ( ~ZEnfeg)n
i  EC hI ~Pn; ~Cn; ~Znj ~W; ~LnE ; (~ZEnfeg)ni
(a)
 nN max
p(x)
I(X;Z) + EC
h
I
 
~W ; ( ~ZEnfeg)n
i  EC hH ~Pni+ 2nN"
(b)
 nN max
p(x)
I(X;Z) +NEC
h
I
 
~W ; ( ~ZEnfeg)n
i  nN max
p(x)
I(X;Z)  "+ 2nN"
(c)
 4nN"
where inequality (a) follows from (3.52) and inequality (b) holds since the messages ~W are indepen-
dent across dierent layers and equation (3.49) and inequality (c) holds since the code for network
Ne(Rc; 0) of rate ~R is secure, i.e. EC
h
I
 
~W ; ( ~ZEnfeg)n
i  n".
Since W ! ~W ! ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n and the data processing inequality we get that we have con-
structed a random code with EC
h
I(W ; ~Zn; (~ZEnfeg)n)
i
 4nN". One can follow an analysis identical
to the one used in equation (3.1) of Theorem 8 to prove that there is at least one deterministic code
(3; 12";R){S(N ; A) for network N .
3.4.4 Proof of Theorem 12
Proof of Theorem 12. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 4 and therefore we will only
give an outline. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4 we assume any rate R in the relative interior of the
rate region of network N (A), i.e. R 2 int (R(N (A))), and choose another rate ~R 2 int (R(N (A)))
such that ~R(i!B) > R(i!B) for all i 2 V and B 2 B(i) with R(i!B) > 0. Then by a carefully selected
~ > 0 and for every " > 0 we can construct a stacked solution of rate R for stacked network N (A)
with probability of error less than =3. The number of layers in the stack will be denoted by N .
We make use of an auxiliary network I which is the same as the A-enhanced network except
that the noiseless bit pipes in

Ce : e 2 E
	 [ he : e 2 E	 are changed back to the original noisy
channels. To guarantee the security of the code used in network I we need to ll up to capacity
the degraded broadcast channels of network I. Specically when the broadcast noiseless channels of
networkN (A) are changed to their noisy counterparts in network I the capacity of the eavesdropper's
channel increases from Re;p to max
p(x)
I(X(e); Z(e)). To ll up the capacity to the eavesdropper for every
broadcast channel e 2 E at each time step t 2 f1; : : : ; ng we add to the public bits some random
bits F
(e)
t such that H
 
F
(e)
t

= N
 
max
p(x)
I(X(e); Z(e)) Re;p

. Since the random bits are independent
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across dierent time steps
H
 
(F (e))n

= nN
 
max
p(x)
I(X(e); Z(e)) Re;p

: (3.55)
In the rest of the proof we will assume that the public bits ( P
(e)
)n at each channel e of network I of
Figure 3.6 denote both the public bits (P (e))n of network N (A) and the random bits (F (e))n added
to ll up the eavesdropper's pipe, i.e. ( P
(e)
)n =
 
(P (e))n; (F (e))n

We will show that rate R is achievable in network I of Figure 3.6 where all noiseless links are
changed to noisy ones. RateR is indeed achievable since we can apply a channel code at every channel
e 2 E and since Re < max
p(x)
I(X(e); Y (e)) and Re;p+Re;c < max
p(x)
I(X(e); Y (e)) for every point to point
and degraded channel respectively the channel codes can transfer the bits previously transfered by
the noiseless links to the output of channel e for all e 2 E with small probability of error where rate
Re;p correspond to the rate of public bits ( P
(e)
)n. The jEj additional receivers of the stacked network
N (A) can decode messages (W;T ) by having access to message W , the bits LnE through the side
channel, and the public bits (PE)n where (PE)n denotes ((P (e1))n; : : : ; (P (ejE ))n) for all er 2 E with
small probability of error. Since by decoding (W;T ) one knows every bit transversing the noiseless
network N (A) and therefore the condential bits (CE)n by Fano's inequality [60, Theorem 2:10:1]
we get
H
 
(CE)njW;LnE ; (PE)n
  h() + nNX
e2E
Re;c:
This equation is similar to equation (3.31) in the proof of Lemma 4. By an analysis identical to the
one following equation (3.31) it can be proved that the additional receivers can decode (W;T ) and
therefore rate R is achievable at network I of Figure 3.6.
It only remains to prove that the code above designed for network I of Figure 3.6 is secure when
used in network N . Indeed by Fano's inequality and by choosing  small enough on can get
I
 
T ;LnE ; (Z
(E))njW  = H T jW ) H T jW;LnE ; (Z(E))n
 H T   nN":
and since I
 
T ;LnE ; (Z
(E))njW  = I T ; (Z(E))njW +I T ;LnE jW; (Z(E))n we get I T ; (Z(E))njW  
H
 
T
  I T ;LnE jW; (Z(E))n  nN" or else
 I T ; (Z(E))njW   I T ;LnE jW; (Z(E))n H T + n"
 H LnE H T + nN": (3.56)
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Moreover since W;T ; (FE)n ! (XE)n ! (Z(E))n we have
I
 
W;T ; (FE)n; (Z(E))n
  I (XE)n; (Z(E))n  nNX
e2E
max
p(x)
I(X(e); Z(e))
and since I
 
W;T ; (FE)n; (Z(E))n

= I
 
W;T ; (Z(E))n

+ I
 
(FE)n; (Z(E))njW;T  the inequality
above becomes
I
 
W ; (Z(E))n
  nNX
e2E
max
p(x)
I(X(e); Z(e))  I T ; (Z(E))njW   I (FE)n; (Z(E))njW;T 
(a)
= nN
X
e2E
max
p(x)
I(X(e); Z(e))  I T ; (Z(E))njW  H (FE)n+ nN"
(b)
= nN
X
e2E
max
p(x)
I(X(e); Z(e)) +H
 
LnE
 H T  H (FE)n+ 2nN"
(c)
 nN
X
e2E
max
p(x)
I(X(e); Z(e)) + nNCE  H
 
T
 H (FE)n+ 2nN"
(d)
 3nN"
where inequality (a) holds since H
 
(FE)njW;T  = H (FE)n due to the fact the random bits
((FE)n) are independent from (W;T ) and moreover H
 
(FE)njW;T ; (Z(E))n  nN" since (FE)n
can be decoded with small probability of error by having access to
 
W;T ; (Z(E))n

. Inequality (b)
follows from (3:56), inequality (c) holds since it upper bounds the entropy of bits transversing the
side channel by its capacity and nally inequality (d) follows from the fact that H
 
T

= nNRT
the denition of rate RT and capacity CE and equation (3:55). We have proved therefore that
the constructed random code for network N is secure and one can follow an analysis identical to
the one used in equation (3.1) of Theorem 8 to prove that there is at least one deterministic code
(; 9";R){S(N ; A) for network N .
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Appendix C
Secrecy Capacity for Networks N^
in Figure 3.2(c) and N in
Figure 3.2(b)
Lemma 6 derives the secure multicast capacity for noiseless network N^ in Figure 3.2(c).
Lemma 6. Given the noiseless network N^ in Figure 3.2(c) and the adversarial set A = fe1; e3g; fe2g	,
R(1!f2;3g)  1 for all R 2 R(N^ ; A), and the given bound is achieved with equality when R(i!B) = 0
for all (i;B) 6= (1; f2; 3g).
Proof. The achievability of rate vector R with R(1!f2;3g) = 1 and R(i!B) = 0 for all other (i;B) is
proven by the code in Figure 3.2(d), as described in Example 1. It therefore remains only to derive
the converse. The denition of secure capacity requires that for any  > 0 and " > 0 there exists a
blocklength n such that I
 
W (1!f2;3g); (Z(e2))n

< n" and Pr
 
W (1!f2;3g) 6= W (1!f2;3g) < . For
any such code,
nR(1!f2;3g) = H
 
W (1!f2;3g)

< H
 
W (1!f2;3g)j(Z(e2))n+ n"
(a)
 H W (1!f2;3g)j(Z(e2))n+ n" H W (1!f2;3g)j(Y (e1))n; (Y (e2))n+ h() + nR(1!f2;3g)
(b)
= I
 
W (1!f2;3g); (X(e1);c)n; (X(e1);p)nj(Z(e2))n+ n"+ h() + nR(1!f2;3g)
 H (X(e1);c)n+H (X(e1);p)n+ n "+ h()=n+ R(1!f2;3g)
(c)
 n 1 + "+ h()=n+ 3
2


:
where equality (a) follows from Fano's inequality [60, Theorem 2.10.1] since receiver T1 can decode
messageW (1!f2;3g) with error probability no greater than  by observing the outputs of channels e1
and e2, (b) follows since (Y
(e1))n =
 
(X(e1);c)n; (X(e1);p)n

and (Y (e2))n = (Z(e2))n, and (c) follows
from the capacities of the condential and public parts of channel e1 and the fact that R
(1!f2;3g)  32 ,
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which is the multicast capacity without the secrecy constraint. Therefore R(1!f2;3g)  1 for network
N^ since the inequality must hold for all " and  greater than 0.
Lemma 7 bounds the maximal secure multicast capacity for network N of Figure 3.2(a). The
following denitions are used in its proof. For any (possibly empty) subset L of f1; : : : ; ng let Lc
denote the compliment (Lc = f1; : : : ; ngnL), and XL be the vector (Xt : t 2 L) with elements
ordered according to their time indices; for example, Xf1;5g = (X1; X5). Let Lj = ft 2 f1; : : : ; ng :
Z
(ej)
t = X
(ej)
t g; that is, Lj is the subset of time steps left unerased by channel ej . Note that Lj is
a deterministic function of (Z(ej))n and therefore H
 
(Z(ej))n

= H
 
Lj ; (Z
(ej))n

. Now we have all
the notation necessary to prove Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. Given the network N of Figure 3.2(b) and adversarial set A = fe1; e3g; fe2g	, R(1!f2;3g) 
0:875 for all R 2 R( N ; A).
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. The outline is as follows: First, we assume the existence of a
secure code that violates the given bound. We then show that the security of this solution implies the
lower bound on the entropy H
 
(Z(e1))n; (Z(e3))njW (1!f2;3g) given in equation (C.2); the entropy
in the degraded outputs observed by eavesdropper fe1; e3g given message W (1!f2;3g) results from a
combination of noise and random keys. Finally, we show that reliable decoding at receivers T1 and
T2 implies an upper bound on the same conditional entropy, as described in equation (C.6). Since
the lower bound is higher than the upper bound, we have a contradiction; the result follows.
Formally, suppose that there exists a rate vector R 2 int(R( N ; A)) in the relative interior of rate
region R( N ; A) with R(1!f2;3g) > 0:875. Then for any  > 0 and " > 0 there is a blocklength n for
which a (; "; A;R){S( N ) solution exists. Fix such a solution; then
Pr
 
W (1!f2;3g) 6=W (1!f2;3g) < 
I
 
W (1!f2;3g); (Z(e1))n; (Z(e3))n

< n" (C.1)
I
 
W (1!f2;3g); (Z(e2))n

< n":
We begin by bounding entropy H
 
(Z(e1))n; (Z(e3))njW (1!f2;3g) from below as
H
 
(Z(e1))n; (Z(e3))njW (1!f2;3g)
(a)
> H
 
(Z(e1))n; (Z(e3))n
  n"
= H
 
(Z(e1))n

+H
 
(Z(e3))nj(Z(e1))n  n"
= H
 
L1

+H
 
(Z(e1))njL1

+H
 
L3j(Z(e1))n

+H
 
(Z(e3))nj(Z(e1))n; L1; L3
  n"
(b)
= n(2  ") + 1
2n
X
l1f1;:::;ng
h
H
 
(Z(e1))njL1 = l1

+
1
2n
X
l3f1;:::;ng
H
 
(Z(e3))nj(Z(e1))n; L1 = l1; L3 = l3
i
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= n(2  ") + 1
2
 1
2n
X
l1f1;:::;ng
h
H
 
(Z(e1))njL1 = l1

+H
 
(Z(e1))njL1 = lc1
i
+
1
4
 1
22n
X
l1f1;:::;ng
X
l3f1;:::;ng
h
H
 
(Z(e3))nj(Z(e1))n; L1 = l1; L3 = l3

+H
 
(Z(e3))nj(Z(e1))n; L1 = l1; L3 = lc3

+H
 
(Z(e3))nj(Z(e1))n; L1 = lc1; L3 = l3

+H
 
(Z(e3))nj(Z(e1))n; L1 = lc1; L3 = lc3
i
= n(2  ") + 1
2n+1
X
l1f1;:::;ng
h
H
 
X
(e1)
l1
jL1 = l1

+H(X
(e1)
lc1
jL1 = lc1)
i
+
1
22n+2
X
l1f1;:::;ng
X
l3f1;:::;ng
h
H
 
X
(e3)
l3
jX(e1)l1 ; L1 = l1; L3 = l3

+H
 
X
(e3)
l3
jX(e1)l1 ; L1 = l1; L3 = lc3

+H
 
X
(e3)
lc3
jX(e1)lc1 ; L1 = l
c
1; L3 = l3

+H
 
X
(e3)
lc3
jX(e1)lc1 ; L1 = l
c
1; L3 = l
c
3
i
= n(2  ") + 1
2n+1
X
l1f1;:::;ng
h
H
 
X
(e1)
l1

+H
 
X
(e1)
lc1
i
+
1
22n+2
X
l1f1;:::;ng
X
l3f1;:::;ng
h
H
 
X
(e3)
l3
jX(e1)l1

+H
 
X
(e3)
lc3
jX(e1)l1

+H
 
X
(e3)
l3
jX(e1)lc1

+H
 
X
(e3)
lc3
jX(e1)lc1
i
 n(2  ") + 1
2n+1
X
l1f1;:::;ng
H
 
X
(e1)
l1
; X
(e1)
lc1

+
1
22n+2
X
l1f1;:::;ng
X
l3f1;:::;ng
h
H
 
X
(e3)
l3
; X
(e3)
lc3
jX(e1)l1

+H
 
X
(e3)
l3
; X
(e3)
lc3
jX(e1)lc1

= n(2  ") + 1
2n+1
X
l1f1;:::;ng
H
 
(X(e1))n

+
1
22n+2
X
l1f1;:::;ng
X
l3f1;:::;ng
h
H
 
(X(e3))njX(e1)l1

+H
 
(X(e3))njX(e1)lc1
i
= n(2  ") + 1
2
H
 
(X(e1))n

+
1
2n+2
X
l1f1;:::;ng
h
2H
 
(X(e3))n
  I (X(e3))n;X(e1)l1   I (X(e3))n;X(e1)lc1 i
(c)
 n(2  ") + 1
2
H
 
(X(e1))n

+
1
2n+2
X
l1f1;:::;ng
h
2H
 
(X(e3))n
  jl1j   jlc1ji
= n(2  ") + 1
2
H
 
(X(e1))n

+
1
2n+2
X
l1f1;:::;ng
h
2H
 
(X(e3))n
  ni
= n
 7
4
  "+ 1
2
h
H
 
(X(e1))n

+H
 
(X(e3))n
i
; (C.2)
where (a) follows from the second inequality of (C.1); (b) holds since H
 
L1

= H
 
L3j(Z(e1))n

= n
and by the denition of conditional entropy, and (c) holds since I
 
(X(e3))n;X
(e1)
A
  H X(e1)A   jAj
for any A  f1; : : : ; ng.
To bound H
 
(Z(e1))n; (Z(e3))njW (1!f2;3g) from above, recall that (Y (e2))n = (Z(e2))n. There-
fore,
H
 
(Z(e1))n; (Z(e3))njW (1!f2;3g)
 H (Z(e1))n; (Z(e3))n; (Z(e2))njW (1!f2;3g)
= H
 
(Z(e2))njW (1!f2;3g)+H (Z(e1))nj(Z(e2))n;W (1!f2;3g)+H (Z(e3))nj(Z(e1))n; (Z(e2))n;W (1!f2;3g)
 H (Z(e2))n+H (Z(e1))nj(Y (e2))n;W (1!f2;3g)+H (Z(e3))nj(Y (e2))n;W (1!f2;3g)
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(a)
 1
2
n+H
 
(Z(e1))nj(Y (e2))n;W (1!f2;3g)+H (Z(e3))nj(Y (e2))n;W (1!f2;3g) (C.3)
where (a) follows since the adversary's output (Z(e2))n of the noiseless wiretap channel Ce2(o; 12 ) has
maximal entropy n2 . To bound the second term in (C.3), note that
H
 
(Z(e1))nj(Y (e2))n;W (1!f2;3g)
 H (X(e1))n; (Z(e1))nj(Y (e2))n;W (1!f2;3g)
= H
 
(X(e1))n; (Z(e1))n; (Y (e2))n;W (1!f2;3g)
 H W (1!f2;3g) H (Y (e2))njW (1!f2;3g)
= H
 
(X(e1))n

+H
 
Z(e1))nj(X(e1))n+H (Y (e2))nj(X(e1))n; (Z(e1))n
+H
 
W (1!f2;3g)j(X(e1))n; (Z(e1))n; (Y (e2))n  nR(1!f2;3g)  H (Y (e2))njW (1!f2;3g)
(a)
 H (X(e1))n+ 1 + h()
n
+R(1!f2;3g) R(1!f2;3g)n+H (Y (e2))nj(XV1(e1))n; (Z(e1))n H (Y (e2))n+n"
= H
 
(X(e1))n

+
 
1 +
h()
n
+ (  1)R(1!f2;3g) + "n  H (Y (e2))n H (Y (e2))nj(X(e1))n; (Z(e1))n
(b)
 H (X(e1))n+  1 + h()
n
+ (  1)R(1!f2;3g) + "n: (C.4)
Here (a) follows fromH
 
(Z(e1))nj(X(e1))n = n,H W (1!f2;3g)j(X(e1))n; (Z(e1))n; (Y (e2))n  h()+
nR(1!f2;3g) by Fano's inequality [60, Theorem 2.10.1], andH
 
(Y (e2))njW (1!f2;3g)  H (Y (e2))n 
n" by the third inequality of (C.1); (b) holds since conditioning reduces entropy. The bound for the
third term in (C.3) is derived the same way, giving
H
 
(Z(e3))nj(Y (e2))n;W (1!f2;3g) < H (X(e3))n+  1 + h()
n
+ (  1)R(1!f2;3g) + "n: (C.5)
Therefore combining (C.3) with (C.4) and (C.5) gives
H
 
(Z(e1))n;(Z(e3))njW (1!f2;3g)H (X(e1))n+H (X(e3))n+ 5
2
+2(
h()
n
+( 1)R(1!f2;3g)+")n
(C.6)
Satisfying both (C.2) and (C.6) requires that
H
 
(X(e1))n

+H
 
(X(e3))n

+
 5
2
+ 2(
h()
n
+ (  1)R(1!f2;3g) + ")n
>
1
2

H
 
(X(e1))n

+H
 
(X(e3))n

+
 7
4
  "n
which is equivalent to
H
 
(X(e1))n

+H
 
(X(e3))n

>
 
4R(1!f2;3g)   3
2
  4h()
n
  4R(1!f2;3g)   6"n:
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Since R(1!f2;3g) > 0:875 by assumption, achieving the above bound for all ; " > 0 requires
H
 
(X(e1))n

+H
 
(X(e3))n

> 2n;
which is the desired contradiction since (X(e1))n and (X(e3))n are binary vectors of dimension n,
giving H
 
(X(e1))n

+H
 
(X(e3))n
  2n.
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Appendix D
Dening Typical Sets A^
(N)
1;t
( ~X; ~Z)
and A^
(N)
2;t
( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z)
The following analysis is taken out of [32] pages 34   38. We reproduce it here and then extend it
to investigate the impact of having an eavesdropper within the network. The following denitions
are used in the proof of Theorem 9 in Section 3.4. Given any vectors 1 = (1(1); : : : ; 1(n)) and
2 = (2(1); : : : ; 2(n)) with 1(t) > 0 and 2(t) > 0 for all t 2 f1; : : : ; ng, let
A
(N)
1;t (
~X; ~Z) =

(~x; ~z) 2 ~X  ~Z :
  1N log pt(~x) Ht( ~X)
  1(t)  1N log pt(~z) Ht( ~Z)
  a1(1; t)  1N log pt(~x; ~z) Ht( ~X; ~Z)
  a1(1; t);
where
a1(1; t)
def
=(1 + 1(t))  inf

0 > 0 : for all N suciently large,
Pr
  1N log pt(~z) Ht( ~Z)
 > 0 [   1N log pt(~x; ~z) Ht( ~X; ~Z)
 > 0  2 6N1(t):
As in [32] the restricted typical set A^
(N)
1;t (
~X; ~Z), which is henceforth called simply the typical set, is
dened as
A^
(N)
1;t (
~X; ~Z) =
n
(~x; ~z) 2 A(N)1;t ( ~X; ~Z) : pt

(A
(N)
1;t (
~X; ~Z))c jx

 2 3N1(t)
o
(D.1)
for each t 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Similarly, let
A
(N)
2;t (
~X; ~Y ; ~Z) =
 
~x; ~y; ~z
 2 X  Y  Z :   1N log pt(~z) Ht( ~Z)
  a2(2; t)
92  1N log pt(~x; ~z) Ht( ~X; ~Z)
  a2(2; t)  1N log pt(~y; ~z) Ht( ~Y ; ~Z)
  a2(2; t)  1N log pt(~x; ~y; ~z) Ht( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z)
  a2(2; t);
where
a2(2; t)
def
=(1 + 2(t))  inf

0 > 0 : for all N suciently large,
Pr
   1N log pt(~z) Ht( ~Z)
 > 0 [   1N log pt(~y; ~z) Ht( ~Y ; ~Z)
 > 0[  1N log pt(~x; ~z) Ht( ~X; ~Z)
 > 0 [   1N log pt(~x; ~y; ~z) Ht( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z)
 > 0  2 6N2(t):
and dene the restricted typical set, henceforth simply called the typical set, as
A^
(N)
2;t (
~X; ~Y ; ~Z) =
n
(~x; ~y; ~z) 2 A(N)2;t ( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z) : pt

(A
(N)
2;t (
~X; ~Y ; ~Z))c jx

 2 3N2(t)
o
: (D.2)
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Appendix E
Bounds on the Probabilities of
N^ e(Rc; Rp) Network
Lemma 8. If (~x; ~y) 2 A^(N)1;t ( ~X; ~Y ) and (~x; ~y; ~z) 2 A^(N)2;t ( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z) for all t 2 f1; : : : ; ng then,
p( ~w; (~z
E
)n; J = 0)2 N
Pn
t=1 b(1;2;t)  p^( ~w; (~zE)n; J = 0)  p( ~w; (~zE)n; J = 0)2N
Pn
t=1 b(1;2;t)
and
p((~zE)n; J = 0)2 N
Pn
t=1 b(1;2;t)  p^((~zE)n; J = 0)  p((~zE)n; J = 0)2N
Pn
t=1 b(1;2;t)
where the denition of variable J is given in equation (3.2) and b(1; 2; t) = 4a1(1; t)+ 8a2(2; t)+
21(t) + 2=N .
Proof. In the rest of the proof we need the following denitions
Kt(~x; ~z) =
8<: 1; if (~x; ~z) 2 A^
(N)
1;t (
~X; ~Z)
0; otherwise
Kt(~x; ~y; ~z) =
8<: 1; if (~xt; ~zt) 2 A^
(N)
1;t (
~X; ~Z) and (~xt; ~yt; ~zt) 2 A^
(N)
2;t (
~X; ~Y ; ~Z)
0; otherwise
and
qt(~x) =
X
~z2Z
Kt(~x; ~z)pt(~z)
qt(~x; ~z) =
X
~y2Y
Kt(~x; ~y; ~z)pt(~yj~z):
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Finally we dene
F
(1)
t (~x) =
n
~z : (~x; ~z) 2 A^(N)1;t ( ~X; ~Z)
o
for all ~x 2 X such that
  1N log pt(~x) Ht( ~X)  1(t) and pt hA(N)1;t ( ~X; ~Z)c ~xi < 2 3N1(t).
Similarly
F
(2)
t (~x; ~z) =
n
~y : (~x; ~y; ~z) 2 A^(N)2;t ( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z)
o
for all (~x; ~z) 2 A^(N)1;t ( ~X; ~Z) and pt
h
A^
(N)
2;t (
~X; ~Y ; ~Z)
c ~x; ~zi  2 3N2(t). Then it is easy to get
X
~z2F (1)t (~x)
p(~zj~x)  1
)
X
~z2F (1)t (~x)
pt(~x; ~z)
pt(~x)
 1
(a))
X
~z2F (1)t (~x)
2 N(Ht( ~X; ~Z)+a1(1;t))
2 N(Ht( ~X) 1(t))
 1
)jF (1)t (~x)j2 N(Ht( ~Zj ~X)+a1(1;t)+1(t))  1
)jF (1)t (~x)j  2N(Ht( ~Zj ~X)+a1(1;t)+1(t)) (E.1)
where inequality (a) follows from (D.1) that gives the denition of set A^
(N)
1;t (
~X; ~Z). Moreover
qt(~x)
def
=
X
~z2F (1)t (~x)
pt(~y)
(a)
 jF (1)t (~x)j2 N(Ht( ~Y ) a1(1;t))
(b)
 2 N(It( ~X; ~Y ) 2a1(1;t) 1(t))
) 1
qt(~x)
 2N(It( ~X; ~Y ) 2a1(1;t) 1(t)) (E.2)
where (a) follows from (D.1) and (b) holds due to (E.1). In order to nd a lower bound on p^t(~zj~x)
we use the expression for p^t(~zj~x) given by Lemma 7 of [32] and by following the steps below
p^t(~zj~x) = pt(~y)1  (1  qt(~x))
2NRp
qt(~x)
(a)
 1
2
pt(~z)
qt(~x)
) p^t(~zj~x)  1
2
p(~yj~x) pt(~x)
pt(~x; ~z)
pt(~z)
qt(~x)
) p^t(~zj~x)
(b)
 1
2
p(~zj~x)2
 N(Ht( ~X)+1(t))2 N(Ht( ~Y )+a1(1;t))
2 N(Ht( ~X; ~Y ) a1(1;t))qt(~x)
) p^t(~zj~x)
(c)
 1
2
p(~zj~x)2N( It( ~X; ~Y ) 1(t) 2a1(1;t))2N(It( ~X; ~Y ) 1(t) 2a1(1;t))
) p^t(~zj~x)  p(~zj~x)2 N(4a1(1;t)+21(t)+1=N))
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where inequality (a) holds for suciently large N , and inequalities (b), (c) hold due to (D.1) and
(E.2) respectively. Following a similar approach it was proved at Lemma 16 of [32] the other side of
the above inequality and nally we have
p(~zj~x) 2 N(4a1(1;t)+21(t)+1=N))  p^t(~zj~x)  p(~zj~x) 2N(4a1(1;t)+21(t)+1=N)) (E.3)
for all (~x; ~z) 2 A^(N)1;t ( ~X; ~Z) and for suciently large N .
We can derive a similar expression for p^(~yj~x; ~z), indeed
X
~y2F (2)t (~x;~z)
p(~yj~x; ~z)  1
)
X
~y2F (2)t (~x;~z)
pt(~x; ~y; ~z)
pt(~x; ~z)
 1
(a))
X
~y2F (2)t (~x;~z)
2 N(Ht( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z)+a2(2;t))
2 N(Ht( ~X; ~Z) a2(2;t))
 1
)jF (2)t (~x; ~z)j2 N(Ht( ~Y j ~X; ~Z)+2a2(2;t))  1
)jF (2)t (~x; ~z)j  2N(Ht( ~Y j ~X; ~Z)+2a2(2;t)) (E.4)
where inequality (a) follows from (D.2) that gives the denition of set A^
(N)
2;t (
~X; ~Y ; ~Z). Moreover
qt(~x; ~z)
def
=
X
~y2F (2)t (~x;~z)
pt(~yj~z) 
X
~y2F (2)t (~x;~z)
pt(~yj~z) 
X
~y2F (2)t (~x;~z)
pt(~y; ~z)
pt(~z)
(a)

X
~y2F (2)t (~x;~z)
2 N(Ht( ~Y ; ~Z) a2(2;t))
2 N(Ht( ~Z)+a2(2;t))
 jF (2)t (~x; ~z)j2 N(Ht( ~Y j ~Z) 2a2(2;t))
(b)
 2N(Ht( ~Y j ~X; ~Z)+2a2(2;t))2 N(Ht( ~Y j ~Z) 2a2(2;t))
) 1
qt(~x; ~z)
 2N(I( ~X; ~Y j ~Z) 4a2(2;t)) (E.5)
where (a) follows from (D.2) and (b) holds due to (E.4). In order to nd a lower bound on p^t(~yj~x; ~z)
we use an expression for p^t(~yj~x; ~z) similar to the one proved in Lemma 7 of [31] and by following the
steps below
p^t(~yj~x; ~z) = pt(~yj~z)1  (1  qt(~x; ~z))
2NRc
qt(~x; ~z)
(a)
 1
2
pt(~yj~z)
qt(~x; ~z)
) p^t(~yj~x; ~z)  1
2
p(~yj~x; ~z)pt(~y; ~z)pt(~x; ~z)
pt(~z)pt(~x; ~y; ~z)
1
qt(~x; ~z)
) p^t(~yj~x; ~z)
(b)
 1
2
p(~yj~x; ~z) 2
 N(Ht( ~Y ; ~Z)+a2(2;t))2 N(Ht( ~X; ~Z)+a2(2;t))
2 N(Ht( ~Z) a2(2;t))2 N(Ht( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z) a2(2;t))qt(~x; ~z)
) p^t(~yj~x; ~z)
(c)
 1
2
p(~yj~x; ~z)2N( It( ~X; ~Y j ~Z) 4a2(2;t))2N(It( ~X; ~Y j ~Z) 4a2(2;t))
) p^t(~yj~x; ~z)  p(~yj~x; ~z)2 N(8a2(2;t)+1=N))
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where inequality (a) holds for suciently large N , and inequalities (b), (c) hold due to (D.2) and
(E.5) respectively. Following a similar approach it was proved at Lemma 16 of [32] the other side of
the above inequality and nally we have
p(~yj~x; ~z) 2 N(8a2(2;t)+1=N))  p^t(~yj~x; ~z)  (~yj~x; ~z) 2N(8a2(2;t)+1=N)) (E.6)
for all (~x; ~y; ~z) 2 A^(N)2;t ( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z) and for large enough N .
Assume that we denote by ~xt, ~yt, and ~zt all channel inputs, channel outputs, and eavesdropper
outputs for all channels in the network for all times up to t. Then by an analysis similar to the one
in Step 4 of [32] we get
p(w; ~xt; ~yt; ~zt) = p(w)
"
tY
t0=1
p(~xt0 j~yt
0 1; w)
#"
tY
t0=1
p^(~zt0 j~xt0)
#"
tY
t0=1
p(~y
t0
j~xt0)
#
: (E.7)
for the random N -layer stacked solution (2 N; "; R){S(N ; A) for network N . Similarly for network
N e(Rc; Rp) we have
p^(w; ~xt; ~yt; ~zt) = p(w)
"
tY
t0=1
p(~xt0 j~yt
0 1; w)
#"
tY
t0=1
p(~zt0 j~xt0)
#"
tY
t0=1
p^(~y
t0
j~xt0)
#
: (E.8)
that is dierent from equation (E.7) in terms p^(~zt0 j~xt0) and p^(~yt0 j~xt0) since due to the emulation the
conditional distributions at the emulated channel change.
Therefore if 8t 2 f1; : : : ; ng (~xt; ~yt; ~zt) 2 A^
(N)
2;t (
~X; ~Y ; ~Z) and (~xt; ~zt) 2 A^(N)1;t ( ~X; ~Z) then by
inequalities (E.3), (E.6), (E.7) and (E.8) we get
p(w; ~xt; ~yt; ~zt)2 
Pt
t0=1 b(1;2;t
0)  p^(w; ~xt; ~yt; ~zt)  p(w; ~xt; ~yt; ~zt)2
Pt
t0=1 b(1;2;t
0)
by dening b(1; 2; t) = 4a1(1; t)+8a2(2; t)+21(t)+2=N . Thus by setting t = n and by summing
over all (~xt; ~yt) with (~xt; ~zt) 2 A^(N)1(t);t( ~X; ~Z) and (~xt; ~yt; ~zt) 2 A^
(N)
2(t);t
( ~X; ~Y ; ~Z) for all t 2 f1; : : : ; ng
and over all ~z(v) where v =2 E (nodes that do not get eavesdropped) we get
p(w; ~zE ; I = 0)2 
Pn
t=1 b(1;2;t)  p^(w; ~zE ; I = 0)  p(w; ~zE ; I = 0)2
Pn
t=1 b(1;2;t) (E.9)
where the denition of variable I is given in equation (3.2) and similarly
p(~zE ; I = 0)2 
Pn
t=1 b(1;2;t)  p^(~zE ; I = 0)  p(~zE ; I = 0)2
Pn
t=1 b(1;2;t): (E.10)
and this concludes the proof.
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Appendix F
Filling up the Bit Pipes
Lemma 9. Fix any rate vector R 2 int R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A) in the relative interior of rate region
R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A) of network Ne(Rc; Rp). Then for any  < Rp,  > 0 and " > 0 there exists a
(; ";A;R){S(Ne(Rc; Rp)) solution of blocklength n such that H
 
Pn
  n(Rp ) where Pn are the
public bits through channel Ce(Rc; Rp).
Proof. Since R 2 int R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A), for any  > 0 and " > 0, there exists a solution (; "; A;R){
S(Ne(Rc; Rp)) for networkNe(Rc; Rp) under adversarial set A. If the entropy bound is satised, then
the result is immediate. Otherwise for any we construct a new code of the same rate that satises
the given entropy bounds. The code construction rst builds a stacked solution S(N e(Rc; Rp))
for N1-fold stacked network N e(Rc; Rp), and then modies that solution to build a new solution
S(N e(Rc; Rp)) for N e(Rc; Rp) by adding extra randomness on the public part of channel of e to
ll up the bit pipe. This new solution with the added randomness can be considered as a random
code for network Ne(Rc; Rp) with blocklength n1 = nN with small expected error, expected rate
of information leakage and expected entropy on the public bhigh enough (the exact values of the
expected error, information leakage and entropy of public bits will be chosen later). In order to prove
the existence of at least one good code, we would create one more stack of N2 layers from the random
solution of blocklength n1. We create this stack with each layer having high expected entropy on
the public bit pipe of channel e, to use the Cherno bound (since each layer is independent) and
prove the existence of at least a single good code with high entropy on the public part of channel e
and small probability of error and information leakage. The details of the proof follow.
Choose two rates ~R 2 int (R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A)) and ~~R 2 int (R(Ne(Rc; Rp); A)) such that R(i!B) <
~R(i!B) < ~~R(i!B) for all i 2 V and B 2 B(i) with R(i!B) > 0 and R(i!B) = ~R(i!B) = 0 for all
R(i!B) = 0. As in the proof of Theorem 8 set ~~ = min
R(i!B)>0
( ~~R(i!B)  ~R(i!B)) and ~ = min
R(i!B)>0
( ~R(i!B) 
R(i!B)) and nd constants ~~ and ~ satisfying
max
(i;B):R(i!B)>0
~~R(i!B)~~+ h(~~) < ~~ (F.1)
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max
(i;B):R(i!B)>0
~R(i!B)~+ h(~) < ~ (F.2)
Then for
~~ > 0 and there is a blocklength n0 secrecy code of rate ~~R for network Ne(Rc; Rp) such that
Pr

~~W (j!K;i) 6= ~~W (j!K)

<
~~ for K 2 B(j) such that i 2 K and R(j!K) > 0 and I( ~~Pn; ~~W ) < n"4 ,
where the double tilde on the public bits, and the message refers to the fact that the code operates
at rate ~~R. It was proved in Theorem 8, that used Theorem 1 of [31] that since (F.1) holds we can
use the single-layer solution (
~~; "4 ; A;
~~R){S Ne(Rc; Rp) for network Ne(Rc; Rp) to build a random
N1 stacked solution (2
 N11 ; "4 ; A; ~R){S
 N e(Rc; Rp) for stacked network N e(Rc; Rp) where 1 > 0.
Let p
 ~~Pn0 be the inputs of public bits for channel e induced by the random stacked solution
(00; "0; A; ~R){S N e(Rc; Rp). These inputs are i.i.d. under the random code design giving
p
 ~~Pn0 = NY
`=1
p
 ~~Pn0(`)
For each t 2 f1; : : : ; n0g, we dene the set of typical inputs for edge e as
A
(N1)
0 (
~~P t) =

~~P t :
  1N1 log p ~~P t0 H  ~~P t0
  0; 1  t0  t ; (F.3)
and event J as
J =
8<: 1; if
~~Pn
0
=2 A(N1)0 ( ~~Pn
0
)
0; otherwise
:
Similar to the proof of Lemma 8 in [31], when
 ~~Pn0(1); : : : ; ~~Pn0(N1) are drawn i.i.d. from distri-
bution p
 ~~Pn0, the probability of observing an atypical input ~~Pn0 in stacked solution S N e(Rc; Rp)
drops exponentially in N1. We choose N1 large enough so that( 
Pr (J = 1) < min
  ~
2
;
1
n0Rp
! ^  2 N11 < ~
2
!)
(F.4)
and treat the situation of observing an atypical ~~Pn
0
as an error event.
For 2  t  n0 and every ~~P t 1 2 A(N1)0
 ~~P t 1, dene the conditional typical set as
A
(N1)
0
 ~~P tj~~P t 1 def= n~~P t : ~~P t 2 A(N1)0  ~~P to : (F.5)
Then the cardinality of the conditional typical set A
(N1)
0
 ~~P tj~~P t 1 for any ~~P t 1 2 A(N1)0  ~~P t 1 is
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upper bounded as
1 
X
~~P t2A
(N1)
0
 
~~Ptj ~~P t 1
 p ~~P tj~~P t 1
=
X
~P t2A
(N1)
0
 
~~Ptj ~~P t 1
 p
 ~~P t
p
 ~~P t 1
(a)

X
~P t2A
(N1)
0
 
~~Ptj ~~P t 1
 2 N1[H(
~~P t)+0]
2 N [H(
~~P t 1) 0]
=
A(N1)0   ~~Ptj ~~P t 1 2 N1[H( ~~Ptj ~~P t 1)+20]
where inequality (a) applies follows from the denitions of the typical and conditional typical sets
from (F.3), and (F.5); therefore
A(N1)0   ~~Ptj ~~P t 1  2N1[H( ~~Ptj ~~P t 1)+20] (F.6)
Since
A(N1)0   ~~P1  2N1[H( ~~P1)+0]  2N1[H( ~~P1)+20], and therefore (F.6) holds for all 1  t  n0,
where for notational convenience
  ~~P 0 = ;.
To build S(N e(Rc; Rp)) that has lled up the public bits pipe of channel e, from solution
S(N e(Rc; Rp)) we replace any typical ~~P t 2 f0; 1gN1 with a unique sequence of nt =

N1
 
H( ~~Ptj ~~P t 1)+
20

bits that uniquely describe ~~P t, and any atypical channel input
~~P t by a binary string chosen
uniformly at random from f0; 1gnt . The nt bits are followed by N1Rp   nt independent random
bits denoted by ~~F t that ll up the public bit pipe of channel e. Let
~~Qn
0
=
 
G( ~~Pn
0
); ~~Fn
0
denote
the resulting bits where G : f0; 1gn0N1 ! f0; 1g
Pn0
t=1 nt is the function mapping ~~Pn
0
to
Pn0
t=1 nt
bit sequences and this function G is one-to-one for typical for typical inputs. Under solution
S(N e(Rc; Rp)) instead of bits ~~Pn
0
, bits ~~Qn
0
will be transmitted through the public bit pipe of
channel e. Code S(N e(Rc; Rp)) works identical to stacked code S(N e(Rc; Rp)) anywhere in stacked
network N e(Rc; Rp) apart from the public bit pipe of channel e, where for each time step 1  t  n0,
the receiver of bits ~~Q
t
reconstructs ~~P t by the looking at the rst nt bits of
~~Q
t
; the case where ~~P t is
not typical and the reconstruction will fail and this is considered as an error event.
We have to prove how the transmission of bits ~~Qn
0
instead of ~~Pn
0
does not compromise the
security of code S(N e(Rc; Rp)) compute its probability of error and entropy of the bits transversing
the public bit pipe of channel e. Indeed, the security of code S(N e(Rc; Rp)) is as good as that of
stacked the solution S(N e(Rc; Rp)) since ~W ! ~~Pn
0 ! ~~Qn0 and therefore due to the data processing
inequality I( ~W ; ~~Qn
0
)  I( ~W ; ~~Pn0)  nN"0 (note that message ~W is of rate ~R and that is why it
has a single tilde). To compute the probability of error, we note that code S(N e(Rc; Rp)) works
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identical to stacked code (
~
2 ;
"
4 ; A;
~R){S(N e(Rc; Rp)) (where ~2 holds due to (F.4)) anywhere in
stacked network N e(Rc; Rp) apart from the public bit pipe of channel e, where for each time step
1  t  n0, the receiver of bits ~~Q
t
reconstructs ~~P t by the looking at the rst nt bits of
~~Q
t
. According
to (F.4), with probability at most equal to
~
2 ,
~~P t is not typical and the reconstruction will fail. That
is considered an error event and therefore the overall probability of failure for code S(N e(Rc; Rp))
is less than ~.
Now we will compute the entropy of bits ~~Qn
0
that transverse the public bit pipe of channel e on
S(N e(Rc; Rp)). The expected entropy of typical ~~Pn
0 2 A(N1)0 ( ~~P t) is bounded by
EC
h
Pr(J = 0) H ~~Pn0 jJ = 0i
= EC
h
H
 ~~Pn0 jJ  Pr(J = 1)H ~~Pn0 jJ = 1i
(a)
 EC

H
 ~~Pn0 jJ  Pr(J = 1)nRp
(b)
 EC

H
 ~~Pn0 ; J H J  1
(c)
= EC

H
 ~~Pn0  2
(c)
= N1EC

H
 ~~Pn0  2 (F.7)
where (a) holds due to the capacity of the public bit pipe of channel e, (b) follows from (F.4), and
(c) holds since H(J)  1 and H J j~~Pn0 = 0. The expected entropy of the random bits ~~Fn0 is
EC

H( ~~Fn
0
)

=
n0X
t=1
EC
h
H( ~~Fn
0
)
i
=
n0X
t=1

N1Rp  

N1
 
EC

H( ~~P tj~~P t 1)

+ 20

(a)

n0X
t=1

N1Rp  N1
 
EC

H( ~~P tj~~P t 1)

+ 20
  1
= N1n
0(Rp   20) N1EC

H( ~~Pn
0
)
  n0
(b)
 N1n0(Rp   30) N1EC

H( ~~Pn
0
)

(F.8)
where (a) follows since dxe  x+ 1, and (b) holds for suciently large N1.
Finally, for all N1 suciently large, the expected entropy EC

H( ~~Qn
0
)

of the overall input ~~Qn
0
= 
G( ~~Pn
0
); ~~Fn
0
to the public bit pipe of channel e for code S(N e(Rc; Rp)) is
EC

H
 ~~Qn0
= EC

H
 
G( ~~Pn
0
); ~~Fn
0
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(a)
= EC

H
 
G( ~~Pn
0
)

+ EC

H
 ~~Fn0
 EC

H
 
G( ~~Pn
0
)jJ+ ECH ~~Fn0
 EC

Pr(J = 0) H G( ~~Pn0)jJ = 0+ ECH ~~Fn0
(b)
= EC

Pr(J = 0) H ~~Pn0 jJ = 0+ ECH ~~Fn0
(c)
 N1EC

H
 ~~Pn0  2 +N1n0(Rp   30) N1ECH ~~Pn0
(d)
 n0N1(Rp   40) (F.9)
where (a) holds since random bits ~~Fn
0
are independent of G( ~~Pn
0
), (b) holds since when J = 0
function G is one-to-one, (c) follows from (F.7) and (F.8), and (d) holds for suciently large N1.
Therefore code S(N e(Rc; Rp)) has the public bit pipe of channel e lled up close to capacity.
So far we have constructed a random code (~; "4 ; A;
~R){S(N e(Rc; Rp)) of blocklength n0 for
stacked network N e(Rc; Rp). Unraveling this blocklength n0 solution across time as described in [31,
Theorem 1] yields a blocklength n1 = n
0N1 solution of rate ~R for network Ne(Rc; Rp).
By applying the blocklength n1 = n
0N1 solution on a stacked version network Ne(Rc; Rp) and
due to (F.2) one can construct another random solution (4 ;
"
4 ; A;R){S(N e(Rc; Rp)) for network
N e(Rc; Rp) of blocklength n1 with for suciently large number of layers N2. The expected proba-
bility of error and information leakage of this code is
EC [P (n)e ] 

4
(F.10)
EC

I
 
(~Z(E))n1 ;W
  n0N1N2"
4
(F.11)
respectively. The entropy transversing the public bits of channel e is
H
 ~~Qn1(1); : : : ; ~~Qn1(N2) = N2X
`=1
H
 ~~Qn1(`) (F.12)
since all the layers in the stack are independent. The expected value of each term in the sum is
computed in (F.9) to be greater than n0N1(Rp   40) and therefore the expected entropy for all
layers is
EC [H( ~~Qn1)]  n0N1N2(Rp   40) (F.13)
Similar to Theorem 8 it remains to prove that there is a specic instance for the choice of each
channel code such that the probability of error, the information leakage are not too large and the
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entropy of the public bit pipe of channel e is not too low. Precisely,
Pr
n
P (n)e  
o
[
n
I
 
(~Z(E))n1 ;W
  n0N1N2"o[nH ~~Qn1  n0N1N2(Rp   50)o
(a)
 Pr

P (n)e  

+ Pr

I
 
(~Z(E))n1 ;W
  n0N1N2"+ PrH ~~Qn1  n0N1N2(Rp   50)
(b)
 EC

P
(n)
e


+
EC

I
 
(~Z(E))n1 ;W

n0N1N2"
+ Pr
 
N2X
`=1
H
 ~~Qn1(`)  n0N1N2(Rp   50)!
(c)
 
4
+
n0N1N2"
4n0N1N2"
+ 2 N2(
0)
=
1
2
+ 2 N2(
0) (d)<
2
3
;
where inequality (a) is the union bound, (b) is Markov's inequalitya along with (F.12), (c) applies
bounds (F.10), (F.11) and equation (F.12), (c) holds is derived by using the Cherno bound similar
to Lemma 8 [31], and (d) holds for large enough N2. Therefore, for suciently large N2 there
must be at least one instance of code S(N e(R   c;Rp)) with error probability no greater than ,
information leakage no more than n0N1N2" and entropy of information on the public bit pipe greater
than n0N1N2(Rp   0). By setting 0 = 5 and unraveling this code in time to become a code of
blocklength n = n0N1N2 for network Ne(Rc; Rp) concludes our proof.
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Appendix G
Conditional Typical Sequences
Denition 16. The typical set A
(N2)
! is the set of

~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pn1 ;~~cn1

tuples with the property
A(N2)! =

~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pn1 ;~~cn1

; 8S  f1; : : : ; n1g :
  1N2 log Pr(~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pS ;~~cS) H(~~L~n; ~~W ~n; ~~PS ; ~~CS)
  ! :
Denition 17. For every S  f1; : : : ; n1g the conditional typical set A(N2)!

~~PSc ;
~~CSc j ~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pS ; ~~pS

of ( ~~PSc ;
~~CSc) with respect to a specic sequence (
~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pS ;
~~pS) that  1N2 log Pr(~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pS ; ~~pS) H(~~Ln1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ; ~~CS)
  !
is dened as
A(N2)!

~~PSc ;
~~CSc j ~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pS ;~~cS

=
n
(~~pSc ;
~~cSc) : (
~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pn1 ;~~cn1) 2 A(N2)!
o
:
Lemma 10. The probability of a random

~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pn1 ;~~cn1

being outside the typical set is expo-
nentially small, i.e.
Pr
h
~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pn1 ;~~cn1

=2 A(N2)!
i
 2 Nb(!):
for some b(!) > 0 and N2 suciently large.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 6 of [31] using the Cherno bound.
Lemma 11. For every (
~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pS ;
~~pS) with
  1N2 log Pr(~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pS ; ~~pS) H(~~Ln1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ; ~~CS) 
! the size of the conditional typical is upper bounded by
jA(N2)! ( ~~PSc ; ~~CSc j (~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pS ; ~~pS))j  2N2(H(
~~PSc ;
~~CSc j~~Ln1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ; ~~CS)+2!)
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Proof.
1 
X
(pSc ;cSc )2A
(N2)
!

~~PSc ;
~~CSc j (~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ;~~pS ;~~pS)

Pr

~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pn1 ;~~cn1

Pr

~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pS ;
~~pS

(a)

X
(pSc ;cSc )2A
(N2)
!

~~PSc ;
~~CSc j (~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ;~~pS ;~~pS)

2 N2(H(
~~Ln1 ; ~~Wn1 ;Pn;Cn)+!)
2 N2(H(
~~Ln1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ;
~~CS) !)
=
A(N2)!  ~~PSc ; ~~CSc j ~~`n1 ; ~~wn1 ; ~~pS ; ~~pS 2 N2(H( ~~PSc ; ~~CSc j~~Ln1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ; ~~CS)+2!)
where (a) holds due to Denition 17 of the conditionally typical set and therefore
A(N2)!  ~~PSc ; ~~CSc j ~~`n1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~pS ; ~~pS  2N2(H( ~~PSc ; ~~CSc j~~Ln1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ; ~~CS)+2!):
By using the upper bound derived for H( ~~PSc ;
~~CSc j~~Ln1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~PS ; ~~CS) in (3.32) the above inequal-
ity becomes
A(N2)!  ~~PSc ; ~~CSc j ~~`n1 ; ~~Wn1 ; ~~pS ; ~~pS  2 (n1 jSj)N22 (Rp+maxp(x) I(X;Z))+2N2!: (G.1)
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Appendix H
Entropy of the Public Bits
Since messages (W;T ) can be decoded with probability of error  by accessing LnE the bits through
the side link of capacity CE , the public bits (P
E)n and the message W and by applying Fano's
inequality we get H
 
W;T jLnE ; (PE)n;W
  h() + nNRT . Since
H
 
W;T jLnE ; (PE)n;W

= H
 
W;T ;LnE ; (P
E)n
 H LnE ; (PE)nW 
and by choosing a small enough  so that h() + nNRT  nN" we get
H
 
W;T ;LnE ; (P
E)n
  H LnE ; (PE)n;W + nN":
Since LnE ; (P
E)n are given by a deterministic function of (W;T ) the equation above becomes
H
 
W;T
  H LnE ; (PE)n;W + nN"
 H (PE)n+H LnE+H W + nN"
 H (PE)n+ nNCE +H W + nN": (H.1)
Equation (H.1) and the fact that H(T ) = nNRT gives
H
 
(PE)n
  nNX
e2E
Re;p   2nN" (H.2)
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Chapter 4
Security in Distributed Storage
Systems by Communicating a
Logarithmic Number of Bits
4.1 Introduction
We study the security and data integrity of distributed storage systems that use coding for redun-
dancy. It is well known that maximum distance separable (MDS) codes can oer maximum reliability
for a given storage overhead and can be used for distributed storage in data centers and peer-to-peer
storage systems like OceanStore [61], Total Recall [62], and FS2You [63], that use nodes across the
Internet for distributed le storage and sharing. In this chapter we are interested in dealing with
errors in the encoded representation. The errors could be introduced either through (unlikely) hard
drive undetected failures or through a malicious or compromised server in the storage network.
This second threat is much more eminent when the system uses network coding to maintain the
redundancy of the encoded system as proposed recently [2]. To illustrate this consider a large data
object that has size M bits. If this object is to be stored on n servers, depending on the desired
redundancy, an (n; k) linear MDS code can be used, dividing the object into k packets of size M=k
each, and storing an encoded packet at each server. Assuming the code is over a nite eld Fq,
requiring log q bits to represent each symbol, each server will also need to keep a header denoting
the coding coecients of the linear combinations stored on the server (see section 4.2 for the details)
and the size of this header is larger than the size of the useful data if the code is used only once. For
this reason it was proposed that the same code is used several times [8] by dividing each packet into
N symbols of log q bits and repeating the same code N times. If N >> n the overhead of storing
the coecients becomes negligible. We refer to this as the N{extended version of an MDS code,
shown in Figure 4.2 for the (4; 2) code used in Figure 4.1.
Observe that in this example, each node is storing two linear combinations, (rows) as opposed
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Figure 4.1: A (4; 2) MDS code along with the repair of the rst storage node. Each node stores
two packets and any two nodes contain enough information to recover all four data packets. In
this example the rst node leaves the system and a new node is formed by communicating linear
combinations f2; f3; f4 which can be used to solve for x1; x2 at the new node.
to one. This sub-packetization is performed to facilitate repair through network coding as proposed
in [2]. The problem of repair consists of constructing a new encoded node by accessing as little
information from existing encoded nodes. In the example of Figure 4.1, we assume that the rst
storage node failed and the redundancy of the system needs to be refreshed. This is achieved by
communicating \small" linear combinations f2; f3; f4 of the encoded packets from nodes 2; 3; and
4 each of size 1=2 of what each node is storing, which as proven in [2], is information theoretically
minimal. As storage nodes leave the system and new ones are added, this forms a dynamic storage
network that keeps a xed redundancy and reliability by building new encoded packets from already
existing ones. The problem of security should now be clear: even if a single node in this storage
system is compromised and participates in this repair process, then it can send incorrect linear
combinations that will create erroneous packets at the new nodes. All new nodes using these linear
equations will have incorrect data and soon the whole system will be contaminated with nodes
having erroneous data.
Our contribution: Since the problem of repairing a code is equivalent to wireline network cod-
ing [2], existing techniques for network error correction can be used to detect and correct the er-
rors [64, 65]. These techniques are designed to work for general networks and always guarantee a
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transmission rate of C   2z, where C is the min-cut capacity from the source to the destination
and z is the number of links contaminated by the adversary. Our approach, that is, creating and
communicating small linear hashes which preserve the structure of the code, allows the detection
of errors and achieves a transmission rate that can be asymptotically equal to C (by having the
receiver connecting to all the non-erroneous nodes) since it takes advantage of the specic structure
of the network and the set of links an adversary can contaminate.
To explain our scheme, consider the (4; 2) MDS code of Figure 4.1 and assume one of the four
nodes contains errors (say in both rows). A trusted verier that communicates with all four nodes
can nd this error by getting the 8 equations contained in each of the
0@ 4
2
1A = 6 node pairs. Since
this is a (4; 2) MDS code, the combinations of equations that come from error-free nodes will be full
rank and give a consistent solution whereas the other sets will give dierent solutions (or might not
even be full rank). This is, of course, just using the error-correction capability of the code to detect
an error. Our contribution involves using this idea to the N -extended version of a code, by creating
a linear projection (hash) of each row on the same random vector. The key observation is that if the
same random projection is used, this creates an error-correcting code for the hashes which can be
communicated to the verier. The benet is that each hash has size only 1=N of the data in each
row reducing the amount of communication to the verier. One complication is that each node needs
to project its data on the same random vector of length N , which requires N log q bits of common
randomness. Subsequently the problem at the verier is to decode an error-correcting code under
adversarial errors. This decoding task can be computationally inecient but we do not address this
issue here, assuming that the verier can detect the errors if they are within the error-correcting
capabilities of the code as dictated by the minimum distance (half the minimum distance). Our
analysis investigates under which conditions the small projected hash code will detect any error in
the large amount of data stored at the nodes. In particular, we prove the following
Theorem 13. In a distributed storage system storing a total of M bits, using an N{extended
(n; k) MDS code over Fq, with the n storage nodes sharing O(M) bits of common randomness, our
random hashing scheme can detect up to t  t1  b(n   k)=2c errors by communicating a total of
n(n  k)(logM+ log t1) bits to a verier, with probability of failure
Pr[F ]  1M :
One important weakness of the previous result is the large common randomness required which
is comparable to the total size of the data object stored (1=k(n  k) fraction of the M bits). Note
that these bits do not have to be a secret, they only need to be realized after the error has been
introduced to the new disk. Their large number, however, makes it impractical to generate them at
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one node and then communicate them to the others. Our second contribution involves showing how
to use only O(logM) bits of common randomness to achieve almost the same performance:
Theorem 14. In a distributed storage system storing a total of M bits, using an N{extended (n; k)
MDS code over Fq, with the n storage nodes sharing O(logM) bits of common randomness, our
pseudorandom hashing scheme can detect up to t1 = b(n  k)=2c errors by communicating a total of
O(n(n  k) logM) bits to the verier, with probability of failure
Pr[F 0]  1M :
If there is no common randomness, the verier can generate the O(logM) random bits and
communicate these to all the nodes requiring a total of O(n logM) extra communicated bits.
Notice that in this case the total number of bits communicated scales only logarithmically in
M, to achieve a probability of failure that scales like 1=M. Our construction relies on the pseu-
dorandom small-bias generator used in [33] which can expand logN random symbols of Fq (which
require logN log q random bits to generate), into N pseudorandom symbols that can \fool" any
linear function1. The only modication to our algorithm is projecting each stored row on this pseu-
dorandom vector to generate each hash and this induces only a small addition to the probability of
error. Notice that our work does not rely on any cryptographic assumptions and guarantees that
errors inserted in the distributed storage system will be detected with high probability if they are
within the capabilities of the code used.
Using the error-correction capability of the code for distributed storage has been suggested before
as a way to detect errors [67, 68] and identify \free riders" within the network. A dierent approach
to nd errors injected in distributed storage and content distribution systems is the use of signatures
and hash functions. Reference [69] introduced the use of homomorphic hashing functions that enables
a nodes to perform on-the-y verication of erasure-encoded blocks. Gkantsidis et al. [15] used
the computationally less expensive secure random checksums to detect polluted packets in content
distribution system that use network coding while [70, 71] used a method of subspace signatures
based on dierent cryptographic primitives. See also [72, 73, 74] for other related work on security
and distributed storage.
4.2 Model
As stated, we consider a data object of size M bits that is divided into k pieces (of size M=k bits
each) and these are coded into n (> k) encoded pieces through a linear (n; k) maximum distance
1First introduced by Naor and Naor in [66] for linear functions in F2.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the 3{extended version of the (4; 2) MDS code shown in Figure 4.1. Each
of the three columns stored on the source nodes is coded by repeatedly using the (4; 2) MDS of Fig-
ure 4.1. During verication, each row is projected on the vector rT = (1 1 1) and the corresponding
products S1; : : : ; S4 form a codeword of the initial (4; 2) MDS code. For example, the errors at the
rst row of the rst node will not be absorbed by the projection as long as (e11 e12 e13)(1 1 1)T 6= 0
separable (MDS) code. These encoded pieces are stored on n distinct storage nodes along with a
header denoting the exact linear combination saved at all the storage nodes. Since the size of the
code (n; k) will be much smaller than N , the overhead of storing the code description everywhere
(including the verier) is minimal. This simplies the model and we can now assume that the errors
occur only at the data, since an error at the header would be immediately detected.
We assume that the original information (of size M bits) is organized into a matrix X with
k(n   k) rows and N columns. The elements of this matrix are elements of the nite eld Fq, i.e.,
X 2 Fqk(n k)N where q is a prime or an integer power of a prime. Each column Xci 2 Fqk(n k)1
(i 2 f1; : : : ; Ng) of matrix X will be separately encoded with the use of an (n; k) MDS code
with generator matrix G 2 Fqn(n k)k(n k) and all the columns GXci 2 Fqn(n k)1 derived by this
encoding will be stored on the n dierent storage nodes of the distributed storage system. We will
call this code applied to the N dierent columns of matrix X as the N{extended MDS code. The
overall eect that the N{extended MDS code has upon the information matrix X is captured by
the matrix multiplication GX. Figure 4.2 shows such a code for N = 3 where the MDS code used
is the same as the one shown in Figure 4.1.
The storage nodes of the distributed storage system are assumed to have limited computational
capabilities allowing them only to perform inexpensive operations over the nite eld Fq. Some of
these storage nodes are assumed to store erroneous information, where these errors might be either
random due to hardware failures or inserted adversarially by a malicious user. The malicious user
can be computationally unbounded, have knowledge of all the information stored on the distributed
storage system and can insert errors to any t of the storage nodes.
We assume the existence of a special node called the verier that is assigned to check the integrity
of the data stored on dierent storage nodes. The verier does not have access to the initial data
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object (other than the description of the code) and therefore has to rely on the communicated
information to check which nodes contain errors.
4.3 Random Hashes
4.3.1 Illustrating Example
Assume that in the distributed storage system shown in Figure 4.2 with four storage nodes it is
known that one of them (the rst in this example) stores erroneous information. The goal of the
verier that overlooks the state of the whole system is rst to nd the erroneous disk with the
minimum data exchange and second to repair it by using the information stored on the other disks.
Since all three columns stored on the distributed storage system are codewords of a (4; 2) MDS code
with at most one error (some columns might be error free) and minimum distance d = 3, the nave
approach to nd the erroneous disk is to download all data from dierent disks and then by using
minimum distance decoding on each separate column one would be able to nd the erroneous disk.
The nave approach would certainly nd the faulty disk but it would require the transfer of
double the size of the le stored (nkM bits of information in general). So as the size of the le
increases this approach will become prohibitively expensive in bandwidth. Instead of transmitting
all the information stored on the distributed storage system, the central node could choose a vector
with each component chosen independently and uniformly at random from Fq and have each storage
node transmit the inner product (called the hash product) between the randomly chosen vector
and each of the rows stored at the disks. In the absence of errors, these hash products will form a
codeword of the MDS code used to encode the dierent columns of the information matrix. In case
there are errors, as in the case of the rst node in Figure 4.2, the multiplication with the random
vector will not obscure these errors unless Sei = 0, ei1 + ei2 + ei3 = 0, for i = f1; 2g. The reason
why the chosen vector should be random is so that the adversary cannot deliberately choose the
error values in order to make them "disappear" after the vector multiplication.
4.3.2 General Case
The initial information matrix X 2 Fqn(n k)N is coded with the use of an N -extended MDS code
with generator matrix G 2 Fqn(n k)k(n k). Some of the storage nodes contain errors and therefore
what is actually stored on the distributed storage system is Y = GX + E where Y;E 2 Fqn(n k)N
and E is the error matrix. The verier wants to identify all erroneous disks by sending hash product
requests to all nodes. Then the following theorem holds:
Proof of Theorem 13. All storage nodes share N log q bits of common randomness and therefore they
can create the same random vector r 2 FqN1 with each component of vector r drawn uniformly
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at random from Fq. After the random vector r is computed, each storage node calculates the hash
product{inner product{between the random vector r and its content on every row. These n(n  k)
hash products are equal to:
H = Y r = (GX + E)r , H = G(Xr) + e (4.1)
where e = Er 2 Fqn(n k)1 is a column vector with at most tm non-zero components representing the
erroneous disks (these non-zero components must correspond to the position of at most tm storage
nodes with errors). The key observation is that the projection will not identify an error pattern at
a specic row if vector r is orthogonal to that row of E. Intuitively, a randomly selected r will be
non-orthogonal to an arbitrary row of E with high probability and this is the probability we need
to analyze.
From equation (4.1) it can be seen that the order of applying the MDS encoding on the dierent
columns of the information matrix X and the calculation of the hash products can be interchanged
((GX)r = G(Xr)) making the process of identifying the erroneous disks equivalent to nding the
error positions in a regular MDS code that is guaranteed to succeed if the minimum distance of
the code (n   k + 1) is larger than twice the number of errors 2t (that is indeed satised by the
assumptions of Theorem 13).
The set of indices that correspond to the components of vector e that come from disk i is
Ri = f(i  1)(n k)+1; : : : ; i(n k)g. We are interested in vector e since this gives us the positions
of the faulty disks. One complication that might arise is the fact that disk i might contain an error,
meaning that rows fErj ; j 2 Rig of the error matrix E are not all zero whereas the corresponding
components of vector e (fej ; j 2 Rig) turn out to be zero and therefore our scheme fails to detect
that error. Assume that the set of erroneous disks is W  f1; 2; : : : ; ng and dene Pr[F ] to be the
probability of failing to detect some errors. We get
Pr[F ] = Pr
24 [
i2W
8<: \
j2Ri
 
Erj r = 0
9=;
35

X
i2W
Pr
24 \
j2Ri
(Erj r = 0)
35 X
i2W
1
q
 b
n k
2 c
q
 t1
q
(4.2)
where inequality () holds due to the fact that the probability that some storage node with errors
produce zero hash products is less than 1=qf where f is the number of linearly independent errors
rows saved at its disk. So by assuming that the adversary has produced linearly dependent errors
would only increase the probability of failure.
If the adversary has saved error vectors at storage node i with rank 1 then the probability
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Pr[ \
j2Ri
(Erj r = 0)] in equation (4.2) reduces to an equation for a single row (assuming row k):
Pr
24 X
ekf 6=0
ekf rf = 0
35 = Pr
24rf =   X
ekf0 6=0
ekf 0
ekf
rf 0
35 = 1
q
where we only took the terms with a non-zero error coecient ekf . The numbers (ekf 0=ekf ) rf 0 (ekf
is any non-zero error element from the kth row) are independent and uniform over Fq and so is their
sum according to Lemma 12. So the last equality holds since two independent uniformly distributed
over Fq random numbers are equal with probability 1=q.
When the errors have rank f > 1 then the probability Pr[ \
j2Ri
(Erj r = 0)] can be evaluated by
disregarding the linearly dependent rows. By looking only at the linearly independent ones and
by choosing f columns we can formulate an invertible submatrix E^i 2 Fqff and similarly to the
previous analysis we have that Pr[ \
j2Ri
(Erj r = 0)] = Pr[E^i r^ = b^] where r^; b^ 2 F f1 where r^ are
the components of the random vector that correspond to the columns where the submatrix E^i was
formed. Since b^ is uniformly random, due to the previous analysis Pr[E^ r^ = b] = 1=qf .
Each of the n storage nodes has to convey to the verier the result of the hash product from all
its (n  k) rows, so that the total size of the hash communicated is H = n(n  k) log q, whereas the
size of the le M = k(n  k)N log q. By substituting the eld q equal to bn k2 cM we conclude the
proof of Theorem 13.
Lemma 12. The sum of any number of independent uniformly distributed random variables gives
a uniformly distributed random variable.
Proof. Without loss of generality we will prove Lemma 12 only for the case of two random variables.
Assume that x; y 2 Fq are two independent and uniformly distributed random variables. We will
prove that x+ y is also uniformly distributed, indeed 8t1; t2 2 Fq:
Pr[x+ y = t1] =
X
t22Fq
Pr[x = t1   yjy = t2]Pr[y = t2]
()
=
X
t22Fq
Pr[x = t1   t2]  1
q
=
X
t22Fq
1
q
 1
q
= q  1
q2
=
1
q
where equality (*) holds due to the independence between x and y.
Before we continue to prove Theorem 14 we need to give the following denition (extension of
Denition 2.1 in [33] to non-prime numbers):
Denition 18. a) Let q be a prime or an integer power of a prime. For a random variable X with
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values in Fq, let the bias of X be dened by
bias(X) = (q   1)Pr[X = 0]  Pr[X 6= 0]
A random variable X 2 Fq is -biased if jbias(X)  j.
b) The sample space S  Fq` is -biased if for all c 2 Fq and each sequence  = (1; :::; `) 2 Fqnnf0`g
the following is valid: if a sequence X = (x1; : : : ; x`) 2 S is chosen uniformly at random from S,
then the random variable (
P`
i=1 ixi + c) is -biased.
Proof of Theorem 14. All storage nodes execute the algorithm described in Proposition 4.12 of [33]
and produces a pseudorandom vector r0 2 FqN1 with N components. The quantity m in the
algorithm (and consequently the eld size Fqm too) is chosen so that the bias (q   1)(N   1)=qm is
equal to 1 and therefore qm = (q   1)(N   1) or m = O(logN). The size of the necessary seed that
needs to be provided at all the storage nodes so that they can start the algorithm is two elements
from Fqm chosen uniformly at random or equivalently 2m log q  O(logN) random bits.
Once all storage nodes have constructed the same pseudorandom vector r0 they compute the
inner product between vector r0 and the content stored on each row of the storage nodes. These
pseudorandom products are all sent to the verier to identify the erroneous disks. The whole
analysis is identical to the proof of Theorem 13 with one major dierence in the calculation of
failure probability Pr[F 0]. For the case of a pseudorandom vector r0, using the same notation as in
the proof of Theorem 13:
Pr[F 0] = Pr
24 [
i2W
8<: \
j2Ri
 
Erj r
0 = 0
9=;
35

X
i2W
Pr
24 [
j2Ri
 
Erj r
0 = 0
35  X
i2W
X
j2Ri
Pr
 
Erj r
0 = 0

(n  k)bn  k
2
c2
q
 2(n  k)t1
q
where inequality () holds since Pr  Erj r0 = 0 = 2=q. Indeed the bias of the space constructed by
the pseudorandom procedure is 1 that means:
(q   1)Pr  Erj r0 = 0  Pr  Erj r0 6= 0  1
, (q   1)Pr  Erj r0 = 0  1  Pr  Erj r0 = 0  1
, qPr  Erj r0 = 0  1  1) Pr  Erj r0 = 0  2q
By setting q = 2(n  k)t1M we conclude the proof.
2This algorithm is described for q prime but it is readily extensible to q equal to an integer power of a prime.
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We would like to underline here that both theorems above exhibit the same behavior on the
probability. In Theorem 14 the size of the required common randomness is decreased in the expense
of an increased eld size. Moreover the use of pseudorandom generators incurs the additional
computational cost at each storage node of O(Nm2) or O(M logM) operations in Fq to generate
the pseudorandom vector r0.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Future Work
5.1 Summary
In this thesis we examined network transmission delay and security of network coding. With respect
to latency we studied acyclic networks comprised of erasure links, where the source has a xed number
of packets it wishes to deliver to the destination. We discussed how network coding compares with
traditional routing and showed that even in the unicast case where coding and routing with hop-
by-hop retransmissions can achieve the same transmission rate, network coding provides superior
performance with respect to transmission delay. The building network for our analysis was a line
network. Viewing it as a tandem of queues and using tools developed in queuing theory, we found
a tight upper bound on the transmission delay. On the other hand, in networks containing multiple
paths, we showed that unlike the line network, network coding and routing have dierent performance
with respect to delay. Specically we showed that the dierence in transmission time between
network coding and routing can grow as the square root of the number of packets. Finally, with an
analysis based on Azuma-Hoeding inequality, we proved that time it takes for network coding to
complete a transmission of a xed number of packets is well concentrated around its expected value.
With respect to security of network coding we study the secrecy rate region of a general network
with multiple multicast demands in the presence of an eavesdropper that has access to an unknown
number set of links and receives a degraded version of what the intended receiver gets. All the
channels in the network are assumed to be simultaneously maximizable, meaning that for each
channel the same distribution maximizes the mutual information towards the intended receiver and
the eavesdropper. We show how to change any of the channels in the network to a corresponding
noiseless degraded broadcast channel so that the derived network after the change has a secrecy
capacity region that bounds the secrecy capacity region of the initial network. We provide both
upper and lower bounds that are independent of the specic network topology and demands. In the
case where the eavesdropper cannot wiretap multiple links simultaneously then the bounds are tight
leading to an equivalence result. By applying the equivalence transformation from a noisy channel to
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a noiseless one for each channel in the network, one can map a noisy network to a noiseless with the
same secrecy capacity region; where the noiseless network problem is in general more tractable. In
the case where the eavesdropper can wiretap multiple channels at the same time then the equivalence
does not hold since the bounds presented in this thesis in this case are loose.
Finally, this thesis closes with the design of a practical code for the detection of maliciously
attacked nodes in a distributed storage system. We use pseudorandom generator functions that can
fool linear polynomials to create and communicate hash functions of the data in order to detect with
high probability all the maliciously attacked nodes in the distributed storage system.
5.2 Future Work
Further work includes extension of the delay analysis and comparison between network coding and
routing to general networks with multiple sources and receivers. An interesting avenue is to nd
tight bounds on the expected transmission time when coding or routing is used in general networks.
It is also interesting to analyze the performance of network coding versus routing under dierent
constraints on parameters such as nite eld size or buer size.
On the security side, one area of further work is nding a noiseless model that is equivalent to a
noisy wiretap channel in the case where the eavesdropper can wiretap multiple channels simultane-
ously. Our models, fail to be tight and up until now, it is even an open question whether a noiseless
tight model exists.
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